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ABSTRACT 
A review of literature reveals, that three key issues underlie the debate on whether soldiers may have 
labour rights. The first suggests that it is socially unjust, or undemocratic, to deny soldiers the right to 
belong to a labour union to advance their interests as employees. The second, is that the constitutional 
rights of soldiers to belong to trade unions must yield to the unique nature of military service, given the 
need for discipline, obedience and cohesion. For the sake of national security, these rights must be 
curtailed. The third area of concern, is the effect of military unionisation upon the political control of the 
armed forces. 
This study sets out to analyse whether labour rights, such as the right to belong to a trade union for the 
purpose of collective bargaining, as well as the right to strike, can be extended to soldiers without 
undermining national security. The suggestion is made that the unique nature of the military profession, 
the ethical requirements of the profession, as well as the potential consequences of the abuse of the 
monopoly over the means of mass destruction, complicates the acceptance of a more pluralist approach to 
labour relations. The drift towards occupationalism, as well as the impact of certain societal trends on the 
military organisation, nevertheless compels the armed forces to adapt their unitarist approach to labour 
relations, and accept a more pluralist dispensation. The unique nature of military service complicates the 
acceptance of pluralist labour relations practices, and even where labour rights have been extended to 
soldiers, the activities of the unions or associations representing soldiers are curtailed. Against this 
background an assessment is made whether labour rights can be extended to soldiers in South Africa. 
The research methodology is as follows. The theoretical frame of reference for this study emerges from 
the literature on the military profession and the manpower challenges of armed forces in recent times. The 
literature describing the features of the unitarist and pluralist perspectives to labour relations, explained the 
various managerial approaches to labour relations within the armed forces. The South African case study 
relied on primary and survey data. Two closed-ended survey questionnaires were conducted to establish 
the views of officers towards their employment in the military. A synthesis of the facts obtained, led to 
certain suggestions on how the present unitarist labour relations dispensation can be improved to 
accommodate the needs and aspirations of the soldiers serving in the South African National Defence 
Force. 
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The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows. 
The unique nature of the military profession has led to labour relations being managed from a typically 
unitarist perspective. This approach to labour relations is accepted by soldiers given the shared value 
system that exists. Where the value system of the soldier changes, from traditional 
professional/institutional values to a more occupational orientation, the pressure to accept a more pluralist 
approach to labour relations is enhanced. 
No labour relationship functions in a vacuum. Ultimately it is societal forces that determine whether or not 
armed forces will be pressurised to extend labour rights to soldiers. 
Where labour rights have been extended to the armed forces, certain limitations have been placed on the 
activities of the associations representing military personnel. The limitations conisist of ones that are 
considered detrimental to organisational or combat effectiveness, as well as civilian control over the armed 
forces. 
In South Africa, the weakening of professional values, the ascendancy in occupationalism as well as 
certain societal forces, indicate that the SANDF will have to cope with the prospect of unionisation. 
The conclusion is reached that the SANDF will need to create the necessary mechanisms through which 
the needs and aspirations of soldiers can be addressed. It is considered far better to institutionalise 
labour relations, than to be forced to concede to the demands by disgruntled soldiers at gun point. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1993, just prior to the shift to an all-volunteer force, the former South African Defence Force (SADF) 
felt the first rumblings of possible unionisation within its ranks. Civilians, employed in the Department of 
Defence, had already begun to join trade unions, and sporadic incidences of labour unrest had occurred. 
The prospect of such trade union activity spilling over the uniformed military personnel, evoked concern, 
especially as members Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress, soon to be 
integrated in the new Defence Force, were seen to publicly support and participate in demonstrations with 
the Police and Civil Rights Union (Popcru). 
The response to the prospect of unionisation among military personnel by the SADF was swift. Just six 
months before the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in April 1994, the 
Defence Act was amended to prohibit any form of trade union activity, or public protest by members of the 
armed forces. This controversial amendment would become a topic of much debate, as both the Interim 
Constitution and later the new Constitution of South Africa, entrenched both the freedom of association 
and labour rights. The question arose, whose rights are paramount? The soldier's1 ·right to have the 
freedom of association to belong to a trade union, or the right of the military to restrict trade union activity 
for the sake of national security? 
This legal vacuum opened up the opportunity for unionisation and within a matter of months, the South 
African National Defence Union (SANDU) was formed to represent uniformed personnel on the premise, 
that it is the constitutional right of members to belong to trade unions, despite the restrictions in the 
Defence Act. For the first time, the SANDF began to think seriously about the prospects and dilemmas of 
unions within its ranks. Labour relations was identified as a "strategic issue", and soon internal regulations 
and procedures were upgraded in an attempt to address the grievances of military personnel and to pre-
empt trade unionism. Internal SANDF Communication Bulletins were circulated to explain these 
1. ·Soldiers' is used as a universal term to include uniformed military personnel of all arms of service, irrespective of rank and gender. 
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2 
procedures to military personnel and to draw attention to the fact, that in terms of the Defence Act, it is 
illegal for soldiers to belong to trade unions. 
While the SANDF attempted to curtail trade unionism within its ranks, the external labour relations climate 
appeared to stimulate the desire for unions. First the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1993, extended 
labour rights to civilians employed in the Department of Defence, and a year later, the Correctional 
Services and later the Police, permitted their members to join trade unions. The new Labour Relations Act 
of 1995, which came into effect in 1996, extended labour rights to all employees, with the exception of 
uniformed members of the SANDF and the Intelligence Services. To add to the labour relations problems 
of the SANDF, uniformed personnel had begun to experience a rapid decline in their service conditions 
and tenure, as a result of budgetary constraints and rationalisation, increasing the desire for some means 
to prevent a future erosion of their service conditions. An anti-military environment was also perceived to 
exist, as public debate centred on the future size of the defence force and n whether South Africa needs 
a technologically advanced defence force, in the absence of any immediate external threat. 
These are just some of the circumstances, which by 1996, had begun to place pressure on the SANDF to 
review its present unitarist labour relations practices, and implement more appropriate labour relations 
mechanisms for its uniformed personnel. 
1.2 PROBLEM POSTULATION 
Against this background, the research problem that is addressed in this study is whether labour rights, 
such as the right to belong to a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining, and to strike, can be 
extended to the armed forces. 
To answer this question, it is necessary to establish why labour rights have traditionally been curtailed for 
members of the armed forces. What are the unique professional requirements that have led to the 
restriction on labour rights? How do the armed forces manage labour relations? Should it be shown that 
military service is no longer viewed as a unique profession, but as an occupation, the question is raised 
whether this affects the management of labour relations in armed forces? Does the decline in 
professionalism and the increase in occupationalism enhance the demand for labour rights? Does this 
demand come merely from a change in attitudes of soldiers (at the micro level), or is it a result of the 
change in nature of military service and military organisation (mesa level factors)? Furthermore, are there 
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3 
certain societal pressures that either restrain or advance the pressure to extend labour rights to the armed 
forces, such as the equality of rights? Is it unjust or undemocratic to deny soldiers the right to belong to a 
labour union formed to advance their interests as employees, especially if other employees have these 
rights and the dominant industrial and political culture is supportive of unionisation? 
The next issue that arises is whether the demand for labour rights can be accommodated within the armed 
forces? Can a form of group representation, be it a lobby group, a professional association or a trade 
union be compatible with military service given the need for discipline, obedience and unswerving loyalty to 
the chain of command for military effectiveness? An additional concern is the effect military unionisation 
might have upon the political control of the armed forces. Will unionised soldiers not use their strength to 
influence policy decisions affecting the armed forces, thereby disturbing the fragile balance of civilian 
control over the armed forces? Finally, if it is proved that labour rights need to be curtailed for members of 
the armed forces, what are the alternatives? These are the issues that need to be addressed to answer 
the proposed research problem. 
1.3 THE AIM OF THIS STUDY 
The aim of this study is to establish whether the extension of labour rights to soldiers can be compatible 
with military service, given the need for unswerving loyalty to the chain of command for the sake of military 
effectiveness. By examining the unique nature of the military profession, the impact of occupationalism, 
the societal forces that influence labour relations and international precedent regarding group 
representation in armed forces, it is determined whether labour rights can be extended to uniformed 
members of the SANDF. 
1.4 LIMITATIONS 
This study does have a number of limitations. Although the concept "soldier" is used generally to apply to 
all military personnel, only officers' options were surveyed and not non-commissioned officers, who may be 
considered the rank and file in the SANDF. While it is acknowledged that the non-commissioned officers 
may have different opinions on aspects relating to their employment in the SANDF, it is the officer corps 
who are the leaders and who are supposedly more committed to professional values. Thus, should 
officers desire unions, this has a significant impact on traditional institutional values and organisational 
culture and practices. The opinions of officers are considered decisive in this regard. International trends 
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4 
seem to indicate that it is the officers, who are the first to indicate the need for unionisation, although the 
non-commissioned officers are often the most active. Similarly, in South Africa, it was officers who formed 
the South African National Defence Union (SANDU), but non-commissioned officers who represent the 
majority in membership2. 
Although a survey conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) measured the differences in 
attitudes towards unions in the SANDF among the broader population by race, the survey conducted within 
the SANDF did not use race as an indicator of support for unions. The present sensitivity to race made the 
inclusion of such a question problematic and even where it was included, many respondents refused to 
respond to this question. However, what is significant, is that the majority of officers who responded to the 
survey questionnaire where white, and contrary to popular opinion that only blacks support unions, there 
was substantial support for a union or some form of association for uniformed personnel by these white 
officers. 
Another possible limitation, is the use of European examples to illustrate the various forms of group 
representation that have been created to represent the interests of military personnel, with little reference 
to African militaries. The problem experienced in the course of this research is that none of the African 
armies have any system of group representation that can serve as any comparative analogue. Many of 
the African counties have also been subject to military coups, which at present is an unlikely scenario in 
South Africa, even though the causes of these coups have often been rooted in economic causes. The 
European social-democratic countries are thus the only case studies that have accommodated labour 
rights for military personnel. The socio-political circumstances of these countries that eventually led to the 
acceptance of some form of group representation, are in many respects comparable to South Africa, and 
thus have some comparative value. Looking at the professionalism of the South African military, their 
structure and the societal pressures upon the organisation, the European situation is perhaps more 
relevant than any African comparison. 
1.5 THE VALUE OF THE STUDY 
This study attempts to provide a balanced and timely assessment of the constitutionality, feasibility and 
desirability of military unions in South Africa. Concerning the constitutionality of military unionisation, the 
2. In an interview with the executive officer of SANDU, Mr Corvan Niekerk, he indicated that approximately 60 percent of the membership 
of SANDU is non-commissioned officers and 40 percent officers. As the union is still struggling to obtain recognition, given the 
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5 
SANDF faces the challenge of whether it is reasonable and justifiable to restrict the labour rights of military 
personnel in a democratic society. The next issue is whether it is feasible to extend these rights to 
members of the armed forces in South Africa if it could potentially divide the SANDF along racial lines and 
undermine discipline in the force which is still grappling with the problems of having to integrate seven 
different armed formations. This desirability is associated not only with the possible impact on military 
discipline and cohesion, but with the impact unionisation may have on civil supremacy over the military. 
Although many soldiers appear to have the need for greater representation on pay and service conditions 
and support the need for a professional association, and even a trade union with collective bargaining 
rights, the question is whether it is desirable in a fledgling democracy as South Africa. Nonetheless if 
military leadership appears unable to address the grievances of soldiers and if societal trends tend to 
promote the inclination to unionisation, it is imperative that the SANDF creates the necessary structures to 
address the needs of their members. This study hopes to shed some answers to these questions and to 
provided possible alternatives to unionisation, should the extension of full labour rights to military personnel 
be limited. Two antithetical schools of thought are integrated, that of military sociology and industrial 
sociology, to provide a clearer understanding of the management of labour relations within the armed 
forces. 
The review of literature reveals, that no such study has been done in South Africa, as until recently it has 
not been an issue that has evoked any serious attention. Other than the NATO countries, little research 
has been conducted on this topic outside these countries. 
The scant attention paid to the possible effect of labour unions and collective bargaining with the armed 
forces in South Africa may be based on the belief that present prohibitory legislation will prevent the 
development of unionisation. There has also been a tendency to ignore the changing attitudes of soldiers 
towards their employment in the military. This study attempts to illustrate that the "legal shield" the 
Defence Act has provided to restrain unionisation, may be challenged in the Constitutional Court. 
Furthermore, that there is a definite shift in the attitude of military personnel towards military service, with a 
greater priority being placed on self-interest rather than the interests of the employing organisation. 
This study is of particular relevance at this stage in the history of the armed forces of South Africa. The 
SANDF is in a process of transformation and a Defence Review is currently being finalised. Policy is being 
formulated on almost every facet affecting the armed forces. One such issue under review by the Human 
limitations placed on trade unionism by the Defence Act, he was hesitant to release the actual membership strength of the union. 
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6 
Resources Sub-committee of the Defence Review, is the formulation of labour relations policy for the future 
armed forces. It is hoped that this study will be able to make a contribution towards this process and assist 
'-
with the formulation of appropriate labour relations regulations for uniformed personnel serving in the 
SANDF. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The theoretical frame of reference for this study emerged from the existing literature on the military 
profession, the most noteworthy being, the classic works of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) and 
the new path traced by the institutional/occupational hypothesis of Moskos (1977). The work of these 
scholars, as well as subsequent contributions by Cotton, (1981,1988), Downes (1985), Segal (1986) 
Moskos (1983, 1986, 1988) and the latest work by Nuciari (1994) and Caforio (1994) who have either 
referred to, expanded or criticised Moskos' 1/0 theory, helped to contextualise the uniqueness and 
changing nature of the military profession and military organisation. 
The most influential works in the field of labour relations, that explained the typical approach to labour 
relations within the armed forces, was based on the work by of Fox (1969,1979), Flanders (1979), 
Farnham and Pimtott (1983), and Salamon (1989), with specific reference to the unitarist and pluralist 
approach to labour relations. 
The work of these scholars, led to a closer analyses of the manpower issues facing the modem military, 
and in particular those issues associated with the shift to an all-volunteer force .. This prompted a review of 
literature in the field, much of which was written by scholars such as Hauser (1980), Moskos (1983) and 
Segal and Lengerman (1980). Numerous articles were published in periodicals such as Armed Forces and 
Society, on the challenges posed by the shift to an all-volunteer force, among them, debates on 
unionisation. 
Comparatively, the debate on unionisation spawned little literature. Only a few significant works were 
published, of which the most noteworthy included those either written or edited by, Taylor et al (1977), 
Krendel and Sarnoff (1977) and Sabrosky (1977). Numerous authors, however, such as, Harries-Jenkins 
(1977), Segal (1977, 1978, 1983) and Fleckenstein (1976, 1988) made significant contributions to this 
debate. The writings of these authors, together with the various reports that were compiled on the issue of 
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7 
military unions, particularly the CMRI report,3 provided some valuable insights into the compatibility of 
labour rights with military service. 
The South African situation relied more heavily on primary data, as little has been published on the topic of 
military unionism or other relevant manpower issues in South Africa. Besides the work of Cilliers and 
Reichardt (1996), Cock and Nathan (1989), Nathan (1994) and the latest work by Seegers (1996), little 
substantive material is available which can reflect on the solider as an employee in South Africa. Most of 
the material explaining the South African position depended on Defence White Papers, Internal 
Communication Bulletins of the SANDF, internal policy documents, newspaper clippings and correspon-
dence obtained from SANDU. 
To supplement information, and to reflect on the attitude of military personnel towards their service in the 
SANDF, two surveys were conducted among military personnel. The first, comprised of a forty two item 
questionnaire compiled to determine the commitment to professional values among the officers studying at 
the SA Military Academy (refer Appendix C). The exact same questionnaire survey, conducted in 1989 as 
part of a leadership development programme, was repeated.4 Unfortunately, the original survey data has 
not been preserved, although the graphic representation of the data was retained, providing some 
indication of the shift in 1/0 trends from 1989 to 1995. 
The questionnaire was distributed to the officer student population at the Military Academy consisting of 
239 officers in November 1995, of which 183 responses were received. Responses were anonymous and 
students were assured that their responses would be treated confidentially. Of these students 61.4 
percent were in the Army, 22.8 percent in the Air Force, 7.6 percent in the Navy and 7.1 percent in the 
Medical Services. This profile is in line with the Arm of Service composition. By rank group, 20 percent 
were 2 Lt/Ens, 51 percent Lt/ S Lt, 25 percent Capt/Lt {SAN) and 3 percent Maj/ Lt Cdr. The value of the 
Military Academy sample is that it represents an elite group of junior officers, "the best and the brightesf' 
who will set the future standardss of professional behaviour and eventually go on to fill the top posts in the 
SANDF. 
3. A special word of appreciation is expressed to Prof Gwyn Harries-Jenkins who on request, forwarded a copy of the CMRI report on 
'Group Representation European Armed Forces' and provided the author with some value information and advice on military unionism 
within armed forces. 
4. In order to draw a longitudinal comparison, the same questionnaire complied by Col J.S. Kotze, Department Head, Military History at 
the Military Academy, measuring 110 trends among the student officer corps at the Military Academy was repeated. The questions 
used in this questionnaire were obtained from the book 'The Military More than just a Job', Moskos, C. and Wood, R (eds.). The 
questionnaire used for this survey, induding the results obtained are provided in Appendix C. 
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The questionnaire contained five biographic questions in order to assess if there are any differences 
between the 1/0 orientations of students in ( 1) the different study directions, (2) the various arms of service, 
(3) the various rank groups (4) year of study and (5) by marital statu~. Not all this data has been used for 
the purposes of this study. 
The non-biographic questionnaire items included attitudinal and perceptual questions that serve as 
indicators of 110 trends. Many of the questions were of a general nature reflecting attitudes towards 
military traditions and norms, to more specific questions on attitudes towards the kind of job they would like 
to have in the military, reasons for joining the permanent force, personal attitudes towards aspects of 
military service, the need for a representative association to represent their interests and the view of 
themselves as military professionals. 
In November 1996, a second survey designed to measure attitudes towards specific aspects of military 
service was conducted among officers attending the different arms of service Junior Staff and Warfare 
Courses, Senior Command and Staff Courses, and Joint Staff Course. Every officer in the SANDF is 
obliged to complete these courses at some stage in their career if they wish to be promoted to higher ranks 
or the command echelon. 
The biographic data of the sample is as follows. Of the 188 respondents, 50 percent were officers 
attending the Junior Staff and Warfare Course (average rank Capt-Maj), 35 percent the Senior Command 
and Staff Course (Lt Col-Col) and 15 percent the Joint Staff Course (Col-Brig). The sample corresponds 
roughly with the broader population with the exception that the rank group "colonel" is over-represented, 
while women are slightly under-represented. The value of this sample is that it provides a random cross-
section of officer opinion at various strategic points in the officer's career, among all arms of service and 
rank groups at a specific period in time. 
As with the previous questionnaire, certain biographic data were included, and where appropriate cross 
tabulations were drawn with the questions which could reflect on the current attitudes of officers towards, 
for example, the need for representation on pay and working conditions, the need for an association to · 
represent their interests; a union with collective bargaining rights; opinion on women in combat positions; 
the legitimacy of the SANDF; society's views of military service; and the operational competency of the 
SANDF (see appendix D for a copy of the questionnaire) 
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Both these surveys provided some valuable insights into the perceptions and attitudes of officers towards 
their employment in the SANDF. A number of interviews were conducted with the executive officer of 
SANDU, Mr Corvan Niekerk, who throughout the period of the study forwarded any relevant information. 
1. 7 CHAPTER PROFILE 
The first introductory chapter traces the development of the military-union debate; defines the problem to 
be researched; outlines the aim of the study; the value of the study; the research methodology and the 
profile of the study. 
Chapter two defines the characteristics of a profession and the unique features of the military profession, 
such as, the high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge which makes military personnel 
specialists in the management of violence, the institutional autonomy of the military and the constraints 
imposed on this aspect of the military profession; the sense of corporatism required of the profession; the 
internal controls regulating the behaviour of members; and the professional social ethics of the profession. 
After verifying that the profession of arms is indeed a unique profession, and discussing some of the 
anomalies of the military profession, it is explained why the armed forces have managed labour relations 
from a unitarist perspective. This perspective is defined and its applicability to the management of labour 
relations within the military explained. 
Chapter Three indicates that the military profession is experiencing an ascendancy in occupationalism, 
which is associated with a change in value orientations of military professionals who seem to be turning 
away from reference patterns based on altruistic values, to individualistic patterns grounded in self-interest. 
This change can be defined as a shift from an institutional/professional orientation to an occupational 
orientation. The 1/0 theory as proposed by Moskos is explained, as well as those factors which tend to 
promote occupationalism, such as the civilianisation of the military profession, the shift to an all-volunteer 
force, the changing profile of recruits and the erosion of the unique compensation system of the military. 
The consequences of occupationalism is discussed, and it is suggested that where there is an ascendancy 
in occupationalism, it may require the acceptance of a more pluralist approach to labour relations. This 
approach to labour relations is defined, and the difficulties associated with the acceptance of pluralist 
labour relations practices are highlighted. 
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In Chapter Four it is argued that the pressure to accept a more pluralist labour relations is not purely the 
result of occupationalism, but of societal forces which influence the management of labour relations in the 
armed forces. The most decisive societal trend is where labour rights are constitutionally entrenched. 
Other societal pressures include the influence of the dominant political and trade union culture on the 
military, whether other public sector employees have labour rights. 
Chapter Five sets out to determine whether labour rights, such as the right to belong to a trade union for 
the purposes of collective bargaining, as well as the right to strike, can be compatible with military service. 
The six most diverse and frequently quoted European case studies namely France, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden are discussed. The legislative position and the various forms of 
group representation that have been created to accommodate the labour rights for military personnel are 
evaluated, and it is determined whether the extension of these rights to soldiers has had any negative 
effect on organisational effectiveness, or civilian control over the armed forces. 
Chapter Six provides a historical overview of the South African armed forces. The aim of the chapter is to 
sketch a background that will place the forthcoming chapters into perspective. The British influence on the 
future armed forces in South Africa is discussed. Hereafter, the major mission definition, the force 
structure and manpower procurement systems of the SADF and SANDF, the organisational structure of 
the SANDF (as it existed at the end of 1996), as well as the mission, structure and manpower problems of 
the four arms of service, are outlined. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the professionalism of the South African armed forces. An assessment is made 
whether the South African Armed forces conform to the principles of professionalism, as outlined in chapter 
two of this study. After establishing that the SANDF complies with the principles of professionalism, it is 
explained why labour relations has been managed from a typically unitarist perspective. This is achieved 
by examining the mechanisms that have been implemented to deal with grievances, complaints and 
dissatisfactions of members, as well as the response of the SANDF to the possible emergence of trade 
unionism. 
Chapter Eight sets out to illustrate that, despite the commitment to professionalism, that there is an 
ascendancy in occupationalism within the SANDF according to the variables listed by Moskos as 1/0 
indicators. Furthermore, that this ascendancy in occupationalism is facilitated by the civilianisation of the 
military profession; the recent shift to an all-volunteer force; the changing profile of recruits; and the erosion 
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of unique institutional compensation system of military personnel. The consequence of occupationalism, is 
that there is a growing priority with self-interest, which stimulates the need for some form of representation, 
association or trade union. This is placing increasing pressure on the SANDF to accept a more pluralist 
labour relations dispensation for its members. 
Chapter Nine emphases that it is not merely the ascendancy of occupationalism, but societal forces that 
may eventually pressurise the SANDF to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation for 
uniformed personnel. The fact that labour rights are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, and have not been specifically curtailed for the military; the influence of the dominant trade union 
culture and the receptiveness towards unions; the impact of labour rights of the public service and police 
on the SANDF, and the perceived decline in the status and relevance of the military in society, were all 
identified as forces that promote unionisation. 
Chapter Ten attempts to determine whether labour rights can be compatible with military service in South 
Africa. Suggestions are made whereby the present grievance rocedures for both individual and collective 
grievances, could be improved. The value of a Military Ombudsperson and the possible role and functions 
of such an institution is discussed. Should members of the SANDF desire some form of group represen-
tation, the possible structure and function, scope of activities and process of representation and joint 
consultation is delineated. 
Chapter Eleven provides a brief summary of the findings, as well as a conclusive comment on each of the 
chapters, ending with a final remark on the need to institutionalise labour relations mechanisms that are 
compatible with military service. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MILITARY SERVICE AS A PROFESSION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The uniqueness of the profession of arms, lies in the function the military is called upon to fulfil within 
society, the protection of the nation through what Harold Lasswell terms the "legitimate management of 
violence" (Huntington, 1957:11 ). Fighting wars or maintaining readiness to fight wars, is the purpose of 
employment in the military. The product of military labour, is the defence of the nation. 
To be trained for mass destruction or to kill does not appear to be an activity that one would classify as a 
profession. As Sarkesian (1981:5) aptly states, "[k]illing even when ordered by the state, is hardly a goal 
or mission that engenders high ideals of professionalism or is necessarily associated with the public goocr. 
Yet, the status of the military as a profession is largely accepted, as it embodies the principle characteris-
tics of an ideal-type profession, namely a body of theoretical and practical knowledge; a high degree of 
autonomy; a sense of corporateness; a system of.internal controls regulating the behaviour of its members; 
and a professional social ethic which ensures that members of the profession use their skill to be benefit of 
broader society. 
The intention of this chapter is not to dwell on the various interpretations of military professionalism, but 
rather, to identify the uniqueness of the profession of arms. After discussing the features of the military 
profession, as well as some of the anomalies of the profession, it will be explained why the armed forces 
have sought to adopt a unitarist approach to the management of labour relations. It is concluded that this 
managerial approach to labour relations is accepted by military personnel only as long as there is a 
common value system. 
2.2 THE DIMENSIONS OF A PROFESSION 
The definition provided by McKinlay (1971:250-251) which encompasses the features most frequently 
quoted by scholars of the military profession, will serve as the theoretical foundation to define the features 
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of the "ideal type" profession, as well as the military profession (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; 
Sarkesian, 1981; Downes, 1985). 
According to McKinlay, the first essential element of a profession is that it must encompass a "high degree 
of generalised and systematic knowledge" based on a complex of intellectual advancements. The profes-
sional man is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of endeavour, who has 
acquired this expertise through prolonged education and training. 
The second criteria of a profession is the "institutional autonomy" conferred upon the profession by society 
to manage their own affairs within their sphere of activity or competence. Autonomy is associated with two 
I 
fundamental principles, firstly the control over the practices of recruitment and selection, and secondly, the 
establishment and maintenance of standards of the profession. 
"Corporatism" is the third essential element of a profession, and reflects a collective sense of unity and 
consciousness that differentiates them from laymen or other professions. Corporatism is measured in 
' terms of loyalty of the members to the profession, to the evolution of egalitarian means of interaction, and 
the absence of any conflicts and cleavages within the profession. 
The fourth dimension of professionalism refers to the development of "internal controls and internal affec-
tive neutrality". This entails the internalisation and development of self-controls regulating the behaviour of 
members, and certain internal impartial criteria that regulate the appointment, promotion and standards of 
the profession. 
The fifth dimension of professionalism concerns the development of a "professional social ethic and exter-
nal affective neutrality". This requires that the knowledge and skills associated with the profession be 
applied to societal, rather than personal, group or organisational interests. Because the profession has 
virtual monopoly of power over the profession, it has a responsibility to use this power in the best interest 
of the community. This is one of the most distinguishing features of a profession (McKinlay, 1971 :250-
251). 
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2.3 THE DIMENSIONS OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION 
Measured against McKinlay's five dimensions of professionalism, an attempt will now be made to define 
the ideal-type military profession, as applicable to the officer corps. Mention should be made that while the 
focus is on the professional soldier, there are also those who can be classified as praetorian or revolutio-
nary soldiers (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980). Brief mention will be made, where appropriate, to the charac-
teristics of these soldiers in relation to the professional soldier. 
2.3.1 A high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge 
Samuel Huntington (1957: 11) states that the military profession differs from other occupations as it mono-
polises the knowledge and skills related to "the management of violencen. The duties of the military officer 
include the organising, equipping and training; the planning of the activities; and the direction and opera-
tion of che military force in and out of combat. These peculiar skills are generalised, as the principles of 
military science apply to all professional armed forces. Huntington (1957:13) for example, states that 
• ... the same standards of professional military competence apply in Russia as in America. The posses-
sion of a common professional skill is a bond among military officers occurring across other differences". 
Although there may be differences in weaponry, training doctrine and tactics, there is universally applicable 
body of knowledge within the field of military science. 
The expertise of the military officer is acquired through their mastery of a lengthy period of theoretical and 
practical training. To become an expert in the management of violence, the officer is required to undergo 
lengthy training and education in the complexities of modem warfare. Huntington (1957: 11) claims that 
"(t]he intellectual content of the military profession requires the modem officer to devote about one-third of 
his professional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in 
any other profession." Although this may be a little exaggerated, the professional officer must graduate in 
a succession of specialist courses in order to be promoted to higher ranks and levels of command. 
2.3.2 Institutional autonomy 
As the military profession is seen to be performing a vital service to society and claims a monopoly of the 
skills associated with their profession, it possesses the power to determine how the service is provided. 
Hence, the military has the institutional autonomy to make decisions regarding membership, organisation, 
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recruitment, education and qualificational standards, and the equipment needs of the profession (Downes, 
1985:160). The deed of commission conferred upon officers by the state provides clear guidelines as to 
the nature and standard of occupational behaviour expected of the officer. 
However, the military profession may only exercise control over such matters as recruitment, training, 
deployment of forces and the procurement of armaments and equipment within the confines of state policy 
and legislation. This does not mean that the military is not granted the opportunity to influence and partici-
pate in the formulation of defence policy but that ultimately the decisive powers lie with the government. 
Given the dire consequences of possible abuse by the armed forces of their monopoly over the skills of 
organised violence, this subordination to higher political authority by the military is considered a sui generis 
of the military profession (Downes, 1985:160, 161). 
The professional soldier does not intervene in politics to advance the interests of the military establish-
ment. Should the military intervene in the sphere of politics sacrificing professionalism for political expe-
diency, it can no longer be classified as a professional force, but one guilty of paetorianism1 (Perlmutter & 
Bennet, 1980:203-207). The professional soldier accepts civil supremacy over the armed forces, unlike 
the praetorian soldier, who intervenes or may even dominate the political process. 
2.3.3 Corporateness 
A unique feature of the military profession is its heightened sense of corporateness.2 For the military 
profession, group solidarity, interdependence and teamwork are embraced as functional requirements for 
combat effectiveness (Downes, 1985:161). This corporateness in the military is bound by the loyalty of the 
soldier to the Constitution, to the goals of the organisation and towards those serving in the military. 
Loyalty is both professional and bureaucratic by virtue of the bureaucratic/professional nature of military 
organisation. In fact the military can be considered an ideal-type bureaucratic profession.3 
1. Praetorianism is a word frequently used to characterise a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent 
political power by means of actual or threatened use of military force. Within a praetorian state the military plays a dominant role in 
political structures and institutions (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:200). 
2. Corporateness refers to the cohesion of the professional community derived from the combat training experience, bond of work and the 
shared social responsibility of the occupational group. 
3. See Weber's definition of the features of an ideal type bureaucracy in relation to the features of an ideal-type military profession 
(Haralambos & Holbom, 1991:406). 
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One of the main features that distinguish the military profession from other professions and occupations, is 
the requirement for absolute loyalty towards the goals of the organisation. All armed forces function 
according to the principle of loyalty and obedience to the chain of command. As Hauser (1980:188) states, 
"[t]he first rule of the soldier, 'dinned' into him, from the first day of his service, is to obey. If this condi-
tioning process has been effective, the soldiers will continue to submit to the orders of legitimate authority, 
even though the orders may be contrary to his fundamental instincts of self-preservation." Orders must be 
executed to the best of one's abilities, completely, conscientiously and immediately. Only when there is 
loyalty to the chain of command and a high level of cohesion cultivated by a corporate identity, can the 
military be successful in accomplishing its mission in the face of danger, even if this may entail the loss of 
the members own life. 
2.3.4 Internal control and internal affective neutrality 
The behaviour of the officer is governed by an inculcated set of ethics and values that form part of the 
military culture. These codes of conduct are acquired through a process of occupational socialisation, and 
are policed and enforced by the officer corps itself, to ensure compliance to the behavioural standards of 
the profession. Where members violate the behavioural standards which are normally contained in a code 
of conduct, they will be subject to the purview of the military justice system and disciplinary codes (Malan, 
1994a:32). 
Internal affective neutrality is manifested through standardised and documented norms for appointment 
and promotion. The established criteria for appointment and promotion are applied in an impartial manner 
by senior officers based on professional performance, and not on subjective criteria or personal prefe-
rence. Nepotism and appointments and promotions based on political affiliations of the officer are not 
accepted in a professional military, but are typical in militaries displaying praetorian tendencies (Perlmutter 
& Bennet, 1980:205). 
2.3.5 A professional social ethic and external affective neutrality 
The image of the military professional is that soldiers have a deep sense of responsibility to use their skill 
to the benefit of broader society, to which they has been commissioned to defend (Huntington, 1957:13). 
According to Downes (1985:159) " ... the military profession, perhaps more than any other profession must 
seek to convince society and those elected to govern on societies behalf that the profession is motivated 
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by the ethic of self-sacrificing and selfless servicen. Without this commitment, she claims, society would be 
loath to allow the military profession to retain its monopoly over the profession. The orientation of the mili-
tary profession towards societal rather than personal or organisational goals is inherent in the nature and 
purpose of the military organisation. 
A further requirement of a professional military is the commitment to external affective neutrality, which 
implies that they adopt a non-partisan stance to party politics. In most countries, officers are legally prohi-
bited from becoming involved in partisan politics or other activities that could erode the impartiality of their 
service to society. In this regard, it is of interest to note that one of the main dilemmas facing countries 
having to integrate revolutionary soldiers in post-revolutionary times, into a professional military, is how to 
disarm these soldiers politically and re-arm them professionally• (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:23). 
2.4 THE ANOMALIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION 
It is appropriate at this point to highlight some of the anomalies in the ideal-type military profession, which 
have been subject to many debates among scholars of the military profession. 
The military profession claims to be distinguished from other occupations on the basis that it possesses a 
distinct body of theoretical knowledge and skills related to the "management of violencen (Huntington, 
1957:11). However, Downes (1985:155) illustrates that this is an inadequate definition of the sphere of 
competence and tasks of the military profession, as it fails to take into account the diversity of tasks which 
are carried out by the armed forces in contemporary times, such as deterrence, peacekeeping, nation-
building and disaster relief. 
There are also many officers employed by the armed forces who are not "military professionals" trained for 
combat, but are merely "professionals in uniform", for example, dentists, doctors, nurses, accountants and 
so forth. This implies that the definition of military professional as applied to the officer corps, (involved in 
the management of violence) is limited to only a comparatively small core with basic operational skills and 
knowledge. A possible justification of the retention of the military profession, as applied to the officer 
corps, is that all serving in the armed forces partake in the same overall mission, and it can thus not be 
said that only combat officers are involved in the management of violence (Boene, 1990:8). 
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Most social scientists tend to agree that the professional group is limited to the officer corps of the armed 
forces. Non-commissioned officers are considered craftsmen or skilled workers rather than professionals, 
who are responsible for the "application of violence", the task of the officer being the "management of 
violence" (Huntington, 1957:18). Others such as Moskos (1977) avoid using the concept professionalism 
as limited to the officer corps and prefer to use the term institution to describe the traditional image of the 
military, here understood to include all ranks. Downes (1985:158) holds a similar view and states that 
"[ w]hile society is prepared to accept, and even expect, differing standards of moral and social conduct 
from officers and other ranks, it demands that the armed forces as a whole, demonstrate a high standard 
of patriotism, discipline, courage and self-sacrifice in the performance of their duties". Unlimited liability 
inherent in military service is also not limited to the officer corps as" ... bullet and bombs do not differentiate 
between ranks". The professional soldier (officers and non-commissioned officers) are all seen to be 
committed to altruistic values, to military competence, and to maintaining behavioural standards that are 
essential to safeguard the integrity of the military profession (Nuciari, 1994:8). In fact, Lengerman and 
Segal (1980:181) claim that in recent times the officer corps has undergone a deprofessionalisation, while 
the. non-commissioned officers show an increase in professionalism, particularly those in combat speciali-
ties. The same does not apply to "conscripts", who are not professionals or those who only serve in the 
military for a short-term, performing relatively unskilled tasks. 
Despite the controversy that exists over the exact definition of the profession of arms, most agree that it 
, displays many of the features of a profession. Furthermore, that it is and remains a unique profession, not 
only with respect to the task they may be called upon to fulfil, but also due to the normative requirements 
placed upon the profession. 
2.5 THE UNIT ARIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS 
Taking into consideration these unique features of military profession, it will be explained why the armed 
forces have sought to adopt a "unitarisr managerial approach to labour relations. The essence of the 
unitary perspective of labour relations is that each employee identifies with the aims of the enterprise and 
with its methods of operation. All members of the organisation work together as part of the same "team". 
This implies that all persons serving in the organisation are an integrated group, with a single 
authority/loyalty structure and a common set of values. Everyone employed in the organisation, strive 
4. The political motivation of the revolutionary soldier is integrated with the revolutionary movement Successful revolutionary soldiers 
are not necessarily trained to be professional soldiers but have a high status in society given their role in bringing about a new order 
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towards the shared organisational goals and are committed to the leadership of the organisation. This 
loyalty is reciprocated, as it is the duty of the leader to inspire loyalty by caring for subordinates, by promo-
ting hannony and by building up esprit de corps in the work-place (Fox, 1979:301; Farnham & Pimlott, 
1983:53). 
From this it follows, that within the unitarist perspective there is no inherent conflict between the main 
parties in the employment relationship. Conflict, when it does arise, is believed to be primarily frictional, 
due to incompatible personalities, due to misunderstandings as a result of faulty communication, a lack of 
understanding, or the cause of agitators inciting the majority. The immediate reaction to any fonn of 
employee dissatisfaction is to improve interpersonal relations by creating the necessary structures to 
address employee grievances, and by ensuring that communication systems within the organisation are 
adequate. This is coupled to appeals for loyalty from management to employees (Salamon, 1987:27). 
Within this perspective, the presence of trade unions as well as collective bargaining, are usually seen as 
an intrusion into the unified structure of the organisation. Unions are seen to compete illegitimately for 
control over the loyalty of the employees. What is especially resented, is the horizontal links that trade 
unions fonn with employees of other establishments, as this is viewed as an additional intrusion into the 
affairs of the company. Indications of the functioning of these assumptions are, for example, abrupt refusal 
by management to negotiate, sudden assertions of managerial prerogative, and moral outbursts against 
unions. Attempts may even be made to introduce legislation to prevent or reduce the incidence of trade 
unionism. Fox quoted in Salamon (1987:27) argues, that managers who adopt this perspective believe 
that • ... increased legal intervention can and should take the form of regulating men's behaviour directly, 
and enforcing this regulation by direct punitive legal sanctions". 
If the employer is pressured to accept trade unions, they are reluctant to concede any decision-making role 
within the organisation to trade unions. In management's view trade unions are seen as little more than 
political power vehicles used by a militant minority in order to subvert the existing and legitimate political, 
social and economic structure of society. The presence of trade unions representing the collective 
interests of their employees, is suffered rather than welcomed and is resisted wherever possible (Salamon, 
1987:27). Generally, management's under this system will try to prevent or subvert trade unions by 
allowing the establishment of "sweet-hearf' unions which act more like benefit societies, or will try to keep 
unions out by upgrading internal structures to address working conditions. 
(Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:21). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
20 
Employees themselves may have a unitary perspective of work, and of labour relations. This is often the 
case where internal social structures are supportive of the individuals needs and where the predominant 
value systems are accepted by all employed by the organisation. According to Farnham and Pimlott 
(1983:54), the armed forces have traditionally tended towards unitary structures and consensus values, 
which have generally been accepted by managerial cadres and subordinates alike. 
To summarise, the unitary perspective in its "ideal form" stresses the harmonious nature of both industrial 
organisations and of industrial relations. The acceptance of this managerial approach to labour relations 
depends on the internal social structures within the organisation, and whether subordinate personnel 
accept the predominant value system. In fact, the "linchpin» around which the unitary perspective of labour 
relations is either accepted or rejected is a "common value system» {Farnham & Pimlott, 1983: 56). 
2.6 UNIT ARIST LABOUR RELATIONS PRACTICES AND THE MILITARY 
Given the heightened sense of corporateness of the military profession and the necessity for loyalty and 
obedience towards the chain of command, conflict, in the form of the expression of overt employee dis-
satisfaction and differences, is not tolerated. Typical of the unitarist perspective, the military often resorts 
to legal punitive measures if the military leadership cannot manage employee dissatisfaction. Members of 
the armed forces can for example be charged, within the parameters of the military justice system if they 
do not lodge their complaints via the channel of command, or if involved in collective actions, will be guilty 
of mutiny.s 
Should conflict arise within the employment relationship, this is addressed through the chain of command, 
preferably on a one-to-one basis. Where these structures fail to address the conflict, attempts are made to 
improve interpersonal relations by upgrading communication structures, or by creating internal structures 
to address the grievances of soldiers. These internal measures, to address collective grievances, are seen 
as sufficient to protect the well-being and individual rights of military personnel {Phillips, 1977:57). 
Characteristic of the unitarist approach, the emergence of a trade union within the armed forces is seen as 
an intrusion into the unified structure of the military organisation. Malan (1994a:43) professes that 
5. Mutiny is a term used to describe an act of collective military insubordination or a revolt by troops against lawfully constituted military 
authority (Rose, 1982:561 ) . 
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because unions exist [solely] for the promotion of issues related to the self-interest of the soldier they 
would " ... have a potentially destructive effect on military cohesion, and would reinforce other tendencies 
towards disintegration." Preselay (1977:180) too holds the view, that one of the most serious conse-
quences of unionisation in the armed forces is that" ... it could lead to the degrading of military readiness 
by lessening the individual's commitment to combat effectiveness or by dividing this loyalty between the 
military unit and the union". Hallenbeck (1977:239) concurs with this opinion that, and claims that one of 
the most debilitary impacts of a unionised military is that a disrupted chain of command authority would 
impair combat effectiveness. The main concern is that a military union would subvert military discipline 
and obedience, the fundamental base on which the corporate culture of the military is based. 
The principle objection to military unions, is the fear that the loyalty of the soldier will be divided between 
the union and the military organisation, the former providing a second formal organisational parallel with 
the "parent union", the military support structure. Such duality it is believed, would drive a wedge in the 
chain of command, creating a "we they", relationship, that will erode an essential element of combat effec-
tiveness, that of unit esprit de corps (Taylor & Arango, 1977:261). The fact that a union might sell itself as 
the protector of the soldier, claiming to be the only one that can truly represent the interests of members, is 
in total conflict with the military traditions that an "officer's first duty is to take care of his men" (Delholm & 
Humes, 1977:72). This signifies an erosion of the institutional autonomy of the military leadership, as once 
a union is established, the military leadership will have to consult with the representatives of the union on 
matters concerning personnel policies, practices and working conditions, before decisions can be made. 
Given the commitment to the social ethic of self-less service it is considered contrary to the professional 
ethics and standards of the professional soldier, to join interest groups such as a trade union to advance 
their own interests, or that of the military organisation. As trade unions are seen as political power 
vehicles, it is feared that they will not only promote self-interest behaviour, but also erode the external 
affective neutrality of the military. Well-organised military union promoting institutional goals, a kind of 
"military qua military" may be a powerful political force, designed not only to negotiate with the military 
command structure, but directed toward placing pressure on government. One of the main arguments 
against military unionisation as a form of self-interest articulation is that it would strengthen the political 
influence of the military in policy formation, undermining the principle of civilian control over the armed 
forces. 
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In many respects the soldier has willingly accepted this paternalistic approach to labour relations due to the 
professional/organisational duality that exists. Because there has been the belief that the institutional 
leadership is devoted to their members, soldiers have been willing to accept certain difficulties and sacrifi-
ces intrinsic to military service. Whether this willingness to accept the authority of the military leadership to 
decide over the conditions of employment of the soldier will continue, depends upon how the soldier views 
his employment in the armed forces. According to Fox (1979:304) some of the main forces propelling 
. organisations towards the acceptance a new ideology is amongst others, a change in the values of 
employees, rising aspirations, and the weakening of traditional attitudes towards officially constituted 
governance. One of the questions that are raised, is whether military unionism is symptomatic of a move 
away from the professional model of military organisation, towards an occupational model (Harries-Jenkins 
& Moskos, 1981:37). 
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The kind of activity, performed by those who practice the management of organised violence, embodies a 
number of characteristics of an ideal-type profession. The military officer is competent in military expertise, 
is obedient and loyal to the authority of the state, is dedicated to using his/her skill only in the interests of 
society and not in self-interest, and is politically and morally impartial. While there is many debates over 
the exact definition of the military profession, it does embody most of the features associated with a 
profession. 
As a profession, and because of the corporate need for a high degre~ of personal commitment to the goals 
of the military organisation, the military as employer has traditionally approached the management of 
labour relations from a unitarist perspective. This perspective is based on the premise that there is no 
room for opposing groups or factions within the organisation, that everyione is loyal towards the leadership 
of the organisation, that conflict is not inherent in the employment relationship and that the intervention of a 
trade union into the unified structure of the organisation will undermine the goals of the organisation. 
Apart from the fact that this paternalistic approach to labour relations corresponds with the leadership style 
of the armed forces, the main reason armed forces have adopted this approach to labour relations, is 
primarily, out of concern over the impact on the service ethic of soldiers and the potential impact on organi-
sational goals of the military. There is the belief that trade unions will institutionalise interest group 
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behaviour, which would not only undermine the social ethic associated with selfless service, but would 
erode the institutional autonomy and corporateness of the military profession/organisation. The implication 
is that this will breakdown military cohesion, which in tum will affect combat effectiveness. A further 
concern is the impact on external affective neutrality exercised by the state over the armed forces. Here 
the primary concern is not only the possible politicisation of the armed forces, but also the potential impact 
of a military union upon the political control of the armed forces. 
Despite these reasons which are used to justify a unitarist approach to labour relations, there appears to 
be indications that the military profession is experiencing a deprofessionalisation or occupationalisation as 
a result of the changing nature of the military, task as well as a decline in the relevance, legitimacy and 
prestige afforded to this profession in contemporary society. The consequence of this decline in the 
occupational status of the military profession, is a shift in value orientations of military professionals, who 
seem to be turning from reference patterns based on altruistic values, to patterns of self interest, where 
employment in the military is viewed as a job like any other. As the acceptance cf a common value system 
is the "linchpin", around which the unitarist perspective of labour relations is accepted or rejected by 
employees, a shift towards occupationalism by military personnel necessitates a revision of labour 
relations practices within the armed forces. 
\, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MILITARY PROFESSION AND THE ASCENDANCY OF OCCUPATIONALISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Technological advance and the broadening of military tasks to include functions such as deterrence, 
peacekeeping and disaster relief required that the professional officer develop more and more skills 
common to other non-military bureaucracies. Sociologists such as Janowitz {1960) suggested that a 
process of civilianisation of the military profession was taking place, affecting not only the nature of military 
service, but also the attitude of military personnel toward their employment in the military. He claimed that 
the military professional, seen in terms of a "heroic warrior", dedicated to a professional service ethic and 
performing work activities closely related to the management of violence, was being replaced by that of a 
military manager. The military manager pursued activities similar to those in a non-military environment, 
and particularly valued those that were applicable to a possible second career {Segal & Lengerman, 
1980:163). Janowitz {1960:117) also observed that" ... those who see the military profession as a calling 
or a unique profession are outnumbered by a far greater concentration of individuals for whom the military 
is just another job". 
In the wake of the Vietnam war and drawing heavily on the American experience, Charles Moskos, too, 
noted that associated with the shift to an all-volunteer force" ... that the military was undergoing a strange 
sort of crisis .. . that officers were driven by careerism1, and that reasons for military service had become 
obscured". He concluded that not only the military profession, but the whole military social organisation 
was undergoing a shift from a predominantly institutional format {legitimised by normative values) to one 
resembling that of an occupation (akin to civilian marketplace standards). At first Mosk~s· institutional/ 
occupational (1/0) thesis, referred only to changes taking place in the nature of military organisation, rather 
than the nature of military service, but it soon became apparent that it focused on both levels (Segal & 
Lengerman, 1980:163). The potential outcomes of the move away from the professional/institutional 
model of military organisation towards an occupational model, was the need to bring about changes in the 
1. The term careerism developed in the sixties as a term to describe officers who strive to get through the various stages of career 
training as fast as possible in order to take up desired command assignments. This was often referred to as 'ticket punching' 
(Janowitz, 1975:125). 
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compensation system of military personnel, a growing interest .in military unions and the increase in the 
employment of civilians in the military (Harries-Jenkins & Moskos, 1981 :37). 
Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to explain with reference to the Moskos' 1/0 thesis, that 
the ascendancy of occupationalism has certain implications for the management of labour relations within 
armed forces. The ideal-type institutional and occupational models are defined and the two types of mili-
tary social organisations compared. It is illustrated that the drift towards occupationalism has been 
exacerbated by the civilianisation of the military profession; the move to an all-volunteer force; the 
changing profile of recruits; and the decline in the institutional compensation system of the military. 
The outcome of the occupational model is, that the "soldier as an employee", comes to seek the same 
qualities from their work environments as civilians, including the right to participate in decisions affecting 
their working lives. Where military service as a calling is replaced with military service as a job, indicating a 
fundamental shift in value orientation, the pressure to accept a more pluralist approach to labour relations 
is increased. This approach to labour relations is defined, whereafter the implications for the management 
of labour relations within the armed forces is discussed. 
3.2 FROM INSTITUTION TO OCCUPATION 
Moskos developed the "institutionar and "occupationar model to represent two ideal types of armed 
forces, of the institutional military, highly divergent from civilian society, and the occupational military, 
highly convergent with civilian structures. These two positions are not viewed as polar opposites. What 
Moskos suggested, was that a particular military organisation at a given point in time, could be placed 
somewhere on an institutional/occupational continuum, depending on the modality assumed by specific 
variables (see Table 3.1). He also acknowledged, that while one must deal with pure types for analytical 
purposes, that " ... 110 modalities will interface in different ways even within the same national military 
system. There will be differences between military service and between branches within them. 110 
modalities may also vary along internal distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned 
officers, and lower ranks; between draftees and volunteers" (Moskos, 1986:381). This implies that the 
military is not a homogeneous organisation, and that a shift in occupationalism in one sector, cannot 
necessarily be generalised to the entire military organisation. 
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3.2.1 Definitions 
The two ideal-types of military organisations can be defined as follows. Moskos terms "institutional ", a 
specific military organisation legitimated in terms of values and norms that transcend individual self-
interest, in favour of a presumed higher good. The institutional model identifies closely with the profes-
sional image of the soldier. Members of an institution are seen to be following a "calling" 2, are viewed as 
being different from broader society, identify closely with the institutional role of the military, and are 
ordinarily held in high esteem by larger society (Moskos, 1988:16). Although Moskos agrees that only 
officers can be viewed as following a calling, he avoids using the term military profession as synonymous 
with institution. As the 1/0 thesis relates to changes in both the nature of military service and the military 
organisation, it is seen as a whole, including all ranks and not merely the officer corps (Sorensen, 
1994:600; Nuciari, 1994:9). 
The occupational model is legitimated in terms of the marketplace and supply and demand, rather than 
normative considerations. The more occupational a military, the greater the demand by members for 
approximately the same salary and working conditions, as civilian employees, and the more employment in 
the military is seen as "just another job". The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest, rather 
than the interest of the employing organisation. A common form of self-interest articulation, is the trade 
union (Moskos, 1988:17; Nuciari, 1994:9). 
3.2.2 Institutional and occupational militaries compared 
A specific military organisation can be placed on an institutional/occupational continuum, depending on the 
modality assumed by each of the variables3 (see Table 3.1 ). 
3.2.2.1 Legitimacy and societal regard 
In an institutional military, the legitimacy4 afforded the armed forces relates to the unique role the military 
fulfils in society. Where military service is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and commitment to the 
2. A calling usually enjoys high esteem in the larger community as it is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication 
to one's role (Krendel, 1977d:162). 
3. The 1/0 model was subject to much debate and critique, especially by Janowitz who claimed that Moskos had 'changed the rules of the 
game'. This critique by Janowitz and others, led Moskos to review his model and the above version is the most updated version of the 
original 1/0 thesis (Sorensen, 1994:599-603). 
4. Within this context, legitimacy refers to the social prestige given to a specific military organisation on the basis of the recognised 
service they render; and their monopoly of theoretical and technical knowledge associated with their profession. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
27 
goal of the institution, it is ordinarily held in high esteem by society. One of the most significant signs of 
altruism, is the subordination of individual financial rewards to the goal of serving society. Military person-
nel must therefore be prepared to make certain personal sacrifices in the course of their duties, accept 
liability for 24 hour service, frequent relocations, and the inability to resign, strike or negotiate working 
conditions. Although such sacrifices may be made by other groups within society, only military service 
involves an unlimited liability5, which may result in the sacrifice of the members own life in the course of 
duty (Moskos, 1977:42). 
The occupational military on the other hand, is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. The underlying 
premise is that all employees with equivalent skill should receive the same remuneration, whatever the 
employing organisation, be that civilian or military (Moskos, 1988:17). 
Table 3.1: Military Social Organisation: Institutional versus Occupational 
Variable Institutional Occupational 
Leaitimacy Normative values Marketplace economy 
Societal reaard Esteem based on notions of service Prestiae based on level of compensation 
Role commitments Diffuse; generalist Soecific; soecialist 
Reference aroups "Verticar within the armed forces "Horizontar with occupations outside military 
Recruitment aooeals Character qualities; life-style orientation High recruit pay; technical training 
Evaluation of oerformance Holistic and qualitative Seamented and quantitative 
Basis of compensation Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank Skill level and manpower shortages; corn-
pressed by rank 
Mode of comoensation Much in non cash form or deferred Salary and bonuses 
Legal system Military justice; broad purview over member Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over 
member 
Female roles Limited employment; restricted career pattern Wide employment; ooen career pattern 
Soouse lntearal part of military community Removed from military community 
Residence Work and residence adjacency; military Work and residence separation; civilian 
housina; relocation housina oermanence 
Post-service status Veterans' benefits and preferences Same as non-server 
Source: Moskos, 1988:16. 
3.2.2.2 Role commitment. reference group and recruitment 
The more institutional the military, the more dispersed and diverse the tasks of those employed in the mili-
tary. Members have to perform an array of tasks not necessarily related to their military specialisation. 
Their main frame of reference is their own collegial group within the military. Even recruitment is based on 
5. Unlimited liability implies that members of the military may have to give up their 'right to life' in the course of duty. 
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institutional features such as the individuals disposition towards military service, leadership characteristics 
and liking for the "military way of life". s 
The more occupational the military, the more specific the tasks and the more members see themselves not 
as military professionals, but as professionals with specialist skills employed by the military. The reference 
group, is not the collegial equivalent in the military, but like occupational groups outside the military. 
Recruitment to the military tends to reinforce this, especially as the compensation for the required skill is 
compared to marketplace criteria. 
3.2~2.3 Compensation 
In the institutional military, the system of remuneration is unique, with compensation being based on rank 
and seniority and not on skill or educational requirements. Payment is often made in non-monetary forms, 
such as uniform allowances, subsidised consumer facilities, low cost military accommodation, subsidised 
mortgage premiums, medical and dental benefits, and unique pensions on termination of service (Moskos, 
1977:42,43; Downes, 1985:161). Another feature of the institutional compensation system is that the level 
of compensation is decompressed, with many different pay scales. 
In the occupational military, compensation structures contain wage differentials based on different skill and 
educational levels, other than rank and seniority. There is a preference that compensation be in cash, 
rather than in benefits and that remuneration is market related. Pay scales are more condensed, and 
promotion to a following scale is often linked not only to rank, but also too specific qualification require-
ments. 
3.2.2.4 Evaluation of performance 
The evaluation of performance in the institutional military is holistic and qualitative, taking into considera-
tion a whole diversity of factors such as work performance, relationship with subordinates, and personality 
traits. The system rests on the theory of the "whole man" rather than on attributes related to skill, or quali-
fications, or productivity. In the occupational military on the other hand, evaluation is quantitative and is 
based on performance or productivity. 
6. Thi~ refers to features such as a liking for discipline, orderliness, conformity, and fraternity. 
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3.2.2.5 Women service members 
Women serving in institutional military careers are limited to support roles, and often serve in separate 
female corps. The more occupational the military, the more women serve in the same corps as men, 
undergo the same training, and may even take up combat roles. There is no discrimination in pay and 
women are promoted on the same basis as men. There are no restrictions curtailing the career advance-
ment of women, based on gender in the occupational military (Moskos, 1988:18). 
3.2.2.6 Military Justice 
The more institutional the military, the wider the span of military justice. Members are under the purview of 
the military organisation, whether they are on or off duty, or whether on or off base. If redress is sought, 
this is channelled through the chain of command. The more occupati nal the military, the more likely 
offenders will be treated by civilian courts, or soldiers will be permitted representation by independent 
civilian lawyers or representatives (Levitan & Alderman, 1977: 160-161). There is also less concern with 
the members' behaviour away from work, providing it does not affect work performance (Moskos, 1986: 
381). 
3.2.2.7 Spouse 
Another unique feature of military service is that institutional membership extends to the military spouse 
who is expected to initiate and take part in social functions, and volunteer for activities in the military com-
munity. Wives are socialised into their military role through various means, such as ladies courses and 
through other social structures, such as the military ladies club, which wives are expected to join. Infor-
mally too, spouses carry the rank of their husbands and behavioural prescriptions and expectations are 
judged accordingly. A great deal of social pressure is exerted on the military wife, particularly the officer's 
wife, to play an active role in the military community (Segal, 1988:88). 
In the occupational military, there is a growing reluctance of wives at both non-commissioned and junior 
officer levels to take part in customary base social functions (Moskos, 1986:381 ). This could be due to the 
increase in the separation of work and residence, but also because there is a breakdown in the loyalty of 
the military family to the military institution as a whole, especially if the latter is seen to compete for the 
loyalty, time and energy of the service member (Segal, 1988:82). 
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3.2.2.8 Residence 
Typical of the institutional military is that the place of work and home are adjacent. Military personnel 
reside in a military base, forming their own close community, generally removed from the civilian com-
munity. One of the facets of occupationalism in the armed forces, is the disintegration of the institutional 
military community, with the separation of residence and workplace. 
3.2.2.9 Veterans 
In a society where the military profession is held in high esteem, veterans normally enjoy preferences over 
non-veterans, especially in government employment entitlements (Moskos, 1988:19). In societies where 
military personnel are viewed as no different from other civil servants, veterans are treated the same as 
other pensioners. 
3.3 TRENDS PROMOTING OCCUPATIONALISM 
Referring to Moskos' list of variables, it is apparent that the 1/0 thesis refers to a number of changes taking 
place at different levels. On one level it refers to changes that are taking place in the attitudes and 
behaviour of those employed in the military. These attitudes are in tum influenced by changes taking 
place within the military social organisation itself, which are often dictated to by broader societal trends 
affecting civil-military relations (Moskos & Wood, 1988:6). All these levels interact and influence each 
other. This is clearly illustrated in the following section which focuses on the effect of civilianisation of the 
military profession; the shift to an all-volunteer force; the change in the profile of the recruits; and the 
decline in the service conditions and tenure of military personnel. 
Traditionally the military have sought to curtail the drift towards occupationalism, primarily because it is \1 
believed that it would give rise to an employee-employer relationship which is at variance with the military ;I 
culture and traditions. The aim of this section is to illustrate how this shift to occupationalism affects this 
relationship, and in effect promotes the need for a more pluralist approach to labour relations. 
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3.3.1 The effect of civilianisation 
Prior to World War II, there were important differences between military and civilian work forces, as well as 
crucial technological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military personnel spent 
their time doing different things than civilians. Warfare was primarily a land-based phenomenon with the 
infantry and armour at the core of the army. The typical soldier was male, young and unmarried. The mili-
tary workforce was flexible, expanding rapidly in times of war and demobilising quickly thereafter, with 
soldiers returning to civilian life (Segal & Segal, 1983:160). 
With the increase in the use of airpower between the two world wars, and the advent of nuclear technology 
in World War 11, warfare became more capital intensive in the middle part of the twentieth century, which 
meant that military personnel had to acquire more and more skills common to the civilian sector. Many 
jobs in the military come to resemble jobs performed in other civilian enterprises, decreasing the unique-
ness of the military profession. 
Technological advancement also increased the reliance of the military on non-military civilian experts for 
the development and operation of complex weapon systems (Wood, 1988:83). Commenting on the impact 
of these civilians on the United States armed forces, Moskos (1979:22) remarked that: " ... it is difficult to 
overstate the extent to which the operational side of the military system relies on civilian technicians ... [for 
example] the large warships of the US Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of contract 
civilians". Wakin (1979:219) reiterates similar concerns "[o]ne of the alarming signs of the occupational 
model is increased military pay within the structure of the all-volunteer force, another is the increasing use 
of civilian technicians to perform military functions. Possible consequences of these trends are the unioni-
sation of the military and the ultimate loss of military legitimacy". The fact that civilians work alongside 
uniformed personnel, often in the same post structure has increased the trend to equalise military and 
civilian pay scales. These civilians are in most cases, public servants, and have the right to belong to 
trade unions to advance their interests. 
In this regard, it is of interest to note that while Moskos sees this trend towards unionisation as one of the 
consequences of occupationalism within armed forces, Janowitz viewed trade unions as just another 
example of the civilianisation (Sorensen, 1994:601). 
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3.3.2 The effect of the all-volunteer force 
Another trend believed to influence the ascendancy of occupationalism, is the shift in the manpower pro-
curement system from conscription to voluntarism. Where the military must rely to a large extent on indivi-
duals to join the military voluntarily, this has significant implications for the military "employer''. Under 
conscription, military service was regarded, at least in part as an obligation of citizenship, and the military 
did not have to be concerned about the attractiveness of military service as a fonn of employment. 
The volunteer system compels the military to take marketplace criteria into consideration if quality staff is to 
be recruited. Obvious factors, which influence the relative attractiveness of enrolment in the military on a 
voluntary basis, are pay, service benefits and the availability of alternative employment opportunities 
(Downes, 1988:16). Wages and service benefits in this contract are assumed to be the critical enlistment 
motivators. Under a volunteer manpower procurement system, the soldier is seen to become a rational 
employee who chooses the military occupation to maximise long-tenn earnings. According to Cortright 
(1977:216) where anned forces recruit rather than conscript personnel, a new contractual basis for military 
employment comes into being, which is associated with a decline in the notion of service as a calling. 
Many join not because of the uniqueness of the military service, but for other reasons such as tertiary 
education or job opportunities, that provide the financial and promotion prospects needed to attain material 
success. 
The military, itself, has exacerbated this trend by not emphasising the unique features of military service 
during recruitment drives. Advertisements often paint a rosy and misleading picture of military service, 
creating the impression that military life and working conditions are, or can be, similar to those of the 
civilian world (Cortright, 1977:219). 
However, Lengennan and Segal (1980:166) are not convinced that the trend towards occupationalism as 
proposed by Moskos is necessarily linked to a shift to an all-volunteer force. Even under a conscript 
system, full-time force members listed both material and altruistic reasons for joining and remaining in the 
military. However, the difference is that under an all-volunteer system the military can no longer rely on 
high quality recruits to supplement its personnel shortages. There is thus more pressure on the "military 
employer'' to take marketplace criteria into consideration, when competing for scarce and highly skilled 
manpower. This forces the military to deviate from its previous institutional compensation system, based 
on rank and seniority and to a compensation system based on occupational values. 
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3.3.3 Changing profile of recruits 
Another important factor with respect to recruitment in the volunteer force, is the shift in the profile of 
recruits from elites, to being more representative of the broader population (Janowitz, 1975:120). In an 
extensive study by Caforio and Nuciari (1994:54) amongst European nations, it was found that occupa-
tional officers more frequently come from lower status groups, and that their reasons for joining the military 
were motivated primarily by a desire for job security and by opportunities for education, which could ensure 
future material success. A civilian type union is also preferred on average by occupational officers, while 
those officers showing a high commitment to professional/institutional values, were more inclined to 
support some form of internal representation. 
Pro-union attitudes too, were strongly linked to social origin. Officers from underprivileged backgrounds 
were more supportive of civilian type unions. This was even more so, if prior to employment in the military 
the soldier had benefited from being a member of a union, and/or either parents were perceived to have 
benefited from union membership (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49). 
3.3.4 Erosion of service benefits and tenure 
In the past the economic disadvantages of military service were partially offset by the extensive fringe 
~enefits that formed part of the compensation package of the implied service contract of the soldier. Asso-
ciated with this paternalistic remuneration system, was the support of the military occupation as a calling, 
the maintenance of the military as a separate community that takes care of its own, and the legitimisation 
of the military as a social institution by society (Segal, 1978:228). 
With the move to equalise civilian and military pay levels, there have been changes in the structure of 
military benefits that have traditionally been associated with military service. Benefits that have historically 
enhanced the image of the military as a fraternal community that looks after its ll)embers, its past members 
and its dependants, have begun to decline. Commenting on the decline in service conditions, Segal and 
Lengermann (1980:170) observed that in the United States armed forces, there has been a decrease in 
the availability of medical care to military dependants and retirees, reduction in travel and relocation 
allowances and cuts in post graduate and veteran education benefits. The entire traditional military 
retirement system has furthermore been revised or brought in line with the retirement packages of other 
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civilian organisations. This has meant that the conditions of employment in the armed forces have come to 
resemble, at least in terms of employment incentives, the conditions of employment in civilian occupations. 
Many serving in the military, resent measures attacking the benefits, which have long been considered pro-
tected rights. Especially for members with many years of service, whose careers and family futures have 
been based upon expected levels of pay and benefits, there is a mounting sense of insecurity and frustra-
tion. Fringe benefits are just as important to military personnel as to their counterparts in the civilian sector 
(Perselay, 1977:177). In this regard Lane (1977:104) states that " ... perhaps the major incentive for 
unionisation amongst an all-volunteer force would be the perception of an erosion of self-related benefits 
and a certain frustration and helplessness to do anything about if'. 
It was precisely this "inability of the system" to protect the interests of service members in the Australian 
Defence Force, which contributed to the formation of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia. Even 
though most Australian officers felt that unionism and the military did not mix, they nevertheless believed 
that it was the only effective means to prevent a further decline in their service conditions (Jans, 1988: 
216). This is substantiated by Moskos and Wood (1988:288) where they state that "[t]o the degree that 
military members perceive senior military leaders as ineffective defenders of an institutional compensation 
system, creeping occupationalism will appear in the rank and file". 
Another feature of military employment in recent years has been the reduction in manpower levels or 
downsizing of the armed forces. The possibility of being retrenched has a significant impact on the com-
mitment to military service, especially by those who viewed it as a long-term career. Wrong and McNally 
(1994:209) found that there was a " ... significant decrease in organizational commitment after the down-
sizing began, which is noteworthy because the sample reflects those in the army who supposedly had 
made it, and were not vulnerable to future layoffs." This downsizing also stems from society itself as 
government seeks to control expenditure. 
· The decrease in commitment of the survivors is important for several reasons. On an organisational level, 
a decrease in commitment may present a leadership problem, as members are no longer committed to 
altruistic values or to the service. Should this organisational commitment continue to decline due to down-
sizing, it has the potential to threaten military effectiveness, as the military often loses its top soldiers due 
an associated lack of job security or promotional prospects. The most serious concern, is if the soldiers 
become so disillusioned with the conditions in the military, they may develop hostility towards the state. 
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They feel " ... abandoned by a society, which in its pursuit of a new world order sacrificed the job security, 
career progression, combat readiness, and the quality of life of its military (Wrong & McNally, 1994:213). 
Traditionally, the military member has looked to government to serve as its advocate to protect their 
service conditions, and has not felt the need to form unions to protect their interests. Should government 
divest itself from its paternal obligation to the military, it may well see its soldiers investing in self-interest 
groups, such as unions to do it on their behalf. 
3.4 CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATIONALISM 
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the change in the function and structure of the military 
has affected the professional identity of military members and their commitment to military service. Instead 
of being motivated by a desire to serve the country, the trend towards occupationalism has meant that 
servicemen have become more concerned with pay, benefits and the quality of their working lives. 
In a study by Segal (1983:231) measuring certain preferred job characteristics between army, navy and 
civilian personnel, in all three work environments, personnel wanted good pay, good fringe benefits, an 
opportunity to control their personal lives and avoidance of bureaucracy. Factors such as prestige, job 
cleanliness, availability of free time, not being "bossed" and opportunity to serve the country were relatively 
less important in all three environments. From this survey, both' military and civilian· personnel valued 
personnel independence (controlling one's personal life and avoiding entangling bureaucracy) and econo-
mic success (good pay and fringe benefits) as most important. Job characteristics that least concerned 
them were cleanliness, prestige, free time, absence of a boss, and most significantly for the military, an 
opportunity to serve one's country (see Table 3.2). Although there was very little variance in preferred job 
characteristics, the military samples indicated "greater dissatisfaction with the pay and prestige of their 
jobs" (Segal, 1978:232-3). 
The fact that military personnel are in general very similar to their civilian counterparts in what they would 
like from their jobs, signals a change in the value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be 
turning away from reference patterns based on "common good" to individualistic patterns in career and job 
security, like any other occupation (Nuciari, 1994:8-9). The nature of the individual's relationship to the 
organisation is transformed where the " ... implied contract between the service person and the service is 
replaced by an explicit contract in which work and time are exchanged for economic remuneration" (Segal 
& Lengermann, 1980:171). 
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This is particularly so, where there is no longer a good fit between preferred and perceived job characteris-
tics. In a social system where money and power are seen as the indicators of success, and where society 
no longer holds the military profession in high esteem, despite their commitment to serve society, one 
cannot expect otherwise. Such a value system, based on material incentives, is almost totally at odds with 
the values that have traditionally been regarded by the military as imperative to their operational efficiency 
(Downes, 1988:163). 
Table 3.2: Most and least important features of a preferred job 
Army Civilian men Navy 
Most important 
Good pay Opportunity to control personal life Opportunity to control personal life 
Fringe benefits Good pay Good pay 
Opportunity to control personal life Friendly people Avoiding bureaucracy 
Avoiding bureaucracy Fringe benefits Fringe benefits 
Steady work Avoiding bureaucracy Challenging work 
Least important 
Opportunity to serve my country Opportunity to serve my country Opportunity to serve my country 
Prestigious job No one to boss me Lots of free time 
No one to boss me Clean job No one to boss me 
Lots of free time Lots of free time Prestigious job 
Clean iob Prestigious job Clean job 
Source: Segal, 1978:230. 
Where the soldier views himself as simply another category of worker, it can be expected that they would 
seek some control over the nature of their work lives (Segal & Lengermann, 1980:171). One of the conse-
quences of military service being equated with employment in the civilian labour force, is the desire to have 
input or say in matters that affect their working lives. The lack of effective participative mechanisms or 
channels to address military policies and practices affecting the soldier's working environment, has meant 
that even those in the military have begun to question seemingly arbitrary decisions affecting their service 
conditions. The basic purpose of a union is to give employees a voice in influencing their conditions of 
employment. This becomes even more important where the commitment of individuals to the 
organisational goals are no longer complementary. As Segal (1977:28) states: "[t]o the degree to which 
individuals, by behaving in ways supportive of an organisation fulfil their own needs, their commitment to 
the organization will be increased; where this complementary does not exist, their commitment will be 
minimized". 
However in reality, this is not a cause and effect relationship. While soldiers may display a concern with 
their material conditions, in most instances they view their employment in the military as a mixture of 
profession and a job. Cotton (1981) defined three role orientations, the institutional (the soldier), the 
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occupational (the employee) and the ambivalent. Individuals have been known to score highly on both 
institutional and occupational values, belying the notion that there is an inverse relationship between the 
two positions. Segal (1986:351-76) refers to this category as "pragmatic professionals", who maintain both 
traditional and ideal professional values, but at the same time stress a strong interest in aspects such as 
pay, job security, transferability of skills and the public image of the profession. This, in fact, concurs with 
Herzberg's "two factors theorf' 1 which shows that pragmatic professionalism, is the norm in most work 
situations and seems to be the rule within the modem military profession. 
In more recent research Caforio and Nuciari (1994:36-56) identified four "officer ideal types". There are 
those that are "indifferent" to both professional and occupational positions, other officers who are clearly 
"occupational", officers who have both professional and occupational characteristics, "pragmatic professio-
nals" a and officers who clear1y belong to the professional group "radical professionals". Of interest are the 
results obtained from a survey measuring these four ideal-types in eight European countries (see Diagram 
3.1).9 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
CSFR 
•Indifferent 
•Occupational 
•Pragmatic prof 
•Radical prof 
France Germany UK Greece Italy Sweden Switzerland 
Diagram 3.1: Professional/Occupational attitude by country 
Source: Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:37. 
7. Herzberg's two-factor theory maintains that in any work situation there will be those factors that dissatisfy and those that satisfy. These 
factors referred to as 'hygiene or 'motivators' are not polar opposites. (Handy 1982:33) 
8. According to Caforio and Nuciari's definition of the pragmatic professional officer combines professional and occupational attitudes 
since the profession outlines the general reference values but actual work conditions are at stake when job satisfaction is evaluated. 
9. The survey was conducted by the Working Group on the Military profession of the European Research Group on the Military and 
Society (Ergomas) in 1991-2 among 4 659 active military officers in eight European countries, the former Czechoslovakia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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Another finding revealed by Caforio and Nuciari, concerns attitude towards unionisation by country. If the 
results in Diagram 3.1 are compared with those in Diagram 3.2, some questions can be raised over the 
validity of the 1/0 thesis regarding unionisation. 
Diagram 3.2: Attitude towards unionisation by country 
Source: Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49. 
Although the institutional situation of each country differs greatly, there is no conclusive proof that officers 
who are occupational, necessarily support either unions or even some form of internal representation in the 
military. Nor is there any proof that officers, who are radical professionals, reject a civilian type trade union 
in the military. A good example to substantiate this is Germany and to some extent Sweden, whose offi-
cers are both predominantly radical professionals but they are also the most supportive of unions in the 
military. However, it doe~ appear, that on average a civilian-type union is preferred by occupational 
officers, and that radical professionals are more inclined to support some form of internal representation 
(Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49). 
3.5 PLURALIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS 
The pluralist perspective of labour relations is based on the premise that the goals of employees may be in 
conflict with those of the organisation. The underlying assumption of the pluralist approach is that the 
organisation is in a permanent state of tension resulting from the conflict of interests between the various 
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sectional groups within the organisation. This is not necessarily seen as negative, as both parties have a 
common interest in the future survival of the organisation (Fox, 1969:394). There is a willingness to reach 
a compromise and to the rules that regulate the conduct of their employment relationship. Should conflict 
erupt, both parties are expected to use the mutually accepted systems for conflict regulation to resolve the 
dispute. Where conflict has become uncontrollable, the ground rules are seen to be in need of change or 
adjustment (Salamon, 1987:28). 
This view of the nature of conflict and the role of trade unions is thus fundamentally different to that of the 
unitary approach. The pluralist perspective accepts that it is legitimate for employees to combine in formal 
organisations. The principle of "freedom of association", the process of collective bargaining, the right to 
strike and participation in decision-making is accepted and seen as necessary to balance the power 
between employer and employee {Fox, 1969:397). By means of collective bargaining, employees 
organised into unions can challenge management prerogatives regarding wages, and working conditions 
and can represent members' interests in grievance, disciplinary and dispute procedures. It is also 
accepted that the respective trade union will link up with outside organisations to promote their interests. 
3.6 PLURALIST LABOUR RELATIONS PRACTICES AND THE MILITARY 
The shift towards a more pluralist approach to labour relations within the armed forces, implies that 
soldiers reject the unitarist view that their interests as employees necessarily coincide with the interests of 
the military as employer, and that there is only one source of authority and one focus of loyalty. An 
important feature of this change in value orientation, is the demand for the creation within the armed forces 
for some form of group representation. 
This mood to unionise in the armed forces is attributed to a number of factors. The most obvious being 
conflict arising from dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of service. Other reasons include dissatisfac-
tion with existing procedures for the redress of complaints; a wish to improve the existing status of military 
personnel; a desire to participate in decisions affecting their working lives; and the belief that by organising 
into a collective, their needs can be more effectively met (CMRI, 1980:67). There is the belief that a 
military trade union, will create the necessary structures for soldiers to address poor working conditions, 
help maintain military benefits, eliminate violations of basic human rights and even safeguard the interests 
of the military establishment (Taylor & Arango, 1977:245). 
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Given the structure and function of the armed forces, the transition to a pluralist approach to labour rela-
tions which implies the support for principles of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right 
to strike, is fraught with difficulties. As a function of a union is to present an interest group (the bargaining 
unit) in competition with the established authority (management), it poses a problem to military leadership 
which requires cohesion amongst all levels within the armed forces. Union membership also entails intent . 
to challenge the decisions of management and to challenge the authority of management to make those 
decisions (Hallenbeck, 1977:239). Yet, one of the fundamental requirements of the military profession is 
the need for discipline, unquestioning obedience and the acceptance of authority. 
A logical question is whether a military trade union can become fully involved in collective bargaining, 
which implies the need for negotiation with the military command structure for improved terms and 
conditions of employment and the settlement of procedural and substantive grievances. Once the right to 
negotiate has been conceded to the military union, it gives the military as a purposive organisation ipso 
facto, significant powers. A question that is often raised is what action, if any, can be taken against a 
highly unionised military force, that irrespective of any legal rohibition against striking, exerts pressure 
upon the government in power. A well-organised military union promoting not only its own but also -
institutional goals, a kind of "military qua militaryn, may be a powerful political force designed not only to 
negotiate with the military command structure, but directed toward placing pressure on government 
(Morehouse, 1977:210). This naturally poses a potential problem for civil military relations, particularly 
where these self-preservation instincts run counter to public interest. Taken to the extreme, should the 
military trade union press to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces, this would 
disturb the equilibrium between the military and society. A nation committed to democratic accountability 
and civilian control over the military could be destroyed in the process. 
These are some of the associated concerns raised with the shift towards occupationalism, and the possibi-
lity of having to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation for members of the armed forces. 
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A consequence of the occupational model is that it results in a priority in self-interest, rather than that of 
the employing organisation. Whereas the institutional military is highly divergent from civilian society and is 
legitimated by values, norms and purposes that transcend self-interest, the more occupational the military, 
the more military service is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. This implies, that instead of the soldier 
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being motivated by a desire to serve the common good, there is a greater concern with pay, benefits and 
the quality of working life. When this occurs the existing patterns of authority within the armed forces, 
based of leadership and discipline are challenged. This is especially evident where institutional goals are 
no longer seen to be totally compatible with the individual's needs, resulting in the demand for increased 
rank and file input in military management. 
The increase in occupationalism in modem times has largely been associated with the civilianisation of the 
military profession. This refers to civilianisation in both the content of military work and the increase in the 
number of civilians employed by the military. As these civilians work alongside military personnel, often in 
the same post class, the inclination to draw comparisons with civilian employment norms and practices is 
increased. The shift to an all-volunteer force where the military must take market forces into consideration 
in recruitment, training and remuneration forces the military to accept a more occupation·a1 approach to 
employment in the military. Another important feature of the all-volunteer force is the change in the profile 
of recruits from elites to a broader base, more representative of the wider population. It was found that 
occupational officers more frequently come from lower status groups and that their reasons for joining the 
military are motivated primarily by a desire for job security and material benefits. If material benefits and 
job security serve as motivators for joining the military, it also implies that any erosion of service benefits 
and tenure would promote self-interest behaviour. While occupationalism need not necessarily be equated 
with unionisation, research does seem to indicate that occupational officers are more supportive of a 
civilian-type trade union within the military. 
Needless to say, this would require a more pluralist approach to labour relations. Should trade unionism 
emerge as a form of self-interest articulation, the military as employer must accept that members may 
challenge managerial prerogative in decision-making on matters that affect employees. But as armed 
forces demand high levels of cohesion, discipline and obedience, the transition to a more pluralist labour 
relations dispensation is fraught with difficulties. An additional concern is the potential power and influence 
such a union could wield over the state as employer, and the potential impact this could have on civilian 
control over the armed forces, especially if the union serves to promote not only sectional but institutional 
interests. One of the potential challenges facing many armed forces is how to accommodate the demo-
cratic rights of members to belong to trade unions, without undermining the need for discipline, obedience 
and unswerving loyalty, seen as essential for organisational and combat effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE ARMED FORCES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
42 
The institutional/occupational thesis focuses on the changing nature of military service and military organi-
sation, without due recognition of societal forces that may influence the development and role of unions in 
the armed forces. This can be considered a shortcoming in Moskos' 1/0 thesis, specifically with respect to 
the unionisation debate. Research reveals that officers may show a strong commitment to professional/ 
institutional values, but at the same time be supportive of a civilian type trade union, while others who 
clearly belong to the occupational group, do not support any form of group representation within the 
military (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:37). The 1/0 thesis may thus not be sufficient to explain the development 
or acceptance of unionism within the armed forces. There re other factors that may be as decisive, it not 
more so, when it comes to whether soldiers may want or may be granted labour rights. 
The aim ·of this chapter is to discuss some of the environmental influences, or societal forces that may 
either retard or promote the acceptance of labour rights within the armed forces. One of the key issues is 
whether soldiers have equal or the same rights as any other employee to belong to a trade union, 
especially if such membership carries the constitutionally protected right of freedom of association. 
Another is where the dominant political and trade union culture of the parent society is receptive towards 
trade unions, and where other employees, especially public servants and the police have these rights. 
Where the status of the military in society is seen to have declined and where soldiers experience a 
measure of deprivation, this too seems to promote the need for some form of professional association or 
union. It is often these trends and not only the drift towards occupationalism that has led to the accep-
tance of employee rights for soldiers in some European nations. 
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4.2 SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING LABOUR RELATIONS 
The following section addresses some of the judicial, socio-political and military factors that appear to 
either promote or retard the development of some form of group representation for military personnel within 
armed forces. The first, and possibly the most important is the debate over the equality of rights. 
4.2.1 Equality of rights 
In countries where soldiers have employee rights, these rights were not secured through collective 
bargaining with the military employer, but by government initiated legislation that guaranteed certain 
inalienable rights to individuals irrespective of employment.1 Such rights, include for example, civil and 
political rights such as the right to freedom of association, right to assembly, demonstrate and petition, 
equality, access to courts, and access to information as well as soci -economic rights, which include 
labour rights such as the right to join trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
The extension of these rights to soldiers is based on the premise that certain fundamental rights cannot be 
withheld from any citizen in a democratic society. In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, "[i]mplicit in 
the term 'national defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this nation apart .. 
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of 
those liberties, the freedom of association, which makes the defense of the nation worthwhile" (Phillips & 
Crosby, 1977:103). The underlying premise is that it is socially unjust or undemocratic to deny members of 
the military the rights necessary to protect their interests, which are guaranteed to other citizens (CMRI, 
1980:2). Should soldiers be denied the freedom of association to join trade unions, it in fact suggests that 
the soldier as employee does not have the opportunity to decide how his interests can be protected or 
advanced. As Harries-Jenkins (1977:55) states, since the soldier's " ... status is one of dependency on 
earnings with little or no individual power of direct decision and since the individual contract between em-
ployee and his employer does not reflect a position of equal strength on the two sides, then the individual 
has certain fundamental rights and needs deriving from the nature of the employment relations". 
The recognition that soldiers' are also citizens and should be granted the same basic fundamental rights 
and responsibilities as any other citizen, eventually culminated in the extension of these rights to military 
1. For purposes of clarity, the rights referred to are those fundamental human rights and freedoms of the subjects of the state, which are 
protected against infringement and can be protected and enforced by a court of law (Sasson, 1995:13). 
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personnel in some European countries. While the rights of the individual soldier have been recognised, so 
has the uniqueness of the armed forces. Almost all democracies have a limitation clause that enables the 
state to limit a fundamental right if it can be declared legitimate and valid. For example, in the United 
States, the court held that "[w]hi/e the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted 
by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and military mission requires a 
different application of those prohibitions. The fundamental necessity for obedience and consequent 
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be 
constitutionally impermissible outside" (Krendel, 1977b: 15). This implies that the rights of soldiers may be 
restricted where deterioration in discipline could be demonstrated. In this regard, it is of interest to note 
that even the International Labour Organisation, Convention no 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise), Article 9 (1) acknowledges that "the extent to which this right can be 
extended to the security forces and police be subject to national legislation and regulations". According to 
the ILO provision, it is left to the individual state's discretion as to whether to allow the armed forces or 
police to join trade unions. 
Most countries have required their soldiers to renounce certain political and socio-economic rights. This 
does not mean that the rights of soldiers are obviated, but that they should yield to accommodate the 
unique function of the military. Where soldiers have been granted the rights such as the freedom of asso-
ciation to join a trade union, they have in most cases restricted the activities of such an association for the 
sake of military effectiveness and national security. 
The most important lesson from the European experience is that the right to form military unions in 
whatever form, was not won by collective bargaining with the military employer, but through government 
initiated legislation that respected the rights of the individual (Ballantyne, 1983:6). While the rights of the 
soldier have been acknowledged, so too has the uniqueness of the military, which has led to an accommo-
, 
dation of employee rights for soldiers. In many countries this issue still remains unresolved, as it is a 
matter of whose rights are paramount, the rights of the military to restrict military personnel, or the rights of 
military personnel (Phillips & Crosby, 1977:90). 
4.2.2 Influence of dominant political and trade union culture 
Although the acceptance of basic fundamental rights for all citizens of the state, including soldiers, is 
perhaps the single most important variable influencing labour relations within the armed forces, the histori-
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cal and traditional relations between the labour movement and their respective government has a consider-
able influence on the development and character of military unions. 
In all the European nations that have military unions, these rights were extended to soldiers only after a 
long period of social democratic government, which came to power largely on the strength marshalled by 
the civilian trade union movement (Taylor, Arango & Lockwood, 1977:52). In fact, the labour movement 
and the governments that they dominate, is the establishment. Military unions developed as part of the 
social norm of active support and promotion of government and can thus be considered reflective of the 
social trends within those countries (Ballantyne, 1983:9). 
The opposite is true where the trade union movement is seen to be in conflict with government, and 
unionism is associated with industrial and political activism. In France, for example, even though there has 
been pressure to create unions for soldiers, the government has refused to extend these rights to soldiers 
because of the level of politicisation and confrontation between labour and government (Krendel, 1977c: 
155). Premier Jacques Chirac, for example, accused the Socialists of "undermining national security by 
encouraging the formation of military unions" (Krendel, 1977a: 110). Under such circumstances the rights 
of soldiers are curtailed. 
On the other side of the spectrum is the Un ted States. Although there was much debate surrounding the 
possibility of military unionism in the 1970's when the American Federation of Government Employees 
wanted to recruit military personnel, military unions never got off the ground. Despite the fact that the 
public service and police in the United States are unionised, and the rights of soldiers have not been 
constitutionally curtailed, the trade union culture in America has not been conducive to unionisation as a 
means to fight for the rights of military personnel. Unlike the European unions, which evolved from a 
Marxist tradition, the American labour unions focus primarily on bread and butter issues rather than on 
ideological concerns and have seldom formed constituent parts of government or political parties. They 
operate rather as pressure groups in pursuit of their own pragmatic goals, shifting allegiance to the political 
party that assists them towards the attainment of these goals (Wyatt, 1977:130). Another factor that has 
retarded the development of military unions in the United States is that soldiers themselves have not felt a 
need to unionise because their aspirations have been accommodated within the chain of command. 
From the above it can be concluded, that in countries where the governments came to power on the 
strength marshalled by the trade union movement, and where they form a constituent part of government, 
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the inclination to extent employee rights to soldiers will be enhanced. However, where the trade union 
movement is in conflict with government, or where the political influence of the labour movement is weak, 
the inclination to extent employee rights to soldiers is reduced. 
4.2.3 Influence of public sector labour rights 
Another important factor facilitating the emergence of unions within the armed forces, is where the rest of 
society, and particularly other sensitive occupations such as the police, have labour rights (Cortright, 
1977:220). Once government conceded to grant state employees labour rights (comparable to those 
granted to other employees), these rights transferred to the police and lastly to the military, the argument 
being that " ... what applies to other civil servants, postal, health railway, emergency services and the 
police, cannot be withheld from the armed forces under peaceful conditions, since they are all important 
elements of the welfare state" (Fleckenstein, 1988:182). This trend is facilitated where military personnel 
are treated as, or see themselves merely as public service employees who wear uniform, rather than a 
unique occupational community. 
Where the police have labour rights, the pressure to extend these rights too on the armed forces is greater. 
In many respects the police resemble the military in the nature of their work, traditions and 9iscipline. As 
with the military, the police too have a military command structure which demands unquestioning 
obedience and rigid discipline. Fradin (1977:118) expresses the reasons for unionisation amongst police 
as follows: "The decades of the sixties brought with it the realisation that the prestige and status that went 
with the badge and the blue uniform were no longer there. Declining working conditions, a failure of police 
agencies themselves to professionalize, often unfair liberal criticism of the police, an increased desire of 
the rank and file to have a voice in management and the policemen's fear that American morality and 
patriotism was deteriorating all added to police dissatisfaction and caused them to organize." The 
underlying reasons for the need for unions can therefore be ascribed to a decline in their status, coupled to 
a hostile external environment, and low economic benefits. 
The European experience indicates that the impetus towards military unions in European nations can be 
traced back to developments in the trade union movement, particularly among public service unions. The 
extension of labour rights to the military, in most cases only occurred after these rights were granted to 
other state employers, from here these rights transferred to the police and lastly to the military. The 
sequence of events in the public sector, and more specifically the police, indicate that the potential for 
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collective action among any group of employees can emerge where individuals experience a decline in . 
their working conditions and status, compared to other groups in society. 
4.2.4 Decline in status of the military 
Status is not concerned with power per se, but with a sense of deprivation associated with the decline in 
the importance and job status of members of the armed forces within modem society. 
In this regard, Harries-Jenkins (1977:61) claims that one of the most important factors that predispose 
soldiers to form unions or professional military organisations, is the feeling that the armed forces in compa-
rison with other institutions in society, have lost their previously held status, and have suffered an undue 
amount of deprivation. He states that "[w]hen there is a significant loss of privilege and status of the 
military in society, trade unions are then formed as a pressure group to re-establish the privileges formerly 
held by the armed forces." Taylor (1977:34) too claims that, "[a]nxiety to preserve its autonomy provides 
one of the most widespread and powerful of motives for intervention (in politics). In its defensive form it 
can lead to military syndicalism - an insistence that the military and only the military is entitled to determine 
on such matters as recruitment training, numbers, and equipment. In its more aggressive form it can lead 
to the military demand to be the ultimate judge on all other matters affecting the armed forces .... such 
claims are bound to bring the military into conflict with the civilian government which traditionally occupies 
itself with such matters". Where the government is seen to have divested itself from its paternal obligation 
to the military, the tendency to form pressure groups to influence those areas of decision-making which 
affect the armed forces, is enhanced. 
Where the military is held in high esteem, this inclination is restrained. In Britain for example, which has a 
highly unionised public service, a respect for human rights as well as a strong trade union culture, (listed 
as preconditions for military unionism) there are no military unions. This is possibly due to the fact that the 
British armed forces enjoy a high degree of status within society, given their alliance with the institutions of 
monarchy, parliament, the church and other lesser ruling institutions. Their status, together with the fact 
that the salary scales for military personnel in Britain are responsive to adjustments in the civilian market-
place, has lessened the need for unions in the military (Downes, 1988:154, 174). The British armed 
forces, in terms of international trends, are still very much an institutional military. Should there be a 
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decline in the status of the British armed forces, coupled with an increase in occupationalism associated 
with a decline in service conditions, the possibility of unions may well be enhanced2 (CMRI, 1980:13). 
What this suggests, is that where government has divested its interest in security in favour of social welfare 
objectives, and where the perception exists that government has let the military down by not affording it the 
resources or recognition necessary to secure their task attainment, the inclination to form pressure groups 
to enhance this status, may be increased (CMRI, 1980:83,84). 
4.53 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The institutional/occupational thesis is an inadequate explanation of the unionisation in armed forces, as it 
fails to take into account the societal forces that may either advance or retard the development of military 
unions. International experience reveals that one of the most important factors· influencing the emergence 
of unions is where this right is constitutionally entrenched. These rights are also most frequently extended 
to the military under social democratic governments in countries that have strong links with the trade union 
movement. The pressure to extend employee rights to soldiers is enhanced where other public servants, 
particularly the police, have these rights and where soldiers experience a relative decline in their conditions 
of employment and status compared to other groups in society. The deterioration in the material benefits 
coupled with the decrease in relative importance of the military in society increased the need to form 
pressure groups to re-establish these privileges. 
However, in all instances, these rights are balanced against the needs of the military organisation, taking 
into consideration the unique social and military context in which the military is required to fulfil its mission. 
Where, for example, the trade union movement is in an adversarial relationship with government, and 
where union activity is associated with political and industrial activism, the rights of soldiers are often 
restrained. The emergence of unionisation is not merely an outcome of occupationalism, but is linked to 
broader societal trends that influence labour relations. While it is true that the cultural and political 
differences between nations weaken the applicability of the European analogue, the experience does 
highlight certain general trends that may be of comparative value. 
2. In the Belt report, which focused on the British armed forces' manpower, career and remuneration structures, 66 percent of servicemen 
agreed that the time had come for some form of collective representation on issues relevant to members of the armed forces. These 
sentiments were expressed at a time of pending rationalisation and retrenchment in the absence of any perceived conventional threat 
to Britain and Europe (Belt, 1995:65-66). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH MILITARY SERVICE: 
THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Armed forces are "Janus faced' organisations. One the one hand, they have to build and maintain an 
effective military organisation that can respond to the changing strategic environment, and on the other, 
they have to be responsive to wider social values and to the demands of society {Dandeker, 1994:639). 
The same applies to the management of labour relations in the armed forces. The dilemma faced by the 
military, is how to balance the needs of society to have an effective organisation, subordinate to its needs 
versus tre needs of the "soldier as an employee", to exert some influence over their service conditions. 
This chapter looks at the experiences of six European countries that have addressed this challenge. By 
analysing the legislative position and type of group representation that has emerged in these countries, it is 
determined whether labour rights can be compatible with military service. Three main areas of concern 
underlie the debate over the compatibility of labour rights with military service. The first is whether the 
rights of soldiers to belong to unions, for the purpose of collective bargaining, can be justifiably withheld 
from military personnel in a democratic society. Secondly, whether the above mentioned labour rights can 
be extended to soldiers without undermining either the combat or organisational effectiveness of the armed 
forces. Thirdly, what impact the activities of military associations or unions may have upon civilian control 
of the armed forces. 
5.2 ACCOMMODATING THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE 
Three major forms of group representation have been established within the armed forces: trade unions, 
professional associations and representative committees. Each of these categories can be divided further 
on the basis of their structural variations and differences of purpose {CMRI, 1980: 110). 
For purpose of clarity, a distinction needs to be made between military unions (which are akin to trade 
unions in their philosophy, goals and strategies) and professional associations, which formally represent 
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military personnel, but are not part of a trade union tradition. "Trade unions" differ from other organisations 
with respect to the nature of their membership, their purpose, and the means they employ to achieve their 
objectives. According to Salamon (1987:58) a trade union can be defined as" ... any organisation, whose 
membership consists of employees, which seeks to organise and represent their interests both in the 
workplace and society and, in particular, seeks to regulate their employment relationship through the direct 
process of collective bargaining with managemenr. This definition highlights that a union requires organi-
sation and that it seeks to improve the position of its members in the workplace and in society at large. 
This implies that a union has an implicit social and political role. 
Often the military professional associations are erroneously referred to as unions, while very few resemble 
a trade union in structure, practice or objectives. "Professional associations" are generally distinguished 
from unions in that they seek to maintain the status of the profession as a whole. Their degree of 
unionateness is low, given their reluctance; whether because of professionalism or other reasons, to 
undertake industrial action in support of their sectional interests. By publicly projecting an image of 
responsibility and professionalism, organisations seek to enhance the status of their occupation in the eyes 
of employers, government and the public (Salamon, 1987:129). 
"Representative committees" are structures created, which exist within the organisation to facilitate 
communication and the resolution of grievances. There are two categories of representative committees, 
those which form part of the formal managerial structure, and which strive to present a form of participation 
in decision-making, and those that oppose the military organisation and favour freedom from organisational 
controls, rather than an extensive share in decision-making (CMRI, 1980:51). 
For the purpose of this discussion, the term "group representation" will be used to refer to the different 
forms of collective representation that can be identified with any activity that strives to protect or further the . 
collective interests of soldiers as employees of the state (CMRI, 1980:19). This general definition recog-
nises that there is a multiplicity of representational models. 
5.2.1 France 
Although the French system makes no provision for any form of group representation, it has been included 
as a relevant case study given the internal forms of military personnel representation that have been 
created as an alternative to trade unions. 
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5.2.1.1 Legislative position 
The official doctrine on group representation is outlined in Article 10 of the Military Disciplinary regulations, 
which prohibits any syndicalist activities for regular soldiers and conscripts. This includes those associa-
tions aimed at protecting professional interests, in other words, professional associations. The attitude of 
the French military towards unionism is reflected in the following statement made by the former Chief of 
Naval Operations in 1973: "[I] am a union leader of the Navy, a union without affiliates, a permanent shop 
stewardn (Mandeville, 1976:541). This view fits the traditional belief that it is part of the duty of those who 
are in command to protect the financial· and moral interests of subordinates and to inform the political 
authorities of the latter's expectations (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:37; B6ene, 1988:208; CMRI, 1980:60). 
However, the inability of the military establishment in the seventies to effectively protect the interests of 
soldiers, gave rise to the need for some form of representation. In an attempt to pre-empt trade union 
development, the French government authorised the military to create a system of representation within 
the chain of command. This system facilitated the consultation between regular military personnel and 
political authorities on matters relating to the organisation of military careers, their status and their financial 
positions (Mandeville, 1976:541; Beene, 1988:204). 
5.2.1.2 Structures for group representation 
In December 1969, an Act creating the Council superior de la fonction militaire (CSFM) was passed by 
parliament. The CSFM is an advisory body that represents both officers and non-commissioned officers 
who have been appointed to the CSFM by the drawing of lots. The Minister of Defence acts as chairman 
of the CSFM. The initial jurisdiction of the CSFM covered problems of a general nature concerning the 
standing and statute of military personnel. Changes in the objectives and functions of the CSFM were 
made in 1975, when the scope of consultation between regular military personnel and political authorities 
was broadened to make provision for both officers and non-commissioned officers to participate in any 
study or decision relating to the organisation of their careers, their status and their financial positions. To 
achieve this objective, consultative committees, the Commissions consultatives, were set up under Army 
Regulations Article 72, of 1975 within every military unit. This created a structure at both local and central 
level through which military personnel could express their difficulties, aspirations and concerns (CMRI, 
1980:61; Mandeville, 1976:546). However, the effectiveness and representivity of these structures have 
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been questioned, given the fact that at central level the Minister of Defence is the chairman of the CSFM 
and at local level, the Officer Commanding is the chairman of the commissions consultives. 
During 197 4-5, conscripts who were excluded from participation in the above structures created informal 
and illegal soldiers' committees, the comites de soldats to advance their interests. These committees 
actively sought to secure improvements in pay and conditions of service, to protect individuals against the 
arbitrary power of the established hierarchy, to create associations for soldiers and to promote links 
between soldiers and other workers. By means of street demonstrations and go-slows the syndical des 
soldats wanted to indicate that" ... they were opposed to the maintenance of the managerial prerogative on 
the grounds that as an interest group of workers, they were in conflict with a military hierarchy which repre-
sented a bourgeois socieft (CMRI, 1980:63). The militant behaviour of these conscript committees was 
met with harsh resistance by the government and the public. In response, the then Premier Jacques 
Chirac in his speech in the National Assembly in 1975 declared that any union for military personnel is a 
" ... mortal danger to both military institutions and democracy itself (Krendel, 1977a:110). The tradition of 
union politicisation and confrontation between unions and government, underlines this response. The 
radical extremism of the comites de soldats, together with the fact that they were locally organised and 
were not focused in their objectives eventually led to their disintegration. 
In 1969, the Consel Permanent Du Service Militaire (CPSM), the French equivalent of a military ombuds-
man was created to give conscripts a chance to voice their grievances. The CPSM consist of two Sena-
tors, two Deputies, four military members and four other suitable persons (CMRI, 1980:76). Of interest is 
that all these bodies, the CSFM, the commissions consultives and the CSPM are located neither within the 
established authority structure, nor within an alternative trade union structure. 
By the mid to late seventies the union debate ceased to be an issue when the pay and prestige of military 
service members increased significantly. Granted the unusual demands and control of military personnel 
(24 hours liability for service, frequent relocations, and so forth) legislators ruled that military personnel 
must be adequately compensated for their services. Today, military personnel are better paid than most 
other civil servants (Beene, 1988:198-199). 
Even though the public sector is highly unionised, there have been no further attempts to form syndicates 
in the military. Law forbids unions and even the national union federations, though urged on by extreme . 
left-wing activists in the seventies, have rejected the idea of unions for military personnel. Even the fairly 
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paternalistic official system of representation and consultation has been met with some degree of 
uneasiness; for fear that it may undermine loyalty towards the chain of command (86ene, 1988:203-4). 
The French experience is of value for the following reasons. Firstly, it indicates that where the labour 
movement does not have the support of government and where union activities are associated with indus-
trial activism, there will be resistance to accept any form of group representation within the armed forces. 
Secondly, where members of the armed forces are committed to institutional values and where these 
values are re-enforced and held in high regard by society, the inclination to unionise is reduced. 
5.2.2 ·Netherlands 
While soldiers only received consultative rights much later in their development, the Dutch Armed Forces 
have a lengthy experience of collectivism starting in 1883. 
5.2.2.1 Legislative position 
The right to form associations or other professional organisations to protect and support the economic, 
social and cultural interests of soldiers in the Dutch Armed Forces is guaranteed by national and interna-
tional law. The Constitutional Law (Section 9), the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Section 11) and the Military Public Servant Act (Section 12), form the legal basis 
for group representation in the Netherlands (CMRI, 1980:114). 
5.2.2.2 Structures for group representation 
Twelve groupings of military associations based on rank, religion, branch of service and status represent 
military personnel. It is interesting to note, that if one views this development chronologically, the first to 
organise on a collective basis were the non-commissioned officers, whereafter the officers, and only years 
later, the conscripts developed some form of group representation (refer Table 5.1). Almost 90 percent of 
military personnel in the Dutch Armed Forces belong to military associations, of which the conscript union, 
the Organisation of Conscripted Soldiers (VVDM}, is the largest (USA, 1977:5-6). 
The goals of the military associations differ accordingly, the conscript unions being concerned primarily 
with the material well-being of their members, while the other associations focus on professional issues. 
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Most of the associations resemble professional associations in structure and modus operandi, with the 
exception of the conscript union, which has at times, has been overtly militant in their pursuit for better 
wages. Because military pay is kept in line with private and public sector wage trends, this has not been a 
major issue, except for the conscripts where SQme gains have been made {USA, 1977:6; CMRI, 
1980:114). Civilian personnel serving in the Dutch anned forces are not part of the military associations 
and are represented in the same way as other government employees. They are public servants and by 
virtue of their legal status, do not have the right to negotiate their wages in the Netherlands. 
The associations represent the interests of their members on a broad range of interests, including issues 
such as government's plan to reduce the military budget, the possible reduction in military benefits and 
amendments to the system of military justice, through a complex system of consultations and discussions 
with the Ministry of Defence {MoD). By law, the Associations must be consulted on all matters pertaining 
to judicial conditions and regulations affecting military personnel, otherwise the regulations or decisions 
taken by the MoD has no judicial validity {CMRI, 1980:119). Promulgation of regulations affecting the 
social and economic interests of military personnel do not require the Associations' consent {USA, 1977:3). 
A graphic representation of the consultation process is presented in Diagram 5.1. 
Table 5.1: List of recognised military associations in the Netherlands 
Organisation Year of Founding 
·ons Beland" Roval Association of NCO's 1898 
Association to Protect and Suooort the Interests of Naval and Former Naval Personnel for NCO's 1901 
Christian Association of Military Personnel 1902 
Association of the Military Police 1907 
Association of Officers of the Royal Netherlands Armv and the Roval Netherlands Air Force 1910 
"St Marinus" Roman Catholic Association of Militarv Personnel 1911 
General Association of Netherlands Reserve Officers 1917 
General Christian Officers Association 1900/1919 
Association of Naval Officers 1947 
National Coroorals Association 1965 
On::ianization of Conscripted Soldiers (WDM) 1966 
General Association of Netherlands Soldiers 1972 
Source: Krendel, 1977a:115. 
At the unit level the establishment of consulting committees has ensured a degree of participation in deci-
sion making, where the relevant associations meet with the officer commanding to discuss problems rela-
ting to local duties and working conditions. These committees address issues such as working hours, in-
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dustrial safety and after-duty transportation. The discussions that take place at this level are apart from 
the consultation process between the MoD and the Associations (USA, 1977:8; CMRI, 1980:119). 
The Associations mentioned are not trade unions as they have only limited consultative rights, no collective 
bargaining rights. Nor do they have links with the broader labour movement (Krendel, 1977a:114). Military 
personnel of the Dutch armed forces do not have the right to strike and provisions exist for the suspension 
of association activities during wartime (USA, 1977:3). 
Although the conscript union has received much negative publicity due to their militant conduct, the MoD 
Officials are of the opinion that the associations' activities have not negatively affected military discipline or 
effectiveness (USA, 1977:8). Given the limitations placed on the consultative powers of the associations, 
the activities of the associations have not posed any threat to civilian control over the armed forces. 
MILITARY 
ASSoCIATIONs 
MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE 
t----., FINAL DECISION 
l 1 
DISCUSSIONS FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL 
MILITARY 
ASSOCIATIONS 
MILITARY 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Diagram 5.1: Institutionalised consultation process in the Netherlands 
Source: USA, 1977:4. 
5.2.3 Germany 
In an attempt to strengthen democracy within the institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in 
the military in particular, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) (the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 
pressurised the coalition government of the Social Democrats and Christian democrats to extent all civil 
liberties, including labour rights to soldiers (Krendel, 1977b: 139, 154; Fleckenstein, 1976:507). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
56 
5.2.3.1 Legislative position 
The rights of soldiers as citizens are entrenched in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(paragraph 9). Every citizen has the right to constitute and establish trade unions and other professional 
associations with the object of developing, protecting and supporting economic, social and cultural 
interests (CMRI, 1980:110). These rights were reinforced with the establishment of the concept of "lnnere 
Fuhrung", which emphasizes that the soldier is a "citizen in uniform" and should have the same basic 
rights as any other individual. The soldier may partake in party politics, vote and run for election and join 
professional organisations and unions, and work for their goals (Fleckenstein, 1988:182). 
Military unions effectively had their beginning with the Defence Ministry Decree which was passed on 
1 August 1966, which permitted unions to recruit uniformed military personnel on military bases.1 
5.2.3.2 Structures for group representation 
Consequently, group representation in Germany is widespread, but unlike the Netherlands, is not frag-
mented according to rank, mustering, or arm of service. Four military personnel representation forums 
represent the interests of all military personnel - a military association, military union, unit personnel coun-
cils and a military ombudsman. The most influential is the 300 000 strong Federal Armed Forces Associa-
tion (Deutsche Bundeswehr-Verband: DBwV), established in 1956, a professional organisation open to all 
military personnel, including conscripts and dependents.2 (Fleckenstein, 1988:180; CMRI, 1980:110). The 
DBwV views itself as a lobby or pressure group interested in the economic, social and cultural well-being of 
its members and adheres to the following principles: that it shall not undermine the combat readiness of 
the armed forces; that it will support the maintenance of discipline; maintain political impartiality; avoid 
interference in purely military matters and shall not strike in an attempt to achieve its objectives (USA, 
1977:11; CMRI, 1980:110). The DBwV has no formal organisational ties with the rest of the labour 
movement and strongly resists being labelled a union. 
1. The Degree of 1966 which gave servicemen the right to practice free coalition, including the right to join and form labour unions, 
resulted in three high-raking officers resigning from the Bundeswehr in protest against the presence of labour unions in the barracks. 
This event was termed the 'generals revolt', but did not manage to revoke the decision to extend employee rights to soldiers (Flecken-
stein, 1976:508). 
2. Different sources quote different percentages with respect to membership to the DBwV. The most recent source, Fleckenstein 
(1988:180) claims that over 60 percent of all soldiers in the Bundeswehr, including conscripts are represented by this association. 
According to the DBwV's own statistics claims its membership is around 80 percent. 
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The only authentic union in the German Bundeswehr is the Public Utilities and Transportation Union 
(Gewerkschaft Offentlicher Dienst, Transport und Verkehr: OTV) established in 1964 (Fleckenstein, 1988: 
180). This union represents a small group of technicians and is formally linked to the broader labour 
movement. However, unlike the rest of the union members the OTV are not permitted to strike in the case 
of a dispute. In comparison with the DBvW, its membership is small.3 
Both the DBwV and the OTV are equally recognised by the Federal Ministry of Defence and are consulted 
in the preparation of regulations that affect conditions of service. Civil service law requires that employee 
organisations be consulted before introducing legislation that would adjust salaries, or fringe benefits of 
civilian and military personnel. Military personnel receive basically the same salaries as civilian public 
servants, but the MoO regulates any special issues peculiar to the military such as hours of work, after 
consultation with the employee organisations. Typical issues for discussion are pay scales, fringe benefits, 
training, dress, living conditions and hours of duty. Military command and discipline are excluded from 
consultation (USA, 1977:11,12). 
While it is clear that both the DBwV and the OTV have the right to forward any item for discussion to the 
MoD or Parliamentary defence committees, they do not negotiate terms and conditions of employment. 
They only have "consultative rightsn and "no collective bargaining authoritt (CMRI, 1980:112). The DBwV 
and the OTV do not represent soldiers directly in grievances, as by law, this is the function of the person-
nel councils. 
Issues not covered by agreements are advanced through the military personnel councils. These councils 
exist at the MoD level, regional level and the local unit level. Civilian and uniformed employees elect re-
presentatives, called "trustmen" from their ranks to represent them in dealings with the officer commanding 
at unit level. Their primary responsibility is to promote a mood of co-operation between superiors and 
subordinates and to improve unit espirit de corps. Each spokesmen is entitled to make proposals with 
respect to the units internal conditions, welfare, training and social life. 
The trustmen also represent servicemen in grievance and disciplinary proceedings. According to military 
law, no disciplinary action may be taken against anyone until the officer commanding has consulted the 
3. According to Fleckenstein (1988:180) the membership figure of the OTV in 1975 was around 1 500, a mere one percent of all military 
personnel. A more recent figure has not been published. Two prominent generals belong to the OTV, both of whom openly advocate 
the advantages of union membership. 
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trustman. At regional level, there are councils of trustmen that meet with the officers commanding of the 
various units or battalions. If disputes and grievances arise between the councils and military 
management, it is referred to an arbitration commission at the national level. Decisions of the arbitration 
commission are binding on both parties (USA, 1977:43). Out of all the trustmen, 35 members are selected 
to represent to serve on a council at the level of the MoD. Here the spokesmen inform the Minister of 
Defence of problems and grievances within the ranks and may offer advice to the Minister.4 
Furthermore, a military ombudsman, a Parliamentary Commissioner of the Federal Armed Forces, attends 
• to the interests of military personnel. The latter is an independent parliamentary institution appointed to 
• safeguard the basic rights of military personnel and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary 
control. Every soldier has the right to address the ombudsman if a matter cannot be channelled or 
resolved through the chain of command. 
Outside the military environment, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), with seven million members 
is a powerful bargaining force in the public service. As the rights won by the public service are extended to 
military personnel, the GOB indirectly constitutes an important lobbying body for soldiers' rights, welfare 
and pay with the government (Krendel, 1977b:142). 
Neither civilian officials nor military personnel have the right to strike (Krendel, 1977b:141). Unlike the 
Netherlands, Germany has no legal provision suspending union activities during wartime. The activities of 
the OTV and DBwV have not had any negative impact on military readiness or effectiveness. On the 
contrary, it is held that these practices have improved efficiency, discipline and morale in the German 
Armed Forces (USA, 1977:14). 
Concerning the effect of military unionisation upon the political control of the armed forces, the German 
military unionists are of the firm opinion that " ... a soldier will be more willing and capable of defending 
democracy if he has an opportunity to practice democracy in his life" (CMRI, 1980:3). Unions as 
democratic institutions are seen as a means to ensure that the military remains committed to democratic 
principles. 
4. The information on the role of the trustman was obtained from Lt Col Helmut Jost, Ministry of Defence, Bonn, Germany in December 
1996. 
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5.2.4 Belgium 
In Belgium, the initial demand for the creation of a system of military group representation evolved at the 
end of the 1950's, after the Second World War, during a period when the Belguim armed forces were 
experiencing a feeling of deprivation and decline in their status. 
5.2.4.1 Legislative position 
Under Article 20 of the Belgium Constitution, the right of association is guaranteed to all citizens and no 
one can be compelled to participate or not participate in any association. However, in the early stages of 
military union development, Article 276 of the Military Code restricted the type of associations to which 
military personnel could belong. According to this regulation, soldiers, civil servants or employees of the 
MoD were forbidden to belong to any secret association or to any group that may have political tendencies 
or characteristics. Military personnel could only legally belong to scientific or amenity societies with no 
political characteristics or tendencies (Werner, 1976:481 ). 
These restrictions on the freedom of association of soldiers gave rise to a legal dilemma in 1961, when the 
Association des Officers en Service Actif (AOSA) was formed as a charitable organisation, whose objective 
was to protect the moral and physical interests of its members. This association was neither a scientific or 
amenity society and from a disciplinary point of view, could have been banned. The issue was never 
tested in the constitutional court, instead taut approval was given to the existence of the AOSA, although 
military regulations were initially used to control the type of articles published in the association's news-
letter. As these restrictions on the press were contrary to Article 18 dealing with freedom of speech in the 
Belgium Constitution, they were soon challenged by the AOSA. 
More formal recognition was granted to the associations in October 1964, when a Royal Decree made 
provision for the establishment of a Consulative Commission. This Commission consists of six members 
nominated by the Minister of Defence and representatives of the three professional associations. The 
Minister must consult this Commission on all questions of general interest relative to the statutory position 
of military personnel. While the Minister is not bound by the recommendations of the Commission, should 
they not be accepted, the reasons must be made known. 
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Despite the establishment of this consultative Commission, there was dissatisfaction as to the effective-
ness of this structure in protecting the interests of military personnel (CMRI, 1980:59,124). In 1975, further 
regulations were passed which permitted all military personnel, with the exception of members of the 
gendarmerie, to affiliate to political parties. Further regulations were passed permitting all military person-
nel to join any of the recognised associations or any trade union recognised as representing personnel in 
the civil service. Strike action was forbidden and subject to punishment by the punition disciplinaire under 
the law Concerning the Regulation of Discipline in the Armed Forces" (Werner, 1976:484-485). 
5.2.4.2 Structures for group representation 
Although there was some dispute over whether union membership is contrary to the dignity to officership, 
the legalisation soon prompted the ASOA to establish the Syndicat Beige des Officers (SBO), whose 
modus operandi and goals were very similar to a trade union. The la Royale Alliance Mutuelle des Sous-
Officiers de Belgique (RAMSOB) representing non-commissioned officers set up a similar structure, the 
Syndicat National des Sous-Officiers (SNS) and the l'Associaion des Soldats et Caporauz de Carriere de 
Belqique (ASCCB), representing corporals and soldiers, created the Sydicat national des Militaires (SNM). 
These three organisations later joined together to form the Centrale Generale des Syndicats Militaires 
(CGSM), a central trade union representing all military personnel. 
While the military syndicates closely rese.mble trade unions in their aims and objectives, they are in many 
respects closer to staff associations as their demands have been neither confrontational nor excessive. 
The syndicates negotiate directly with the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for the Civil 
Service on issues relating to pay, conditions of service and remuneration for overtime. 
According to Werner (1976:485) the activities of the syndicates have not had a negative impact on military 
effectiveness, certain concerns are raised with respect to possible budgetary problems for government. As 
personnel costs exceed half the military budget, the question is posed whether the purchase of military 
equipment and operational costs will be reduced to the detriment of military efficiency in lieu of union 
demands. Concerning the political impact of the syndicates, one non-commissioned officer's association, 
the l'Union Professionelle des Sous-Officiers Beiges (UPSOB) affiliated to the Liberal Trade Unions, have 
adopted a political stance, but has consequently been widely ridiculed by the other associations and syndi-
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cates in the Belgium Armed Forces. However, it is indicative of a more extreme stance, when compared to 
the other structures that exist (Werner, 1976:486). 
The Belgium case study is an interesting and very relevant case study for two reasons. Firstly it illustrates 
that where armed forces experience a significant decline in their previously held status in society and as a 
profession, associations may be formed as pressure groups to re-establish formerly held privileges. 
Secondly, that if these associations are not successful, they may over time increasingly develop as trade 
unions or become involved in union activities to advance their interests. 
5.2.5 Denmark 
As with the Netherlands, group representation in the armed forces have a long history. The early military 
organisations were merely social clubs which served as discussion forums and it was only in 1919, after 
state employees were granted the right to form unions and negotiate with the government, that these rights 
were extended to the military (USA, 1977:16). 
5.2.5.1 Legislative position 
The system of group representation in the Danish armed forces is similar to the rest of the public service. 
Members of the military have the same employee rights as other state employees and a high percentage 
of military personnel other than conscripts have joined the unions. The interests of conscripts are dealt with 
though a spokesman process with the MoD (CMRI, 1980:132). 
5.2.5.2 System of group representation 
There are approximately 52 different associations/unions in the Danish armed forces organised into three 
national military unions. The A-Branch Officer Union represents officers with academic qualifications from 
lieutenant to general/admiral level and is affiliated to the Union of University Graduates one of the four 
main public servants unions. The B-Branch officers' Union caters for the lower officer ranks, lieutenant to 
major and is affiliated to the Central Union of Higher State Functionaries. The Association of Regular Other 
Ranks represents non-commissioned officers. This association is not affiliated to any "outside" organisa-
tion but is the strongest and most active of Denmark's military unions and negotiates directly with the MoD 
(USA, 1977:17-19; CMRI, 1980:133). These three major associations negotiate through the Central 
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Unions of public servants with the Ministry of Wages and Budgets. The relationship of the military unions 
with the Ministries of Finance and Defence and the four main public sector unions is presented in Diagram 
5.2. 
Apart from these three major associations, -there are also a number of other associations representing 
various rank or interests groups within the Danish Armed forces. Once recognised these unions may 
negotiate with the Ministries. 
The associations may negotiate over most matters affecting wages and conditions of service, except those 
of an operational nature. However, the implementation of service conditions, does not require the consent 
of the associations unless such conditions are subject to an agreement between the Association and the 
Ministry (CMRI, 1980:135). 
I 
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Diagram 5.2: Collective bargaining process in Denmark 
Source: USA, 1977:18. 
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In addition to the abovementioned associations, a comprehensive system of representative committees 
have been established at Defence Command, regional and unit level to represent and deal with issues not 
covered by negotiated agreements. These committees are composed of an equal number of representa-
tives of the military command and representatives of the various associations. 
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To summarise, the significance of the Danish case study, is that unlike the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium, the Danish armed forces are divided into a number of small associations, which are grouped 
together on the basis of rank and academic qualifications. The rights of soldiers are quite extensive and 
the unions function in much the same way as unions in the private sector, with the exception that they do 
not have the right to strike. As with the Netherlands, provision exists for suspension of military representa-
tion arrangements during wartime or national emergency (USA, 1977:20). Although it is reported that the 
activities of the various associations and unions have not adversely affected military effectiveness or 
readiness, the Danish armed forces claim that workweek restrictions coupled to budgetary considerations, 
have had a negative impact on their functioning: 
5.2.6 Sweden 
Of all the existing systems of group representation among Western European armed forces, those of 
Sweden are the most advanced and highly organised. Because the military unions are fully integrated into 
the Swedish collective bargaining system, the rights of soldiers as employees are extensive. 
5.2.6.1 Legislative position 
Military associations have existed in Sweden since the early 1900s, but it was not until 1965, when other 
public employees were granted rights of association and collective bargaining under the State Officials Act, 
that these rights were extended to military personnel. Since then the military unions have been fully inte-
grated into the Swedish collective bargaining system. The collective bargaining rights of private sector 
employees apply equally to military personnel and cover all aspeCts of pay and working conditions (USA, 
1977:24). Conscripts have not unionised as they are excluded under the State Officials Act of 1965, as 
they are not considered permanent employees (USA, 1977:24). They are however, represented by means 
of a variety of committees (Krendel, 1977a:119). 
5.2.6.2 Systems of group representation 
Membership in the various unions is based on rank, and nearly all eligible military personnel are union 
members. The Swedish Association of the Army, Navy and Air Force Officers (SOF) formed in 1932 
represents officers of the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above. The oldest of the three 
unions is the Warrant Officers Union (KOF) established in 1907, which represents officers from the rank of 
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ensign to lieutenant. The most active military union with the largest membership, is the union for Non-
commissioned Officers' Union (POF) founded in 1918 (Taylor, 1977:26). The POF and the KOF are 
affiliated to the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TCO) and the TCO's Civil Servants Section, 
catering specifically for state employees. The SOF, on the other hand belongs to the Central Organisation 
of Swedish Professional Workers (Brickmann, 1976:531). 
Negotiations take place at national level and union activities at local level are very low key (Taylor, 
1977:26). The relationship of the various military unions with the broader labour movement is illustrated in 
Diagram 5.3. While these military associations have been successful in improving pay levels and 
conditions of service, this success is largely ascribed to the activities of the major unions with which the 
POF, KOF and SOF are affiliated (CMRI, 1980:128). The Swedish Trade Union Confederation provides 
major financial support and membership to the Social Democratic Party and forms a significant component 
of the ruling establishment (Krendel, 1977b: 148). 
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Unlike any other country, the Swedish armed forces are permitted to strike and the government or military 
as employer has the right to a lock-out. So far, no military union has been involved in a strike (USA, 
1977:22). 
As an advanced social democracy, Sweden has established conditions of employment that reflect specific 
political and cultural preferences in that society. As with the rest of society, the level of co-determination in 
the Swedish military is highly developed, even in the military (Brickman, 1976:536). In this regard, some 
officers have expressed concern that co-determination agreements have resulted in "their functioning as 
coordinators rather than commandersn. On the other hand the Swedish armed forces claim that granting 
soldiers full labour rights has not appeared to have had any influence on military readiness, but then, it 
must be taken into consideration that Sweden has not been to war for over 150 years (USA, 1977:27; 
Krendel, 1977b:147). 
5.3 SUMMARY ANO CONCLUSIONS 
The examination of countries with some form of group representative system reveals that there is no single 
model of military unionisation. The European experience clearly indicates that the origins, structure and 
function of the type group representation found in a particular country is reflective of the history and 
societal context within which the military functions. 
An important point worth noting with respect to group representation in armed forces, is that although the 
military organisation has a pluralist structure, in the sense that there are officers who are the managers 
and non-commissioned officers who can be seen as skilled workers or craftsman, the military union 
experience in Europe has not been a means whereby the latter group has consolidated its strength against 
the officer class, although it must be added that they are the most active. 
While it is true that the cultural and political differences between nations weaken the applicability of the 
European analogue, the experience does highlight certain general trends that may be of comparative 
value. With the exception of Sweden, no country has permitted true labour unions as comparable to 
civilian economic sector. The dominant model of group representation within the armed forces are the 
professional associations, which can be differentiated into those who represent all members (Germany) 
and those who represent a particular rank group or a specific military speciality (Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark). With the exception of Germany, different provisions apply to conscripts. 
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Although the professional associations aim primarily to protect the professional interests of service 
members, they have overtime extended these interests to include activities usually associated with 
unionism. Through their efforts they have made substantial gains in improving the salary and conditions of 
service of members. The Scandinavian associations and unions in particular have won substantial wage 
gains and have been able to maintain pay levels equivalent to those of public servants. Generally, the 
unionised armed forces of Northern Europe have much higher pay scales than the non-organised forces of 
I 
Southern Europe. Other gain included the right to participate in promotion boards, and compensation for 
overtime. (Cortright & Watts 1991 :71) 
As military pay is kept in accord with public sector wage trends, it has effectively removed direct 
negotiations over wages from the military arena. No country, except Sweden has granted their soldiers the 
right to strike. Operational matters affecting military command and discipline are excluded from 
consultation. With the exception of the Netherlands, strong links have been established with the broader 
public sector labour movement. 
In an attempt to enhance participation in decision-making, all the countries studied have created represen-
tative committees to supplement the formal grievance and disciplinary procedures within the chain of com-
mand. These committees operate according to the politics of co-operation rather than confrontation and 
provide a forum for joint consultation. In addition, the establishment of a parliamentary military 
ombudsman to investigate the complaints lodged by soldiers serve as an alternative channel through 
which soldiers can voice their individual or collective grievances. 
It appears as if the different forms of group representation implemented in the countries studied have been 
accommodated without any apparent adverse effects on military readiness, efficiency or disciplin·e. There 
has been some concern that the restrictions on overtime have had a negative impact on training, and that 
the time spent on consultation with the representative associations have slowed down decision-making 
and reduced management flexibility. On the other hand, communication, general working and living 
conditions of military personnel and labour relations practices have improved. 
The issue of whether group representation has negatively affected organisational or combat effectiveness 
is difficult to verify. Especially concerning combat effectiveness, the absence of any empirical evidence 
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means that conclusions on this aspect of military functioning are speculative, as there is no experience of 
possible differences between unionised or non-unionised forces in actual combat situations. 
While some governments, such as France have restricted the employee rights of soldiers out of fear that 
such activities may politicise the armed forces, the European experience suggests that group representa-
tive activities have not had any adverse effect upon the political control of the armed forces. The image of 
a military union acting as a praetorian guard, has not been a feature of the European experience. This 
could possibly be ascribed to the strict controls imposed upon the activities of these unions and associa-
tions both within the chain of command an in their relations with the MoD's. 
To conclude, it is clear that the degree to which the rights of soldiers as employees can be accommodated 
within the armed forces is influenced by, and is dependent upon the societal context within which they 
function. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES: 
FROM SADF TO SANDF 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to sketch a profile of the South African armed forces that will place the forth-
coming chapters into perspective. A few key features of the Union Defence Force, followed by a 
discussion on the major threat perception and mission definition of the . South African Defence Force 
(SADF) over the past thirty years is provided. It is illustrated that since the 1960s, the major mission 
definition of the military in South Africa was the defence of the country against a so-called "communist 
inspired threar from both outside and within the country. Throughout this period the SADF adapted its 
force structure and manpower procurement system to counter this threat. In the nineties, in the absence of 
any clear threat, the entire force structure and manpower procurement system would change, bringing with 
it new problems and challenges. 
Currently, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is undergoing a major transformation, 
affecting the entire organisational structure. Taking this into consideration, the present command and 
control structure, the various arms of service, their structure, primary and secondary roles, as well as man-
power procurement system and problems, are briefly described. 
6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE 
Before discussing the 'mission and force structure of the SADF, a few features of its forerunner, the Union 
Defence Force (UDF), which would have a lasting effect on the future armed forces of South Africa, are 
outlined. 
The UDF, established in 1912, was an amalgamation of British and Boer forces. As with the SANDF, 
which came into being some eighty-two years later, the UDF had to integrate former enemies with vastly 
different political loyalties. From the beginning the need for the defence force to remain politically non-
partisan was emphasised. General Lord Methuen expressed the following sentiments "[p]olitics would 
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have no place in the South African Army and Mr Smuts knows perfectly well the curse this has been in 
other Colonial Forces" (Williams, 1992:21). From these early beginnings a practice of subservience and 
loyalty to the state was cultivated. Even though the SADF became increasingly political in the eighties, it 
never challenged civil authority (Wood, 1995:13). In fact, the deep-rooted culture of bureaucratic 
submission to civilian control, is what clinched the peaceful transition to a new democratic South Africa, 
many years later (Shaw, 1996:14; Seegers, 1996:38). 
Although the number of Afrikaners serving in the UDF grew steadily over the years, it was British military 
culture and traditions that shaped the UDF more than anything specifically drawn from the Afrikaner 
military past. As a member of the British Commonwealth, and with the UDF acting in support of the Allied 
Forces, Britain remained influential in determining the corporate identity through the standardisation of 
training, equipment and organisation. UDF officers and troops attended training courses in Britain, and it is 
this standardisation of training and equipment that made close integration with the British forces during the 
Second World War possible. One can safely conclude that the military professionalism of the South 
African armed forces, even today, has its origin in British tradition (RSA, 1977:4; Seegers, 1996:38,68). 
Another feature of the South Africa armed forces is the reliance placed on part-time soldiers or militia 
almost since the beginning of colonisation. Although the Defence Act of 1912 provided for black men to 
serve in war, only white males were liable to serve, should there be insufficient volunteers (Dorning, 
1987:12). In principle, the UDF was a volunteer force, with a provision for a ballot only if insufficient 
citizens rendered themselves available for military service. The UDF consisted of a professional Perma-
nent Force and the Citizen Force (which formed the bulk of the conventional fighting forces), and the 
Commandos, a voluntary home guard of infantry units for local defence. South Africa became involved in 
both World wars using only volunteers, since the Defence Act prohibited the deployment of citizens outside 
South Africa (Fourie, 1996: 152-157). 
One more point worth noting, is the command and control structure of the UDF. The UDF comprised of the 
Commandant General, the Inspector General, an Army, Navy and Air Force Chief of Staff, the Adjudant 
General, the Quartermaster General and the Surgeon General. The Commandant General, served as 
chief executive officer responsible to the Minister of Defence for the implementation of ministerial policy 
with respect to command, control, organisation, discipline and training. The Secretary of Defence was the 
departmental head and accounting officer, directly responsible to the Minister of Defence for the imple-
mentation of ministerial policy with respect to financial administration and control. This division of functions 
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between the Commandant General and the Secretary of Defence was abolished in May 1967, when the 
Defence Secretariat was dissolved. The reorganisation of the command and control structure of the SADF 
would place the Commandant General, as permanent Head of the Department of Defence (RSA, 1971 :17-
18). Hereafter the Department of Defence became militarised with most of its functions being performed 
by Defence Headquarters. After 1967 there-was, therefore, virtually no civilian, although there was parlia-
mentary oversight over the armed forces. Only years later, with the formation of the SANDF would a 
civilian Defence Secretariat be re-instituted as a means to entrench civilian control over the military and 
would the accounting function of the Department of Defence once again reside with the Secretary of 
Defence. The Secretary of Defence would also be the principal advisor to the Minister of Defence 
(SANDF, 1996a: 13-14 ). 
6.3 MAJOR MISSION DEFINITION 
Before South Africa broke away from the British Commonwealth, the former UDF was orientated and 
structured to act as part of and in support of the British Forces. This role was to change with the formation 
of the new SADF in 1957. 
According to the Defence Act, 44 of 1957 the tasks of the SADF were to defend the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA) from foreign attack, the prevention and suppression of terrorism and other forms of internal 
disorder, to act to preserve life·, health, property and the maintenance of essential services, and undertake 
police duties as may be prescribed at any time by the civil authorities (Frankel, 1984:1). In the years that 
followed, these roles were fulfilled often only too well by the SADF. 
6.3.1 The sixties and the "communist threat" 
With the proclamation of South Africa as a Republic on 31 May 1961 outside the Commonwealth, the 
SADF would enter a new era in defence. Reliant upon its own resources, South African defence planners 
undertook a comprehensive review of the threat environment. According to an official Department Defence 
Review of this period, the following signs were unmistakable by the sixties. "Our enemies receive increa-
sing moral and material aid, not merely from the Communist countries, but also from several organisations 
and some governments in the West. Hostile African states are mainly armed and organised with aid from 
Communist countries. The presence of the Russians in the Indian Ocean and the Chinese in Zambia and 
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Tanzania is now an accomplished fact. Terrorists are active in Angola, Mozambique and along the 
Rhodesian border, their training, organisation and armament are improving appreciably" (RSA, 1971 :26). 
This assessment of the threat perception lead to a steady expansion of the SADF with respect to its man-
power, organisation and equipment. The greatest expansion occurred in the South African Army, with new 
units being established and the organisation of headquarters elements accordingly modified and enlarged 
(RSA, 1971 :6). A program of armament modernisation was initiated, which entailed purchasing of various 
types of major equipment such as aircraft, armoured cars and naval elements.1 As South Africa became 
increasingly isolated due to the race-based policies of the National Party, so provision was made for manufac-
turing armaments locally to make South Africa as independent as possible from foreign sources. The expan-
sion of the armaments industry was in fact so successful, that within a decade the Army had been completely 
re-equipped with clothing, weapons, vehicles and communication equipment from own sources (RSA, 
1971 :7). By 1988, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) had grown to the tenth largest 
exporter of arms in the world (Reichardt & Cilliers, 1996a:249). 
Although the focus of the SADF during the sixties remained against an external aggressor in the form of a 
conventional assault, the military was repeatedly used in support of the police during the states of emer-
gency in 1960, 1976 and during the mid-eighties . .But at this stage, operations against both the armed 
wing of the African National Congress (ANC) Umkhonto we Sizwe, formed in 1964, and the Pan Africanist 
Congress' (PAC) Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), who had embarked on a campaign of armed 
resistance against the state, were the concern of the South African Police (Sass, 1996:124). Later, these 
organisations were forced into exile and sought bases in friendly countries, the ANC in Zambia and the 
PAC first in Lesotho and then in Tanzania. During this period both the ANC and PAC, considerably 
weakened by the arrest of many of their leaders under the Suppression of Communism Act, (1950)2 and 
Terrorism Act (1967) and having to operate in exile, did not pose a threat to the South African government. 
It was only with the collapse of white rule in Angola (1974), Mozambique in (1975) and Zimbabwe in (1979) 
that they could consolidate their strength and would become the target of cross-border attacks by the 
SADF (Worden, 1994:114-5). 
1. With the exception of Centurion tanks and a number of armoured troop carriers procured in the early fifties, all Army equipment dated 
from World War II (RSA, 1971:7). 
2. The Suppression of Communism Act gave the Minister of Justice the power to ban any person or organisation viewed as "Communist'. 
A broad definition which gave the government the scope to arrest and detain almost anyone who was considered a threat to the 
'apartheicf state. 
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6.3.2 The seventies and the total onslaught 
The long perceived communist threat assumed greater reality and urgency in the course of the 1970s. 
The military began talking of a "total onslaughr on the Republic both from outside and within the country. 
Up until then, the SADF's military posture was primarily defensive and not offensive. But this soon 
changed as passive defence was perceived as inadequate and the need for retaliatory and interdictory 
capability was deemed necessary (RSA, 1973:3). 
The National Party's determination to retain Namibia, possibly as a fifth province, resulted in the SADF's 
engagement from 1972 in counter-insurgency operations against the South West African People's Organi-
sation (Swapo), who were based in Angola and Zambia (Fourie, 1996:160). Initially these operations were 
classical counter-insurgency operations against rural guerrillas, but in time the scope and intensity of the 
SADF activities increased. With the outbreak of full-scale civil war in Angola, South Africa lent their 
support to Unita (Uniao Nacional para a lndependencia Total de Angola), one of the most friendly anti-
colonial movements in Angola in an attempt to impede Swapo. During this period, the SADF had became 
involved in an escalating war by proxy, initially in support of the Portuguese colonial power and Rename 
(Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana) in Mozambique and, then in Rhodesia and former South West Africa. 
This involvement lead to an escalation of conflict in the region and by the mid-seventies, Cuban and Soviet 
support for the MPLA (Movimento Popular de llbertacao de Angola) increased to halt the advance of the 
Unita/SADF alliance (Seegers, 1996:210-216; Fourie 1996:160). 
The number of armed confrontations between these forces during the seventies and particularly during the 
eighties in southern Angola increased substantially, until the decisive battle of Cuito Caunavale in 1988, 
where for the first time since the war the SADF did not reach their objective (Seegers, 1996:256-8). 
6.3.3 The eighties and the escalation of internal unrest 
During the eighties, internally, South Africa had become engulfed in a rising tide of popular, mass-based 
resistance to apartheid. The labour unrest of 1973 and subsequent urban unrest caught the government 
by surprise. Particularly after the Soweto riots in 1976, the spiral of resistance against apartheid intensi-
fied, culminating in the state of emergencies in the mid-eighties. In the face of virtual civil war the state 
retained control merely through military force. The battlefront of the SADF now shifted to within the 
borders of South Africa. A defence budget which rose steadily during the sixties and seventies, reaching a 
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peak in 1989 at 3,4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), most of which went on internal 
deployment alongside the police (Sass, 1996:134; Worden, 1994:131). 
During this period, the SAP and particularly the SADF, began to play an increasingly assertive role through 
the National Security Management System (NSMS) as part of the "total strategy"3 to counter the "total 
onslaughr. Through the State Security Council (SSC) and a system of Joint Management Centers (JMC) 
the government was able to identify sources of unrest and conflict in the early stages, and co-ordinate the 
functioning of all government departments below cabinet level. The growing political influence of the mili-
tary in these structures often led to accusations that the SADF was becoming an "alternative government, 
with its activities regarded as manifestations of a 'creeping military take over'" 4 (Sass, 1996:129). There 
can be no doubt that during the P.W. Botha era the military had, indeed, become central to state power. s 
Despite the attempts to step up security, the initiation of the "winning hearts and minds" s campaign and 
the meager attempts at reform by the National Party which attempted to remove some of the grievances 
revolutionaries could exploit, the country had become ungovernable by the mid-eighties (Wood, 1995:15). 
The inability of the security forces to contain the internal unrest, the growth of the black resistance 
movements, the increase in support for the exiled ANC and the infiltration of ANC guerrillas into the 
country, the growing strength of the trade union movement and their central role in co-ordinating the Mass 
Democratic Movement's mass civil disobedience campaigns, as well as international sanctions all 
eventually added up and led to the demise of the apartheid state (Worden, 1994: 133). 
By the end of the eighties, negotiations and settlements in South-West Africa/Angola, which had been 
subject to much debate within the United Nations, reached a climax. Hostilities ended with the United 
3. The 1977 Defence White Paper defined the total strategy as '[t]he comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state 
according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of specific policies'. The foreign policy, 
internal policy and defence policy would all be synchronised as a total strategy to counter the total onslaught against the state. A 
counter-strategy was needed to combat this total onslaught and this paved the way for the military to involve itself with major decision 
making on both foreign and domestic matters (Geldenhuys, 1984:140). 
4. The SADF can even be accused of praetorianism during this period as the military tended (even though by consent) to dominate 
National Party politics. Perlmutter (1980:208) defines one of the features of the praetorian army and the praetorian state as one where 
the army dominates an independent political organisation. They also state that such political involvement will to some extend destroy 
the professional status and rank of the military profession. 
5. The SADF can even be accused of praetorianism during this period as the military tended (even though by consent) to dominate 
National Party politics. 
6. In both townships and the rural areas the SADF was deployed in community schemes in a campaign to win the hearts and minds of 
people, but this scheme soon failed once the security forces started to suppress opposition (Worden, 1994:124). This involvement of 
the SADF in an internal role also had a very negative affect on the legitimacy of the military in the eyes of the broader populace 
(Nathan, 1989a:71). 
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Nations Resolution 435, which set out the eventual withdrawal of both South African and Swapo forces as 
well as the Cubans from Angola. The Namibian settlement also meant that the ANC lost its base camps in 
Angola and faced virtually no prospect of re-establishing elsewhere in Southern Africa (Guelke, 1996:89). 
The independence of Namibia in 1990, together with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, created the climate for the political reform that was to follow. 
6.3.4 The nineties and redefining security 
After decades of government pursuit of the policy of preventing at all cost the accession to power of the 
ANC and the South African Communist Party, the 1990s would see an about tum on previous policy with 
the unbanning of these organisations in February 1990. Within a matter of a few years, from 1990 to 1994, 
the mission of the military changed from that of countering a communist threat, and weakening the ability 
of neighbouring countries to support the low level insurgency campaign f the ANC, to that of a military 
literally in search of a mission. Massive budgetary cuts followed with the defence budget being slashed 
from 3,4 percent of the GDP in 1989 to 2,2 percent of GDP by 1995, a reduction of close to 66 percent in 
real terms in a matter of six years (Sass, 1996:134). 
The realisation that there was no conceivable prospect of an external threat led to a total rethink of secu-
rity. In 1994 with the formation of the SANDF, the tasks of the future defence force as defined in the 
Interim Constitution included the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the RSA; to fulfil 
South Africa's international obligations; to preserve life, health and property; to provide to maintain essen-
tial services; to uphold law and order in co-operation with the South African Police Service and to support 
socio-economic upliftment. In the final 1996 Constitution, these tasks are simply defined as follows in 
Section 200 (2): "the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the republic, its territorial 
integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating 
the use offorce". Section 201 (2) also makes provision for the President may authorise the employment of 
the defence force "(a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in ful-
filment of an international obligation". The clauses relating to the preservation of life, health an.d property 
and to provide and maintain essential services and support socio-economic upliftment were not included in 
the final 1996 Constitution. 
While the SANDF continues to budget and design its force structure for its primary function, its main use 
may be in a collateral utility, configured around non-traditional roles and secondary functions. These 
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include regional security, peace operations, aid to the police, protection of the civil power against 
unconstitutional action, border and maritime protection and disaster relief. As Fourie (1996:176) states, 
"[a]t this stage in the history of South Africa the SANDF faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its 
existence, but certainly its expenditure, size, sophistication and significance. While the object proposed for 
the. new constitution is that it 'shall be the defence and protection of the Republic, its territorial integrity and 
its people ... guided by the principle of non-aggression', there is little reason at present to anticipate the 
need for such defencen. Against this background the SANDF faces the challenge of having to design a 
force structure, in the absence of any threat against which to plan, and within the confines of a decreasing 
defence budget. 
6.4 FORCE STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
During the period under review, the entire manpower procurement system was adapted to counter the 
perceived threat of a communist invasion. The combat capacity of the SADF, particularly its part-time 
component, was either expanded or contracted depending upon the external threat or level of political 
instability within the country. 
The military appreciation in the sixties led to a considerable expansion of the Pennanent and Citizen Force. 
With respect to the Pennanent Force, it is of interest to note that throughout the history of the SADF it expe-
rienced problems in recruiting and retaining suitably qualified personnel. As indicated in the 1973 Defence 
White Paper, even though personnel turnover decreased slightly with the improved service conditions and 
other benefits, "... the loss in certain musterings is still too great .. . there is a great drainage towards the 
private sector. This is of grave concern" (RSA, 1973:20). The low salaries and service conditions of the 
SADF in comparison to the private sector seemed to be the main problem in recruiting suitable personnel 
(RSA, 1982:15). 
The demands for high quality manpower were partly overcome by the recruitment of white women. Motivated 
primarily out of need to release white men for operational duties, women were appointed on a pennanent 
basis in supportive musterings such as finance, personnel, logistics, intelligence, medical service and welfare 
since 1970. Similarly the recruitment of Blacks, Indians and Coloureds into the Pennanent Force was moti-
vated by manpower shortages (RSA, 1977:31). Whereas they only initially served in non-combat positions in 
the early sixties, this changed in the seventies. In 1973 a black combat unit was created and 1979 
established a number of ethnic units, attached to the various regional commands. By early 1986, Blacks 
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represented 12 percent, Coloureds 11 percent, Indians 1 percent and whites 76 percent of the Full-time Force 
component of the SADF (RSA, 1986:17; Sass, 1996:123). The civilian component also increased during this 
period in an effort to release regular military personnel for operational service. 
Table 6.1: Desired and actual manpower needs of the SADF 
Desired Actual 
,... ............ e _ ............. e 
In full-time service 
Permanent force 13,5 7,0 
National servicemen 12,5 6,6 
Civilians 4,5 3,1 
Total 30,5 16,7 
In part-time service 
Citizen force 34,8 54,9 
Commandos 34,7 28,4 
Total 69,5 83,3 
Grand Total 100 100 
Source: RSA, 1977:18. 
But it was white male conscription that provided the source of manpower. In 1960 th~ Citizen Force was 
supplemented by means of a ballot system applicable to all young white males. Since then, the number of 
white males called up through the ballot system was increased from 11 759 in 1962 to 19 513 in 1965. With 
the introduction of compulsory national service for all white males of eighteen years and older in 1968, the 
annual intake rose to 26 357 in 1970, an annual intake figure that could not be increased without extending 
conscription to women and other races (RSA, 1971 :6). Although the conscription of women was considered 
at one stage, this never materialised (Cock, 1989:65). Instead, the period of conscription was increased to 
meet the manpower needs (see Table 6.1). From 1978to1989 the period of national service was lengthened 
to two years. Following the completion of this initial period of service, conscripts were allocated to units in the 
Citizen Force Reserve or Commandos to serve an additional 720 days over a period of twelve years. By the 
late eighties, white conscription provided an annual intake of roughly 20 000 conscripts and the estimated 
number of part-time members available for call-up to be around 500 000 (Sass, 1996:126). 
In January 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations, the period of conscription 
was reduced to twelve months, and finally discontinued at the end of 1993. Mention must be made of the fact 
that since the mid-seventies and particularly during the eighties with the deployment of troops in the town-
ships, resistance to conscription grew and fewer recruits were reporting for duty (Nathan, 1989b: 15-17; Shaw, 
1994:230). 
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With the end of conscription and to bridge manpower shortages, a system of "term volunteers" was intro-
duced, where persons could join the SADF for a period of two, four or more years. Just prior to the formation 
of the SANDF the full-time force consisted of a Permanent Force of about 35 000 (45 percent), an Auxiliary 
force of around 9000 (12 percent), Term-Volunteers, 3 000 (4 percent) and civilians 29 000 (38 percent) of the 
Full-time Force (Du Plessis, 1993:19). These figures would swell to around 135 000 with the formation of the 
SANDF and the integration of former statutory forces of the SADF, Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Bophuta-
tswana Defence Force (BDF), Venda Defence Force (VDF) and the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF), the former 
non-statutory military forces Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) 
(Madise, 1995:49). As the SANDF has become essentially a peacetime military, force numbers are to be 
reduced to around 90 000 or possibly less, depending on budgetary constraints. Once the process of integra-
tion is complete, the process of rationalisation and demobilisation, which is already underway, will be finalised. 
The Minister of Defence summarised the envisaged force composition of the SANDF as follows: " ... South 
Africa's basic defence strategy is to have a relatively small affordable 'core force7' consisting of elements of 
the full-time and part-time components ... backed by a sufficiently large part-time componenr (Madise, 
1995:49). The Full-time Force (FTF) and Part-time Force (PTF) component of the SANDF was as at Novem-
ber 1996, is reflected in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: SANDF Personnel Service System (November 1996) 
Personnel Service System Number Percentage 
Full-time Force 
Long term service 46516 46 
Medium-term service 3304 3 
Short-term service 27 612 27 
Auxiliary service 482 
-
Civilians 23 151 23 
Total Full-time Force 101 066 100 
Part-time Force 8 
Voluntary military service 2014 2 
Conventional force 9000 9 
Territorial force 85 211 89 
Total Part-time Force 96225 100 
Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF 
7. The 'core force' concept is intended to ensure that the Regular Force and the PTF constitute an integrated Defence Force which is 
capable of defending the Republic. The Regular Force and the PTF together provide the SANDF's core capabilities which can be 
expanded if required by calling the trained part-time volunteers into service (Bakkes ,1997:10). · 
8. The tenn 'part-time force' is a new and inclusive name for previously separate part-time components, namely the Citizen Force (which 
may be tasked to operate anywhere) and the Commandos (which are usually tasked to operate on an area-bound•basis). Although in 
statute the part-time forces are still called the Citizen and Commando forces, the fonner Citizen Force is referred to as the 
Conventional Force and the fonner Commandos, including some of the Citizen Force Counter-insurgency Citizen Units (COIN), the 
Tenitorial Force. 
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The integration of the TBVC and non-statutory forces brought about a radical change in the racial composition 
of the SANDF. The racial composition had already changed significantly by 1993, with Blacks making up 35 
percent, Asians 1 percent, Coloureds 15 percent and Whites 48 percent (Du Plessis, 1993:16). By November 
1996 the racial composition for the FTF uniformed component was Blacks 56 percent, Asians 1 percent, 
Coloureds 9 percent and Whites 34 percent.9 
As Constitutional provisions forbid discrimination on the grounds of race and gender, women can now be 
trained and employed on the same basis as men, and all combat musterings are now accessible to women. 
However, white males still dominate the senior ranks within the SANDF, with women making up a mere 11 
percent (excluding civilians) of the FTF component of the SANDF. 
The future all-volunteer SANDF shall consist of a relatively small FTF, backed by sufficiently large voluntary 
PTF (SANDF, 1996a:34). The full-time component is to maintain the SANDF infrastructure (headquarters, 
bases, depots, training establishments) and supply the leadership, expertise, planning for operations as well 
as combat commanders at selected levels. The part-time compon nt is to supply and maintain the SANDF 
conventional and territorial forces and reserves for full-time deployment. 
A voluntary Flexible Service System has been introduced to serve as the future manpower procurement 
system for the FTF. At present this service system consists of three different manning components. The 
Long-term Service System (L TS) aims to supply manpower with advanced functional and managerial skills to 
man the top structure of the SANDF. The member's appointment, unlike the other service systems is of a 
permanent nature and stretches until retirement age. In future, only those who have served in the Medium-
term Service System, former Permanent Force members or members of the part-time component holding the 
ranks of Staff Sergeant to Sergeant Major, or Major and higher may be admitted to the L Ts.10 This system is 
available to all classifications in the occupational class, military practitioner11 , as well as to professional 
occupational classes (CSANDF, 1996c:1). 
9. See Appendix A-1 for Department of Defence breakdown per rank, race and gender. 
10. Upon integration, all former SADF and TBVC forces retained their short or long-term contracts. The former non-statutory force 
members enter into agreement with the SANDF according to the prevailing measures under the flexible service system. Their situation 
is basically the same as that of the former SADF with respect to combination of STS, MTS and L TS depending on their age, rank and 
previous period of proven service in MK or APLA. As is reflected in Appendix A-2 the vast majority of former MK and APLA members 
as at November 1996 have been integrated into the STS. This in effect means that they could be technically discharged by the 
SANDF by 1998 if their contacts are not renewed. 
11. The term military practitioner is used to define all those persons who practice the profession of arms. 
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small, affordable "core force" consisting of elements of the full-time and part-time components, which could be 
expanded through the call-up of trained volunteers (Bakkes, 1996:5-6, 10). How this will be achieved, is 
presently a subject of much debate. 
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One of the greatest manning challenges of the SANDF under this all-volunteer system, is not attracting suffi-
cient manpower, but the ability to recruit and retain members of the required quality to staff all the different 
components of a relatively technologically advanced, and sophisticated defence force. An all-volunteer force 
requires competitive conditions of service if it is to attract high quality recruits and secure a low rate of turn-
over (Nathan, 1994:135). This has been a perpetual problem through the years, and is likely to become even 
more so under an all-volunteer system. 
6.5 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
While the Department of Defence, consisting of the Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretariat and the 
SANDF has and still is undergoing substantial restructuring, the organisational structure of the SANDF, 
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(with the exception of the creation of the new Communication directorate and the Service Corps), has 
remained essentially the same as that of the SADF. 
At present, the Chief of the SANDF13 (CNDF) under the direction of the Minister of Defence in times of 
peace and under the direction of the President during a state of national defence, exercises executive 
command and control over the SANDF and the four Arms of Service. The SANDF consists of four Arms of 
Service, the South African Army (SA Army), the South African Air Force (SAAF), the South African Navy 
(SAN), and since 1989, the South African Medical Services (SAMS). Defence headquarters as well as all 
the arms of service headquarters are in Pretoria. Also falling directly under the CNDF is the Chaplain 
General, Chief Communication Directorate, the Inspector General, Adjudant General and the newly 
created Service Corps (see Diagram 6.2). 
CHIEF OF THE SA 
NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE 
CHIEF OF STAFF 
DEFENCE FORCE 
I I I I 
CHIEF 
OPERATIONS FINANCE INSPECTOR CHAPLAIN COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL 
GENERAL GENERAL DIRECTORATE DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 
ADJUDANT CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICAL DEFENCE THE SERVICE GENERAL CORPS DIVISION DIVISION HQ UNIT 
ARMS OF SERVICE 
SA AIR FORCE SA MEDICAL SERVICE 
COMMANDS, SCHOOLS, MILITARY BASES AND UNITS 
Diagram 6.2: Organigram of the SANDF 
Source: SANDF, 1994/5:9. 
Defence headquarters are organised into six staff divisions, each being headed by a Chief of Staff, 
namely: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finance, as well as an Independent Directorate of 
13. The new 1996 Constitution, Section 202 (1) stipulates that '(1) The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in Chief 
of the defence force, and must appoint the Military Command of the defence force'. This implies that in future there may not 
necessarily be a single commander or chief of the SANDF. 
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Management Services. Until recently, the Chief of Defence Force Staff collectively directed these staff 
divisions.14 
The headquarters of the Arms of Service and their lower headquarters are organised along similar lines to 
that of Defence Headquarters. Every Arm of Service Headquarters has a personnel, operations, finance, 
intelligence, logistics division. All these divisions operate within the policy framework determined by 
Defence Headquarters and must ensure that the CNDF policies are administered and adhered to by the 
respective Arms of Service. 
6.5.1 South African Army 
In South Africa, the Army has always been the dominant and largest service within the SADF. This is 
because South African defence policy has invariably been orientated towards a landward threat, not a 
naval invasion. Nor has it been overly concerned with air power, apart from where it serves to supplement 
ground forces. 
The mission of the SA Army has traditionally been de ined as the rendering of landward military services to 
the Republic of South Africa. There are two main types of forces, the conventional and territorial forces. 
The Army Headquarters exercises direct command over the conventional forces and controls the territorial 
forces through a decentralised system of regional commands. The main function of the conventional force 
is to respond to sudden threats. It consists of a rapid deployment force (RDF) of both an airborne and 
ground component, both of which have the responsibility of neutralising any enemy threat within or outside 
the country's borders. This force consists of a number of highly mobile formations consisting of a tank and 
artillery regiment, mechanised infantry and motorised infantry battalions with supporting engineering and 
technical units. 
The territorial force has ten regional commands and these are responsible mainly for rear area defence 
including border protection, support for the police, disaster relief and emergency deployment within their 
area. In time of war they are also responsible for rear-area security operations: Each command has a 
14. This post, previously filled by Lt Genl Siphiwe Nyanda has been rationalised. A process is also underway to restructure the entire 
Defence Headquarters, including the headquarters of the Arms of Service in order to do away with the duplication of functions. This 
process is due to be completed in the course of 1997. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
83 
number of light-infantry battalions, especially geared for counter-insurgency type of warfare (SANDF, 
1996a:2-8; Romer-Heitman ,1994:34). 
The personnel composition of the SA Army is reflected in Table 6.3. Presently, the SA Army is experien-
cing a high level of resignations among its members, particularly at the junior leader and middle manage-
ment levels. According to Fourie (1996:171) "the most serious effect has been the loss of instructors who 
would have been able to raise the professional levels of the newcomers". The full-time component of the 
SA Army has also been subject to the loss of various skills through resignations and retirements, which in 
tum has had a negative effect on morale (SANDF, 1994/4:68). 
While the SA Army is experiencing a rapid loss of skilled personnel, there is an oversupply of members for 
the STS, a relatively unskilled manpower component. The refusal of the SANDF to renew the contract 
period of many black short-term soldiers has lead to strikes, and demonstrations by these members. The 
non-renewal of contracts is largely due to the integration of former non-statutory force members into the 
lower skilled STS (Fourie, 1996:171). Actual rationalisation can only commence after the integration 
process is complete, and this is one of the main reasons why present contracts are not b_eing renewed. 
Table 6.3: Personnel Service Systems per Ann of Service {November 1996) 
Anny Air Force Nav SAMS 
N % n % n % n % 
Full-time force 
Long-term service 28 791 44 7 433 53 3 543 39 4 928 55 
Medium-term service 1 293 2 717 5 748 8 465 5 
Short-term service 23176 35 2 389 17 1161 14 713 8 
Auxiliary service 356 - 15 - 31 - 60 1 
Civilians 12 317 19 3 419 25 3 536 39 2 753 31 
Total full-time force 65 933 100 13 973 100 9 019 100 8 919 100 
Part-time force 
Voluntary Military Service 1 937 2 - - 74 10 1 -
Conventional force 6 591 7 481 100 662 90 1 264 100 
Territorial force 84 896 91 - - 0 - 0 -
Total part-time force 93424 100 481 100 736 100 1 265 100 
Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF. 
As reflected in Table 6.3, the largest part of the SA Army consists of the conventional and territorial units 
with a substantial portion of the conventional warfare capability residing in the PTF. These units are also 
trained in secondary roles. The territorial units form the largest part of the operational forces of the 
regional commands and consist mainly of light infantry elements. In peace-time these units may perform 
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secondary role in co-operation with the local community, local authorities, and the South African Police 
Service (Bakkes, 1997:7). 
With respect to both uniformed and civilian employees the SA Army has experienced increasing pressure 
in the field of labour relations, which is being exacerbated by the incorporation of civilians under the New 
Labour Relations Act as well as the impact of the Constitution, that guarantees certain fundamental rights 
to every citizen (SANDF, 1994/5: 70-71). The fact that the SA Army will be most affected by future rationa-
lisation adds to the labour relations challenges of the future. As Seegers (1996:280) highlights " ... the 
SANDF has encountered two big problems simultaneously, integration and a desperate popular need for 
employment in a local and international context unfavourable to large military forces". It is as she states 
"the cruelest of dilemmas" and .is a problem that is predominantly one that the SA Army has to manage. 
6.5.2 South African Air Force 
The South African Air Force (SAAF) is tasked with protecting the air space of the Republic, through the 
conduct of air operations to prevent an air attack, and to provide air support for ground forces. This was a 
role the SAAF fulfilled quite extensively in Southern Angola, where the Army, with the support of the Air 
Force could operate under an almost continual hostile air situation. Its secondary objectives include 
among others to provide military air transport, to act in support of civil authorities in protecting lives, health 
and property and to assist and co-operate with other friendly air forces and institutions (SANDF, 1996a:2-
9). The SAAF already has a long history of search and rescue missions and of flying relief supplies to 
neighbouring countries, and this is likely to increase if South Africa takes on a growing regional role. 
Unlike the SA Army, the SAAF is run as a centralised organisation, with most of its elements reporting 
directly to Air Force Hea~quarters in Pretoria. The exception is that its squadrons fall under the command 
of their bases for administrative and support purposes. Operationally, all squadrons are controlled by the 
Air Force Command Post. The Southern Air Force Command Post in Cape Town is responsible for co-
ordinating operations with the SA Navy and has particular responsibility for coastal search and rescue. 
Forward Air Force Command Post is co-located with the SA Army regional commands, to facilitate joint 
operations. 
The SAAF is almost exclusively manned by Permanent Force L TS members, with some contract volun-
teers and civilian assistance personnel (see Table 6.3). Especially since the formation of the SANDF, the 
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SAAF has experienced an unacceptably high resignation rate amongst its pilots. This seems to be spilling 
over to other occupational classes such as aircrew, airspace controllers, engineers, and technicians as 
well as supporting service groups. 
Granted the high cost involved in training airforce flight personnel, the SAAF hopes that the new flexible 
service system will ensure the required return on investment. It is envisaged that in future the STS will 
represent 17 percent of the SAAF's human resources, the MTS 73 percent and the L TS 10 percent 
(SANDF, 1994/5:84). 
As reflected in table 6.3 the part-time force component of the SAAF is small. There are nine part-time 
force volunteer air squadrons in the SAAF, responsible for communication and reconnaissance flight. 
These volunteers are trained and tested by the SAAF to Air Force standards. Other part-time force pilots 
and experts in technical and professional disciplines also render support to the regular force (Bakkes, 
1997:8). 
6.5.3 South African Navy 
The South African Navy (SAN) is the smallest of the three combat services. If compared with most foreign 
navies, the SAN is mainly a coastal force, equipped for close defence of South African territorial waters. 
Even though the primary role of the SAN is to conduct naval operations to defend the RSA, it also 
performs some very important secondary functions including search and rescue, protection of maritime 
natural resources, monitoring ships around the Cape, sea transportation and diplomatic support. In the 
last few years, such diplomatic services have included assisting Namibia with fisheries patrols, Zaire with 
the reconstruction of harbour facilities, Mozambique with coastal surveys and transported relief supplies to 
both Kenya and Mozambique (Romer-Heitman, 1994:36). The SAN also contributes towards research and 
development in the maritime field, by providing hydrographic services such as survey and mapping of the 
almost 3 000 km coastline, navigation publications and oceanographic services (SANDF, 1994/5:93). 
The Chief of the Navy is in command of the SA Navy. Ships are grouped in flotillas15 which, together with 
bases at Simonstown and Durban and other naval units, are commanded by Chief of Naval Operations at 
15. These include a strike craft flotilla, a submarine flotilla, mine countermeasures flotilla, and three independent ships, the hydrographic 
survey ship, SAS Protea and the combat support ships SAS Drakensberg and SAS Outeniqua. 
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Naval Headquarters. Chief of Naval Operations is the designated ship operating authority and as such 
exercises operational command over all operations conducted by Navy ships. Also at Naval Headquarters, 
is the Chief of Naval Support, responsible for support functions such as personnel, logistics, finance and 
planning (SANDF, 1996a:2-10). 
There are also a number of PTF units trained to supplement the FTFs in time of emergency or conflict. 
These part-time force members are used to reinforce and sustain the wartime complement of the SAN; 
staff ships and submarines, SAN shore establishments and to perform tasks such as port and coastal 
defence, including naval control of shipping and the staffing of harbour and coastal defence vessels 
(Bakkes, 1997:8). 
As with the SAAF, the L TS component of the SAN is almost exclusively composed of uniformed Perma-
nent Force members and civilians (see Table 6.3). Most of the civilians are employed at the Naval Dock-
yard in Simonstown and are responsible for the repair and maintenance of ships (SANDF, 1994/4:99). 
Although the SAN did not experience a significant drain in skilled manpower, if compared to the SAAF, 
shortages have been experienced with respect to operational and technical personnel. The SAN has also 
experienced labour relations problems among civilian employees in the Naval Dockyard, which has serious 
implications for the operational effectiveness of the SAN. 
6.5.4 South African Medical Services 
The South African Medical Services (SAMS) was formed as a separate Arm of Service in 1979, to provide 
comprehensive medical care for all members of the Defence Force and for the dependants of Permanent 
Force members. The secondary mission is to provide medical support for other departments, including the 
Police and the Department of Correctional Services and third mission, to support emergency and disaster-
relief operations, and to assist the civil medical authorities where necessary (Romer-Heitman, 1994:36). 
Command and control, as with the SA Army, is exercised on a decentralised basis through a system of 
regional medical commands. Officers commanding the various commands are responsible for the execu-
tion of the SAMS mission within their geographical boundaries. Some of the specialist Permanent Force 
Units that render a country wide service, or that are of specific strategic value such as the SAMS 
Academy, Medical Base Depot, the SAMS Technical Support Unit and the Institute for Aviation Medicine 
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and Military Psychological Institute, fall directly under the command of SAMS Headquarters (SANDF, 
1994/5:108). So do the three Part-time Force units which are deployed with the operational forces. 
Concerning personnel, the biggest problem experienced is that the medium-term system is not yet in 
place. Many of the SAMS personnel are professionals with marketable skills outside the SANDF. This 
possibly explains why, during this period of uncertainty with respect to their future careers, why there has 
been such a high personnel turnover in medical officers and nursing staff, resulting in a tum over of 16 
percent and 23,3 percent respectively (SANDF, 1994/5: 115). SAMS also employs a large number of 
civilians in the three Military Hospitals. Many of these civilians now belong to the National Education 
Health and Allied Workers Union and during the past two years, SAMS has experienced a number of 
strikes and stayaways, all related to wage disputes, culminating in over 1433 lost man days. 
6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The South African armed forces owe their beginnings, professionalism, culture and traditions to the former 
Union Defence Force. The SADF developed along British traditions and is comparable to most European 
armed forces in structure, function and professionalism, even today. 
This is particularly true with respect to counterinsurgency and even conventional warfare, in which it gained 
considerable experience since the sixties. In the past three decades, the entire force structure and 
manpower procurement system, based on white male conscription was geared to counter a "communist 
onslaughtn against the RSA, both from outside and within the country. During this period the SADF 
enjoyed a privileged position within society, and by the eighties was central to state power. 
With the settlement in fo"!ler South West Africa and the start of negotiations in 1990, which would even-
tually culminate in the first democratic elections in South Africa, the mission and position of the military in 
society would change dramatically. The realisation that there was no conceivable prospect of an external 
threat and with a new political dispensation being forged, the future tasks of the defence force were rede-
fined to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with internatio-
nal principles. Only the President may authorise employment of the SANDF in Cupertino with the police 
and in the fulfilment of international obligations, such as peacekeeping operations. 
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With no clear mission and no perceived threat, force levels need to be reduced. With the formation of the 
SANDF in 1994, a flexible service system was introduced which catered for both a full-time and part-time 
component. With respect to this manpower procurement system, there are two main future concerns. The 
first relates to the management and training of the part-time forces who are expected to form the largest 
component of the new "core force". The second, the ability of the SANDF to attract and retain the 
necessary skilled personnel, while coping with the relative oversupply of unskilled persons, hoping to 
secure a renewal of their short-term contracts. Although the SANDF is undergoing a major structural 
transformation, it will no doubt move forward from the foundation created by the former SADF. 
The SA Army faces the major challenges. It has the largest component of short-term service personnel, 
has had to absorb the greatest proportion of former non-statutory force members, and is more reliant on 
the Part-time Forces than the other Arms of Service. The SAN, SAAF and SAMS are more dependent on 
long-service (permanent force) members and on civilians. The main manpower problems experienced by 
these arms of service are the ability to retain and maintain sufficiently high quality manpower. Another is 
coping with the increase in labour unrest among both uniformed and civilian employees. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the formation of the South African National Defence Force {SANDF), the "professionalism of the 
SADP' was subject to much debate. The South African Defence Force {SADF) considered itself a first rate 
professional military, and regarded the possibility of integrating "revolutionary forces", who lacked the level 
and type of training required of a professional force, as a threat to the integrity of the future armed forces 
{Griffiths, 1995:402). They, {the SADF), were after all, "superior military specialists" operating 
sophisticated equipment, not a revolutionary army with no conventional training {Seegers, 1996:271). 
The debate surrounding the professionalism of the future South African armed forces raised much concern 
and centred, not only around the level of expertise, standards and level of training of the former non-
statutory forces to be integrated, but also more normative aspects of military professionalism. This led to 
certain principles being enshrined in both the Interim Constitution, as well as the Defence White Paper. 
In this chapter, it will be illustrated that the former SADF conformed to most of the criteria outlined by 
McKinlay { 1971) as characteristics of a professional military. The five dimensions of professionalism, 
namely, the degree of generalised and systematic knowledge; the institutional autonomy to exercise 
control over their sphere of activity; corporatism and loyalty to the profession and bureaucracy; the internal 
controls and internal affective neutrality imposed on members; and the commitment to professional social 
ethics and external affective neutrality, are discussed with reference to the South African armed forces. 
Within this professional/institutional framework, it is explained why labour relations is managed from a typi-
cally unitarist perspective. The mechanisms that are in place to resolve grievances, complaints and dis-
satisfactions, as well as the reaction to the possibility of unionisation is discussed. 
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7.2 THE DIMENSION OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
This section discusses the dimensions of the military profession as outlined by McKinlay (1971), with refe-
rence to the South African Armed forces, in both historic and contemporary times. 
7.2.1 .A high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge 
One of the essential elements of a profession is that it must encompass a "high degree of generalised and 
systematic knowledge", based on a complex of intellectual advancements. Education and training pro-
grammes are considered the cardinal means of building and maintaining a high degree of professionalism. 
The SADF has always prided itself in its level of expertise and considered itself a first-rate professional 
military, especially in counterinsurgency (Griffiths, 1995:402). As with the SADF, the responsibility for 
training in the SANDF resorts with the Chief of the SANDF (CNDF), who may delegate this training to the 
Chiefs of the various arms of service or Chiefs of Staff Divisions. 
According to Rutsch (1996:1), the SANDF in comparison with other state departments has the largest 
training responsibility. Over 2000 formal courses are presented per annum, ranging from military deve-
lopment courses to courses in war fighting skills. While some of the course content of the various educa-
tion and training institutions in the SANDF is under revision, the general training and system of education 
strives to ensure that the defence force has sufficiently trained personnel, with adequate skills to execute 
the primary and secondary functions. 
On joining the Defence Force, all members undergo basic military training, which provides. the newly 
appointed member with basic military skills and an understanding of the military culture and values. Basic 
military training is applicable to all functional disciplines and to all arms of service. This initial phase of 
training lasts about three months, and consists of an orientation phase where members are exposed to the 
unique requirements of the particular arm of service and training in basic military subjects such as military 
law, security, military culture and traditions. The second phase of basic training is functional in nature, and 
is given to all newly appointed members at a level corresponding to their initial post appointment. Such 
training is not related to a specific task but is transferable to a variety of tasks. 
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After basic training members undergo functional training, equipping them to undertake tasks in a specific 
area, unit, or for the operation of specific equipment. Functional task training is provided at an operational 
or supporting unit and includes formal, in-formal and on-the job-training (SANDF, 1996b:4-9). As the 
members progress through the ranks, all must attend more specialist courses in their respective mustering. 
This training is normally provided in a functional training unit. In certain areas where training is similar to 
that provided in the private and public sectors, members are sent to these outside training institutions. 
These typically, include those providing apprenticeship training. Concerning officer training, all selected for 
the officer corps have to undergo formative training, prior to attending functional training, more specific to 
their mustering. 
Every arm of service has a number of highly differentiated feeder organisations involved in developing the 
skills of the military personnel. For example, the SA Army has fourteen Corps Schools training military 
personnel in different specialist areas or musterings. In addition, courses are presented within the various 
regional commands and at various specialist units. These units and schools provide training in staff duties, 
intelligence work, field security and techniques of warfare. The SA Air Force (SAAF) has similar specialist 
training structures, such as the Air Force Flying Schools that are supplemented by a number of regional 
flying schools. There are also specialist training schools for air navigators and for those specialising in air 
control, and radio operators. The South African Navy (SAN) has specific schools to equip its personnel to 
operate the ships. The South African Medical Services (SAMS) too has a number of specialist courses, 
most of which are now presented at the centralised SAMS Academy (Frankel, 1984:10-11; Rutsch, 1996: 
1-2). 
While some of these courses apply to both officers and non-commissioned officers, all officers have to 
attend the various arms of service staff colleges. The following distinction can be made between officer 
and non-commissioned officer training. The latter's training is more functional and can be compared to 
that of a craftsman, or specialist in a specific trade. Officer training includes functional training but is 
directed towards the development of the leadership skills of the officer, who can be compared to that of a 
manager within the organisation. After basic training, the officer first undergoes formative training, followed 
by courses specific to their chosen mustering. Before the officer can be promoted to the rank of Major or 
equivalent they must complete the Junior Staff Course, and to be promoted to the rank of Colonel, a 
Senior Command and Staff Course, which lasts approximately a year. Hereafter, selected senior officers 
who are being prepared for the command echelon and who will be appointed in the command and staff 
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divisions, attend the Joint Staff Course, where they are taught the principles of national security and 
military strategy1 {RSA, 1984:14). 
Depending on the needs of the Defence Force, certain selected officers are sent to universities, technical 
colleges, technicians and other tertiary training institutions. The most outstanding junior officers who have 
completed their formative training, and who have the academic potential, are sent to the South African 
Military Academy to obtain a Bachelors degree in Military Science. All officers in the SANDF are encou-
raged not only to complete their military courses, but to broaden their knowledge by obtaining further 
tertiary qualifications. In 1994/5 in the SA Army alone, 1101 members attended tertiary education 
institutions amounting to a cost of 2,4 million2 {SANDF, 1994/5:66). It has become almost a prerequisite 
for those who aspire to the command echelon to have not only a graduate, but post-graduate qualification. 
Currently the training and education of members of the SANDF is under revision, due to the changing 
mission definition, budgetary constraints, the challenges posed by the integration process, and the need to 
adapt training in order to maintain standards3 {Heinecken & Merts, 1995:32, 35-37). 
7.2.2 Institutional Autonomy 
Institutional autonomy as criteria for military professionalism refers to the ability of the profession to exer-
cise control over its own sphere of activity or competence. In the past, when the Union Defence Force was 
established, the Commandant General (chief of the UDF) was the chief executive officer, responsible to 
the Minister of Defence, for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to command, control, 
organisation, discipline and training. A Secretary of Defence acted as accounting officer, directly respon-
sible to the Minister of Defence for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to financial 
administration. This division of functions and responsibilities between the Commandant General and the 
Secretary of Defence was officially dissolved in 1966, when overall control of the Department of Defence 
1. See Appendix B for a summary of an officers career path indicating professional advancement of a typical officer serving in the 
SANDF. This table was drawn up with the assistance of Lt Col N. Slabbert and Maj J. Moorhouse of the Military Training Branch at the 
Military Academy, Saldanha. 
2. This includes members studying at the Military Academy, but excludes the attendance of seminars/symposia and short courses 
attended by members of the SANOF. 
3. The question of standards have raised much debate. In future, standards in training are linked to three criteria: functional competency 
to perform the work required; international standards as practiced by modem developed military forces; and statutory standards as laid 
down by statutory bodies, such as medical councils, apprenticeship boards (Rutsch, 1996:3). 
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was entrusted to the Commandant General as Department Head. One of the main reasons given for this 
decision was that the division of functions created problems and " ... led to a considerable duplication of 
work with resulting unsuitable employment of manpower' (RSA , 1971 :18). 
The dissolution of the Defence Secretariat in 1967 led to the re-organisation of the command and control 
structure of the SADF in 1970. Since the seventies, overall command of the SADF was vested in the Chief 
of the SADF (CSADF) who was accountable to the Minister of Defence for implementing the defence policy 
of the government of the day. As the most senior official in the department, the CSADF exercised control 
over all the Arms of service, directed the work of the divisions at Defence Headquarters, managed the 
overall functioning and operations of the defence force and was financially accountable for the department. 
Control of the SADF was exercised through centralised joint control system, the supreme, most authorita-
tive and powerful decision making body being the Defence Command Council (DCC). The DCC was the 
highest command authority and was subject only to ministerial approval, while the Defence Staff Council 
(DSC) co-ordinated the defence staffs common and other multifaceted problems (Sass, 1996:132). 
While the overall organisation of the Defence Force has remained essentially the same, the recreation of a 
civilian Defence Secretariat in 1994 places some limitations on the institutional autonomy of the CNDF. As 
was the case in the sixties, the new Defence Secretary is on equal footing with the CNDF and reports to 
the Minister of Defence. 
Section 228 of the Interim Constitution,4 clearly outlines the current hierarchy of authority and control over 
defence matters since 1994. The executive power of the CNDF is subject to the direction of the Minister of 
Defence in times of peace, and under the direction of the President, during a state of national defence. 
The Minister of Defence is in tum, accountable to Parliament and Cabinet for the SANDF. Parliament has 
a range of significant powers with respect to military affairs, which enables it to assert democratic control 
over the armed forces and defence policy. The multi-party parliamentary defence committees have over-
sight over all security issues including the powers of investigation into matters concerning the budget, the 
functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the SANDF (SANDF, 
1996a:12). Based on the decisions of the elected officials of the state, serving on the parliamentary 
4. Note that this is the current position Section 202 of the new 1996 Constitution for the Republic of South Africa, states that "(1) [tjhe 
President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, must appoint the Military Command of the 
defence force. {2) Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member 
responsible for defence, under the authority of the Presidenr. The implication of this clause is that there may not be one single Chief 
of the SANDF as in the past. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
94 
defence committees, the Civilian Defence Secretariat formulates defence policy. The CNDF and his staff 
officers are not precluded from the process of policy formulation and decision-making on defence. Their 
input is assured through the Council on Defence, which consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the 
CNDF and the Defence Secretary. This is the forum for institutional decision-making, concerning the entire 
Department of Defence (DoD). The Defence Staff Council, consisting of the CNDF and his deputy and the 
Secretary and his deputy, as well as various staff advisers, co-ordinate the staff functions in the DoD. 
This system of civilian oversight of the armed forces places extensive limitations on the institutional 
autonomy of the SANDF. Nathan (1994:83) considers this subservience to civilian control an essential 
element of military professionalism, and states that "[v]irtually all authorities on civil military relations agree 
that military professionalism entails a critical element: the subordination and accountability of armed forces 
to the elected civil power". This subordination ensures that the skills of the defence force are used only for 
socially approved purposes. 
The Deed of Commission conferred upon the officer serving in the SADF to uphold the Constitution, and 
".:. in the name of the Republic of South Africa, to serve his country as an officer with loyalty, courage, dig-
nity and honour, to discharge his duties and responsibilities with zeal, diligence and to set a good example 
to those placed under his control" also serves to entrench individual commitment to the principle of civilian 
control (SANDF, 1994:2). 
7 .2.3 Corporatism 
Corporatism grows from the sharing of unique skills (profession}, and from the interest in maintaining high 
standards of applying these skills, as well as loyalty to the authority structure of the military. Officers are 
expected to be loyal not only to the nation they have sworn to protect but to their subordinates, their fellow 
officers, to their unit, and to their arm of service, and to display a commitment to professionalism and the 
maintenance of high personal standards. 
Subordinates are expected to show respect to seniors, to obey all lawful commands and to trust that their 
leaders will never issue an unlawful command. While all members of the SANDF are obliged to comply 
with all lawful orders given by their superiors, both the Interim Constitution, Section 226 (7) and the new 
Constitution, Section 199 (6) states that a member of the SANDF shall have the right to refuse to execute 
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any order, if the execution of such an order would constitute an offence, or would breach international law 
on armed conflict on the Republic (RSA, 1996:85). 
Some former SADF officers, who in the past have been subject to punishment under the Military Discipli-
nary Code if they disobeyed any lawful command given by a superior, dispute this provision in the Consti-
tution. The opinion exists that this clause will undermine the soldier's willingness to fight, and will seriously 
erode military discipline and loyalty towards the chain of command. There are others again who maintain 
that this provision will reinforce subordination to civilian authority and promote mutual trust between 
officers and subordinates, built a culture of professionalism and promote respect for human rights among 
members of the SANDF (Nathan, 1994:89). 
7 .2.4 Internal control and internal affective neutrality 
The notion of internal control and internal affective neutrality refers to the regulations, code of conduct, the 
set of values, norms and ethics that regulate the behaviour of professional soldiers. It is these regulations 
and codes of conduct that ensure a commitment to service in the interests of society, rather than in self-
interest. 
All former SADF as well as current SANDF members are required to adhere to a Code of Conducts The 
military Code of Conduct refers to aspects of self-regulation that govern the professional behaviour of 
uniformed members to ensure operational effectiveness, as well as the respect and moral support from the 
society they serve. It includes a set of principles to which all members should aspire in both their official 
duties, and in their private lives, and includes certain ethical values such as, patriotism as reflected in the 
devotion to the interests of society; loyalty to one's superiors and subordinates; integrity and moral up-
rightness; teamwork by co-:-operation and sharing of common goals and values; discipline and obedience; 
respect for others; moral courage; dependability; military bearing; sense of responsibility; fair and just prac-
tices as well as other values which pertain to the social conduct of members (SANDF, 1996b: 3-5 - 3-13). 
Such principles are inculcated during training. For example, officers undergoing formative training at the 
Army Gymnasium take the following pledge. This pledge is as follows: 
5. The Code of Conduct discussed in this section is based on the provisions included in the Military Disciplinary Code which is currently 
under review. The former SADF Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Code remains in effect until amended. 
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"As an officer I declare my awareness of the worthy tradition of the South African National Defence Force 
entrusted to uphold the principles embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
I accept, as a member of the Officers Crops, to live up to this awareness and with the highest standards of 
integrity, loyalty, obedience and allegiance. 
As a member of the SA National Defence Force Officer Corps I promise: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
never to seek my own advantage, but always to strive for the greatest well-being of my people 
and my country. 
to perform my responsibility and duty with nobility of spirit, conscientiousness, vigilance, fear-
lessness and determination. 
to place the needs of those under my command, above my own and to set a good example. 
to maintain service and use with utmost care and precision, the arms and equipment entrus-
ted to me. 
I honour God with the highest praise and accept Him as the highest authority in my life, and His Word is 
my ultimate code of living. 
My word is my trust of bond and will dedicate myself to uphold the spirit of this promise" (Army Gymna-
sium, 1996:29}. 
Not only officers, but non-commissioned officers have a similar creed or code of conduct. 
Violations of the military Code of Conduct are punishable under the Military Discipline Code, especially 
where such transgressions affect military discipline. For example, riotous or unseemly behaviour carries a 
sentence of not exceeding six months imprisonment. False representation concerning rank (dishonesty), 
using threatening, insubordinate or insulting language, too, carries a sentence of a maximum of six months 
imprisonment on conviction. Other more serious punishable offences under the Code of Conduct include 
neglect of duty, assault, disobedience of lawful commands and orders, and damage to equipment 
(SANDF, 1996b:6-10, 6-13). The military legal system makes it possible for the military to exert internal 
control over its members, to maintain its own discipline and to solve its problems within a military milieu. 
To quote an example, in 1994/5, 5908 members were charged with absence without leave, 1411 for 
absence from duty, 1343 for disobeying orders and commands, 230 for neglect and 955 for drunkenness 
(SANDF, 1994/5:46). 
Internal affective neutrality refers to the system of promotion based primarily on merit. In the former SADF, 
as well as the present SANDF, promotion and appointment to higher posts in the SANDF occurs according 
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to certain objective criteria. Promotion in rank is coupled to the member having completed the required 
service courses, the availability of posts and the suitability of the individual measured against military 
development requirements, military experience, the potential to exercise authority and to hold the post and 
qualifications and seniority. 
This aspect of military professionalism is somewhat contentious at present, with respect to the political 
appointments that have been made. Sass (1996:138) for example, claims that former SADF members are 
leaving the Defence Force " ... as many regard the effects of affirmative action, namely the rapid promotion 
of unqualified, inexperienced black members (particularly those from the TBVC Defence Forces) as well as 
the appointment to senior and general officer rank of ex-MK leaders to newly created posts, as a direct 
threat to their careers". By means of "fast-tracking" & an attempt is being made to ensure that these mem-
bers obtain the required course qualifications and expertise to meet their rank and post profiles. In this 
regard, Nathan (1994:6) warns that should appointments in the future be made on the basis of party affilia-
tion, personal loyalty or ethnic identity, it will" ... undermine any semblance of military professionalism". 
7.2.5 Professional social ethic and external affective neutrality 
Another important facet of professionalism, is the commitment to the social ethic of self-less service and 
external affective neutrality. Loyalty and commitment to serve, and to the nation, are considered the most 
desirable qualities of those who join the armed forces (Huntington, 1957:13; Downes, 1985:158). 
In an Internal Communication Bulletin, the SANDF stated that members of the SANDF must submit to the 
basic ethics of soldiering and accept that certain fundamental rights, such as the principle of freedom of 
association, freedom of assembly, the right to demonstrate or strike and the right to life may have to be 
sacrificed (CSANDF, 1995:73). This sacrifice is made" ... in the interests of preserving those fundamental 
rights for all citizens who are not in the service of the military". According to the SANDF, the limitations on 
these fundamental rights are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society as the Defence 
Force must be ready to serve the nation at any time (SANDF, 1994:15; CSANDF, 1995). Should individual 
self-interest be placed above duty and service in the SANDF, it is considered "a misplaced military ethic" 
(SANDF, 1994:3). Because employment in the military is considered a profession, members are expected 
6. Fast-tracking refers to the priority placement of former non-statutory and TBVC members with potential on qualifying courses to gain 
the necessary experience. Members selected for fast tracking will, however, be subject to the same course qualifying requirements as 
any other member.(Rutsch, 1996:4). 
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not to place emphasis on pay and conditions of employment, as does the person who views his work 
merely as a job. 
Another normative aspect of military professionalism concerns the external affective neutrality of the armed 
forces. This refers to the need to place limitations on the participation of military personnel in the activities 
or organisation of a political party. The politicisation of the armed forces in South Africa has been a major 
concern, as every military formation now integrated into the SANDF, carries some political baggage. Even 
the SADF, which always emphasised and to a great degree maintained political impartiality, was criticised 
as being an armed wing of the National Party during the P.W.Botha era. MK has close ties with the ANG, 
and APLA with the PAC, both revolutionary armies motivated by ideological convictions fighting·for national 
liberation. The homeland armies have all been involved in coups, and have displayed distinct praetorian 
tendencies (Nathan, 1994:96). Section 199 (7) of the 1996 Constitution, however, states that "[n]either the 
security services, nor any of their members, may in the performance of their functions (a) prejudice a 
political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or (b) further in a partisan manner, any 
interest of a political parijl'. This does not imply that military personnel do not have the right to vote. What 
this clause does ensure is the political impartiality of the armed forces. 
7.3 THE UNITARIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE SANDF 
If an assessment is made of the dimensions of military professionalism discussed in the preceding section, 
one may conclude that the SANDF in principle conforms to the criteria required of a professional military. 
A characteristic of such professional/institutional militaries, is that they manage labour relations from a 
typically unitarist perspective, especially where this pertains to the management of conflict within the orga-
nisation, the structures created to address grievances, and the reaction to trade unionism amongst their 
members. 
Labour relations problems in the former SADF only really surfaced after the end of conscription with the 
shift to an all-volunteer force, and in recent years, has been identified as a "strategic issue" in the SANDF. 
In the face of an eroding defence budget, rationalisation of full-time members and restructuring, both Sass 
(1996:138) and Fourie (1996:178) indicate the possibility of unionisation and the need to create appro-
priate means to manage future labour relations problems. 
This section outlines the current labour relations policy of the SAN OF and its response to unionisation. 
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As mentioned under the discussion on military professionalism, the military has its own mechanisms to 
maintain discipline and to address offences by military members. Any uniformed member subject to the 
MDC may be tried by a competent military court for any offence iisted under the MDC, (that is the First 
Schedule together with the Rules made under Section 104 (3) of the Defence Act as well as the principles 
and guidelines constrained in the judgements of the Supreme Court of the RSA). There are two categories 
of military courts - a court martial and a summary trial. A court martial is intended for more serious offen-
ces, while the summary trial, which can be compared to a disciplinary hearing, is for less serious offences. 
Typical offences include, the misuse of uniform, unauthorised use of information, illegal disclosure of 
information, and numerous other offences relating to aspects of military conduct and normal criminal offen-
ces (SANDF, 1996b:6:1-13). 
Given the emphasis on loyalty and for members to channel grievances ~hrough the chain of command, it is 
obvious that any violation or intrusion into this unified structure from outside parties is met with resistance. 
A typical reaction of employers who manage labour relations form a unitarist, is to impose legal sanctions 
on trade union activities, and to improve the communication systems within the organisation, when faced 
with discontent among their employees. As will be illustrated, this too has been the response of the 
SANDF. 
7.3.2 Communication structures for collective grievances 
In 1995, after an increase in labour unrest among soldiers (from both the former statutory and non-
statutory forces)B the SANDF created a communication procedure to ensure effective bottom up 
communication to deal with work-related problems that cannot be channelled through the MDC. The MDC, 
Redress of Wrongs procedure does not cater for work-related problems of either an individual or collective 
nature. This communication structure is depicted in Diagram 7.1. 
At unit level these forums represent different rank groups for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned 
. officers and soldiers. The aim of these forums are to enable the respective groups to formulate proposals 
with respect to improvements in their conditions of service, identify problem areas and contribute towards 
the effectiveness and higher morale in the unit. 
8. Labour unrest surfaced among the predominantly Black uniformed members during the integration phase at the Wallmannstal 
assembly point in 1994 (The Star, 1994b:1). In 1994, in another incident, a group of short term service members from the former 
APl.A, MK and SADF marched up to the Union Buildings in September 1995 against the termination of their contracts and also to bring 
their grievances to the attention of the President. These soldiers were later charged with mutiny (Citizen, 1995:5). 
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Provision is also made within this procedure for the creation of a regional forum at command/base level. 
Officers commanding the respective units must meet at least once a month separately per arm of service/ 
staff division in a regional forum with the officer commanding of the command/base. The function of this 
forum is to consolidate proposals for the improvement of conditions of service, as well as, problem areas 
requiring correction, and that may require onward transmission to the Chief of Arm of Service or CNDF. A 
further function of the regional forums is to ensure that the unit forums receive feedback on all matters 
submitted to them within seven days. 
EXTERNAL 
ROLE PLAYERS 
LEVEL4 
DHQ 
LEVEL 3 
ARM OF 
SERVICE 
LEVEL2 
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LEVEL I 
UNIT 
I DCC I 
OFFICERS' 
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STATE LAW 
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Diagram 7 .1: Communication structure for collective grievances, complaints and dissatisfaction for uniformed 
members 
Source: Internal Labour Relations Directive. 
The next level in this procedure is the Arm of Service Headquarters. An attempt is made at this level to 
resolve problems arising from the unit or regional forums within fourteen days. Should matters not be 
resolved, the Arm of Service must refer the issue to the relevant staff division. 
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The Staff Division must either resolve the matter or forward submissions to external role players such as 
the Public Service Commission, the Department of State Expenditure, the State Law Advisor or the Minis-
ter of Defence, within fourteen days. Hereafter, the relevant staff division will report on the progress made 
every fourteen days to the unit concerned, the regional headquarters and the Arm of Service Headquar-
ters, until finality has been reached on the matter. A similar procedure exists for handling individual work 
related problems or dissatisfaction that cannot be lodged in terms of Section 134 of the Military Discipline 
Code. 
While this structure does contribute towards bringing collective grievances and problems to the attention of 
higher authority, this structure has no dispute resolution mechanism. The lack of any statutory authority to 
resolve grievances has reduced its effectiveness and has meant that many sources of discontent that the 
SANDF could have resolved internally go uncorrected due to a lack of faith in the system.s The lack of 
effective channels to address grievances, coupled with the insecurity felt among members pending the 
rationalisation of the full-time forces, has resulted in wide scale dissatisfaction and resignation of highly 
competent personnel in the SANDF (Sass, 1996:138). 
7.3.3 Response to trade unionism 
As is typical of the unitarist approach to labour relations, the first response of the SADF to the emergence 
of trade unionism amongst uniformed personnel was to amendment to the Defence Act, 44 of 1956. In 
September 1993, just seven months prior to the formation of the SANDF, a provision was passed through 
Parliament prohibiting uniformed members from joining trade unions and from participating in strikes and 
protests.10 Section 1268 (1) of the amended Defence Act states that "[a] member of the Permanent Force 
shall not be or become a member of any trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1956 : Provided that this provision shall not preclude any member of such a Force from being or becoming 
a member of any professional or vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the 
Ministe;'. Section 126 B (2) furthermore states that "a member of the SANDF who is subject to the said 
9. Because the forums have 'no teeth' the effectiveness of this structure is questioned by some members. The mere fact that this 
communication structure was introduced on a trial period, indicates the hesitance to introduce any kind of structure which can 
challenge the authority structure. Some even consider this structure as 'authorised mutiny'. 
10. Prior to this, there were no regulations in the Defence Act relating to trade union activities. The only regulations were those in the 
South African Defence Force Personnel Code, SADFPC/E/V/XXIX/2-11 which merely stated that an unacceptable position would arise 
if members of the full-time forces could belong to personnel associations and that such members must be discouraged from becoming 
members of personnel associations. 
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Military Disciplinary Code, shall not strike or perform any act of public protest or participate in any strike or 
act of public protest or conspire with or incite or encourage, instigate or command any other person 
(whether not such a person is a member of the SADF or an officer or employee refeffed to in Section 83A 
(2) serving in the SADF or a member of any auxiliary or nursing serve established under the Act) to strike 
or to perform such an act or to participate in a strike or such an act". The aim of these provisions are to 
ensure that no member of the Permanent Force belongs to a trade union and that no member of the SADF 
who is subject to the Military Discipline Code, takes part in strikes or actions of public protest. These legal 
punitive sanctions effectively restrain any member of the Permanent Force from belonging to a trade union, 
or from participating in any strike action or public protest. 
Section 126C of the Defence Act goes on to specify that "[a]ny member of the Permanent Force shall 
exercise his rights with respect to labour matters in terms of the regulations, and the State as his employer 
shall handle and administer all such matters, including the resolution of disputes in accordance with the 
regulations". However, since the promulgation of these regulations by the Defence Act, Second Ammend-
ment Act, 1993 on 12November1993, no dispute resolution regulations have yet been promulgated. 
The restrictions in the Defence Act curtailing trade union membership are perhaps the most important 
restraining element in the development of military unions. The fact that any uniformed member contra-
vening the provisions in section 1268 of the Defence Act commits a criminal offence and could be charged 
with mutiny, is a serious deterrent. However, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) plans to 
challenge the restrictions placed on trade union membership as being unconstitutional, based on Section 
18 of the Constitution which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association". Should 
SANDU win the constitutional case, the most effective impediment to the development of unions will be 
removed. 
The reaction of the SANDF to the formation of SAN DU was also typically unitarist. Lt Genl Reg Otto, Chief 
of the Army commented that "[t]he SANDF and by implication the SA Army, does not recognise any trade 
union or person claiming to represent leaders of any trade union. The SA Army has very clear command 
channels to handle grievances. No alternative channel exists. We will not be dictated to by any labour 
union or any of its officials. Peace and stability are our concern and it cannot be achieved with bad 
discipline or the interference of outside institulions" (Weekend Argus, 1995: 11 ). Similar sentiments were 
~~~~~~----
reiterated b( Lt Genl Johan Pretorious, a previous Chief of the SA Army, "[b]ecause of the nature of the 
trust put in members of the armed forces, it is proper for them to subjugate their personnel interests to the 
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great task of protecting the sovereignty of the RSA. If they fail to do so, they cannot claim to be military 
professionals" (Pretorious, 1995:21 ). 
Despite numerous attempts by SANDU to obtain recognition for the union, including a visit to President 
Mandela on 6 April 1995 to put forward the union's case, there is still no indication that the SANDF or 
government is willing to allow trade unions within the military. (SANDU 1995:1) In a letter to SANDU from 
President Mandela, he stat~ that he is not prepared to lift any restrictions placed on trade union activities 
in Section 126 B of the Defence Act because • ... the Defence Force is a critically important institution in our 
country, on whose shoulders the stability and security to the transition to a democracy rests". Other 
reasons given by the President is that •... unlike other employees, the uniformed soldier has access to 
arms and even sophisticated weapons of mass destruction" (Mandela, 1995). Trade unions for military 
personnel are therefore considered counter productive and disruptive, with dire consequences for the 
national security interests of the country and its inhabitants. 
The main fear is that unions will compete illegitimately for the control over the loyalty of soldiers by 
providing a second formal parallel to the chain of command, which would divide the loyalty of uniformed 
personnel between the union and the unit. This is particularly so, if the division occurs along racial and 
institutional lines (former non-statutory versus statutory), or creates friction between the officer corps and 
the non-commissioned officer, creating an "us and them" scenario (Pretorious, 1995:21). The concern is 
that the chain of command and the authority of rank, on which the whole disciplinary structure is based, 
could be disrupted by the introduction of trade union practices for uniformed members (CSANDF, 1995: 1 ). 
Another concern is that a trade union for military personnel could politicise the military or could be used as 
a political power vehicle to promote self-interest. This is of particular concern, given the past praetorian 
tendencies of some of the armed forces now integrated into the SANDF. Williams (1995:10) is of the 
opinion that the development of a praetorian attitude among former MK members within the SANDF, could 
be a potential problem. He states that "[g]iven MK's well-developed relationship with the current political 
elite, MK officers could be tempted to use their influence to further their own corporate interests, thereby 
undermining the values of a South African professional military ethic". The TBVC armies too displayed 
classical praetorian attributes such as nepotism and corruption. Even the former SADF, which always 
prided itself in its professionalism, displayed a praetorian disposition, particularly during the Botha era 
when the military had extensive political influence through the Security Management System (Williams, 
1995:10). A factor that cannot be ignored is that the forces now integrated in the SANDF have strong 
-----· - -· ·~ L...... ----- ----. -· ·---- ----· ---- - ... -·---
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All arms of service show an increase in occupationalism, if compared with the previous survey conducted 
in 1989 (see Diagram 8.1). The most remarkable increase is in the SA Army, which in previous years was 
the most institutional, and is now the most occupational. Only 26 percent of army officers in 1995 indicated 
their support for traditional institutional values, compared to 52 percent in 1989. 
* SAMS: No data available for 1989 
Diagram 8.1: Institutional commitment to values by Ann of Seivice 1989 and 1995 
An attempt will be made in the following section, to explain the reasons for this increase in occupationa-
lism, by briefly discussing the variables listed by Moskos (1988) as indicators of an institutional 
occupational drift, such as the level of legitimacy and societal regard; role commitment; basis, mode and 
level of compensation; evaluation of performance; the legal system; female roles; the military spouse; 
residence and post-service status. 
8.2.1. Legitimacy and societal regard 
According to Moskos (1988:16), an institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms that transcend 
self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good. In an institutional military, both the military and members 
of society expect that military service is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and primary identification 
with the military's needs. As indicated in the previous chapter, these are the values that the SANDF 
expect its members to subscribe to. For example, the SANDF considers placing individual self-interest 
above duty a "misplaced service ethic" (SANDF, 1994:3). Those in service of the military must accept that 
the institution comes first and that they are subject to transfers and frequent relocation of themselves and 
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their families; are on duty 24 hours a day; often have to work longer than an eight hour day; and are 
subject to military discipline and law. Even the private lives of members are under the purview of the 
military and governed by a code of personal conduct (SANDF, 1994:3). 
With respect to policy, the SANDF is institutional, but this altruism in not reflected in personal attitude 
towards military service. Most of the junior officers at the Military Academy for example, were of the 
opinion that they should be given a choice whether to accept a transfer or not, and should not have to 
perform operational duties if this has negative personal and family consequences. Nor should their own 
interests, take second place to those of the organisation (see Table 8.1). With respect to their personal 
lives, the overwhelming majority were of the opinion that what a member does after hours, is none of the 
defence force's business, that differences in rank are not important after hours and what a member does in 
his/her private life should be of no concern to his/her officer commanding. 
Table 8.1 : Commitment of officers to institutional values* 
Agree Disagree 
Variable % % 
Not have to take a transfer if not wanted 67 33 
Perfonn ooerational duty reaardless of family conseQuences 45 55 
Personal interests take second place to the Defence Force 32 68 
What member does after hours not Defence Force business 80 20 
Members private life of no concern to Officer Commanding 79 21 
Concept of officer on duty 24 hours a day no longer valid 58 42 
Service in the Defence Force is a calling 25 75 
* Total number in sample 183 
Concerning overtime, or the concept of an officer being on duty for 24 hours a day, more than 58 percent 
of the junior officers were of the opinion that this is no longer a valid requirement in today's military. 
Furthermore, only 25 percent considered service in the Defence Force a calling. This could be ascribed to 
the recent decline in the role of the military in society, and the lack of clarity with respect to the future role 
and function of the SANDF. 
8.2.2 Role commitment 
In an institutional military role commitment is diffuse, in other words, members are generalists and are 
expected to perform an array of tasks not necessarily related to their specialist training. The more 
occupational the military, the greater the emphasis on specialisation. In the SANDF, this trend is not yet 
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evident. Everyone in uniform is classified as a "military practitioner"2 and may be expected to fulfil many 
different posts, often unrelated to his/her specific mustering. 
Of interest, are the responses of the officers at the Military Academy to this aspect of military service. Just 
fewer than 60 percent of the officers ·felt that they are required to participate in too many activities not 
related to their jobs. When asked "whether they normally think of themselves as a person with special 
training and experience working for the Defence Force, rather than as a military career officer" (military 
professional), most agreed with this view (see Table 8.2). Furthermore, that military training, qualifications, 
expertise, and experience acquired during military service is more important than their officership in 
determining their standing in the Defence Force. 
Table 8.2: Attitudes of officers towards aspects of military service* 
Agree Disagree 
Variable % % 
Compensation based on skills and qualifications and not on post level, 77 23 
rank or seniority 
Think of myself as person with special training working for the Defence 71 29 
Force 
My military training, qualifications, expertise and experience is more 71 29 
important than my officership 
Participate in too many activities not related to iob 56 43 
* Total number in sample 183 
This signifies an overall trend away form those who identify themselves as military professionals, toward 
those who see themselves as specialists in uniform. A movement away from "military professional" to that 
of a "professional in uniform". Concerning basis of compensation, it is of interest that most of the junior 
officers at the Military Academy felt that compensation should be based on one's skills and qualifications 
and not on post level, rahk and seniority. 
8.2.3 Basis, mode and level of compensation 
As from 1 July 1996 the SANDF and all those members classified as military practitioners are remunerated 
on the same salary grading system as the rest of the Public Service. The previous complex remuneration 
system with its multitude of different salary scales and allowances have been compressed. The new 
2. A military practitioner is the functional classification for all uniformed members employed in the profession of arms in the SANDF 
(SANDF, 1996:4-1). 
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salary grading system consists of 16 salary ranges, and each salary range consists of three salary 
notches. Each of the occupational and rank classes has been grouped into six broad bands as reflected in 
Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: Salary grading system for the Public Service and SANDFl 
Salary ranges Salary scales Application Rank 
1 17 100- 18 297 Lower skilled -
2 20 079 - 21 807 Private 
3 23 526- 25 704 Skilled Private 
4 27 882 - 29 928 UCpl 
5 32 988 - 35 604 Cpl/2Lt 
6 40 836 - 45 852 Highly skilled Sgt/ Lt 
7 50 868 - 56 106 SSgt/Lt 
8 63 963 - 71 055 W02/Capt 
9 78141 - 83 949 W01/Mai 
10 98 463-106 941 Highly skilled WO/AOS/Lt 
11 115 413-131152 supervisory Col 
12 139 578-155 370 Col 
13 163 260- 177 486 Management Brig 
14 191712-212400 Mai Gen 
15 233 079 - 256 587 Senior Lt Gen 
16 303 591 - 322 205 management Gen 
Where members require specific qualifications to fulfil a post uniformed personnel, as with the rest of the 
public service are paid according to the salary scale for that specific occupational class. Remuneration in 
these cases, such as doctors, legal practitioners, military university educators, quantity surveyors and so 
forth are paid according to skill and qualification, not according to rank. With the move to an all-volunteer 
force, the pay for recruits has also increased substantially. 
Concerning mode of compensation, many of the traditional institutional benefits have been incorporated in 
the salaries or in some cases, abolished. All salary and cash recognition for certain specialist qualifica-
tions unique to the military, previously added to the pay of the military practitioner, has fallen away since 
1 July 1996. According to the new dispensation only pilots, navigators and flight technical personnel 
receive specialist allowances. All other occupational groups which qualify for special allowances, such as 
danger pay, are compensated in the same way as any other public servant facing the same working 
conditions (CSANDF, 1996e: 1). In addition, the bonus system for military practitioners and other public 
servants is identical, although the system of evaluation (at present) differs. 
3. The details of the 'New Salary Grading System' as reflected in Table 8.3 was complied from an SANDF directive, CSP/DSS/R/104/1/B, 
dated 6 August 1996. 
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To summarise, since July 1996 there is a definite shift towards a more occupational dispensation for 
uniformed members with respect to basis, mode and level of compensation and they are no longer treated 
as a unique occupational category.4 With respect to compensation and the system of remuneration, the 
new dispensation equates military practitioners with public servants. 
8.2.4 Evaluation of performance 
However, where it pertains to the evaluation of performance, the SANDFS still evaluates its members in 
terms of traditional institutional criteria. In an institutional military, according to Moskos' definition, 
members are evaluated in terms of the total person and on normative criteria. In the occupational military, 
merit assessment is based on the functional tasks (standards and quality) of his/her work. 
The merit or efficiency assessment form, as it is called of the SANDF, clearly demonstrates that the 
evaluation of member's performance is holistic and qualitative. Three key areas of the members' work are 
evaluated, namely managerial ability, job ability and adaptability. "Managerial ability" is evaluated by 
assessing the members ability to control his/her flow of work; standard of subordinates' work; ability to 
determine job priorities; capacity to determine goals/objectives; upholding of standards; coping with difficul-
ties that may occur within the work environment; ability to take timeous decisions; level of self-confidence; 
judgement; and handling of emergency assignments. 
The second category of criteria evaluated pertain to the individual's "job ability" and includes questions on 
the members willingness to proceed at own initiative; compliance with time tables; standard of work; 
willingness to accept responsibility; contribution to improve work methods; perseverance in long and 
difficult tasks; ability to cope with various assignments; eagerness to undertake assignments; ability to 
switch from one task to another and knowledge of the detail of present work. 
The final category of questions concerns the individual's "adaptability". Under this section the members 
reaction to suggestions and criticism; co-operation with fellow colleagues; tactfulness and courtesy; ability 
4. In discussions Division Service Systems at Chief of Staff Personnel of the SANDF, the view was expressed that this system of 
remuneration was imposed on the SANDF for its military practitioners. As no consideration was given to the unique institutional needs 
of military personnel, a submission has been made to the Minister of Public Service and Administration to address present dissatis-
faction with the new dispensation. 
5. See Appendix E for an example of a 'Efficiency Assessment Form' used to evaluate uniformed personnel. 
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to adapt to new methods/procedures; control of temper under normal circumstances; maintenance of 
discipline; disposition towards the SANDF; willingness to share in unpleasant tasks; self-control under 
difficult circumstances; attitude towards work; neatness; and general behaviour, are assessed. 
Each question is evaluated out of ten, and the result of the assessment is discussed with the member 
concerned. Should he/she not accept the assessment, provision is made on the form to specify the 
reasons for the rejection, which will then be subject to review. Merit assessments are taken into conside-
ration for the allocation of service bonuses as well as for promotion or selection to a specific post. 
The normative assessment criterion as outlined above is a matter of much deliberation, given the subjec-
tivity of evaluation. Currently the merit assessment is being reviewed and it appears as if more quantitative 
criteria will be used as a measure of evaluation in the future. While the SANDF is still institutional as 
regards the method of job evaluation, there is a definite move towards accepting a more occupational 
system of evaluation. 
8.2.5 Legal system 
According to the institutional model, the military legal system is broad and exercises extensive control over 
the member's behaviour. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Defence Act of 1956 and the Military 
Disciplinary Code makes it possible for the military to maintain its own discipline and in general, to solve 
military problems within the military milieu. According to the present legal system in the SANDF, a member 
may not be tried again by any civilian court for the same offence. Members cannot appeal against the 
finding or sentence of a military court, since a comprehensive internal system of review exists. Only the 
Supreme Court has powers of review. However, a military court may not try cases of high treason, rape, 
murder or culpable homicide committed inside the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa. Such cases 
fall within the jurisdiction of the civilian legal system. 
As with the method of evaluation, the whole military disciplinary system is under review. Where before, 
members were not permitted a civilian or legal representative in the case of a summary trial, this is now 
permitted. Furthermore, a Commission under the chairmanship of R Adm J.F. Retief has been appointed 
to revise South African defence legislation and to bring the entire military legal system in line with the new 
Constitution. For example, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to 
have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a 
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court, or where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum". This will have a signifi-
cant influence on the legal jurisdiction of the military, with the implication that the SANDF will have to 
accept a more occupational legal dispensation. 
8.2.6 Female roles 
According to Moskos, the more institutional the military the more restricted the career paths of women, the 
more occupational, the more open the career paths. In 1994, in line with the Constitutional provisions which 
forbid discrimination on the grounds of race or gender, military policy guidelines were issued to allow women 
to be trained and employed on the same basis as men. Consequently, the career path of women in the 
SANDF is the same as her male counterparts are subject to the same selection and training procedures, and 
no posts are exclusively reserved for men. In addition to the traditional support mustering, all combat muste-
rings are now accessible to women. 
Table 8.4: Gender profile of SANDF (November 1996) 
Male Female Total 
n % n % n 
Armv 61304 94 3749 6 66054 
Air Force 9826 88 1347 12 11172 
Navy 5254 92 440 8 6894 
SAMS 3473 55 2892 54 6365 
Total 79857 90 8428 10 88285 
Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF. 
A concerted effort is currently being made to increase the number of women in combat positions and at 
decision-making levels throughout the Defence Force. Even so, women are still by far in the minority in all the 
arms of service, with the exception of the South African Medical Services (SAMS) (see Table 8.4). 
While there may be equality among the sexes as regards policy, there is still resistance to women serving in 
combat positions. In a recent public opinion survey, 59 percent of respondents felt that women should not be 
allowed to do combat duty or serve in the front line (Schutte & Cilliers, 1995:52). Similar responses were 
obtained from officers attending the Junior, Senior and Joint Staff Courses to the question " ... whether women 
should be permitted to do combat duty in the front line".& 
6. Refer to Appendix 0 for the survey conducted among officers attending the Junior Staff and Warfare Course, the Senior Command and 
Staff Course and the Joint Staff Course. The total number of officers in the sample were 188. 
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Table 8.5: SANDF officers attitude towards women in combat positions 
Agree Unsure Disaaree Total 
n % n % n % n 
Army 25 32 6 7 48 61 79 
Air Force 20 43 8 17 19 40 47 
Navv 13 54 3 13 8 33 24 
SAMS 14 37. 6 16 18 47 38 
Total 72 38 23 12 93 50 188 
Officers in the SA Air Force and SA Navy were the most supportive of women in combat positions, while the 
SA Army was the least supportive (see Table 8.5). As most of these Army officers have experienced the 
stress of combat, many still see women as unsuitable to take up positions that may involve risk or danger. 
Nevertheless, in policy at least, the SANDF has made a dramatic shift towards a more occupational dispen-
sation with respect to women in the military. 
8.2.7 Spouse 
Traditionally, the (white) military spouse has been expected to play an integral role in the military community 
and in support of her soldier-husband. The Defence Force Ladies Association, (an association for military 
wives) in particular, sees it as their mission to render support to wives during times of separation, relocation 
and when husbands were deployed. As a semi-welfare, social and cultural organisation, the Ladies 
Association even today, serves to broaden the understanding of military life and plays an important socialisa-
tion role. Every military unit has a Defence Force Ladies Association and the chairperson is normally the wife 
of the Officer Commanding of the unit. The Officer Commanding's wife, together with her committee, 
arranges visits to military units as well as briefings to incorporate and expose military wives to the military 
culture and organisation (RSA, 1982:16). 
Besides the involvement in the military community, wives are expected to partake in the array of social 
functions characteristic of military life, such as the attendance of formal functions and parades. As a military 
wife, she is expected to be fully supportive of her husband in all areas (Cock, 1989:57). Of interest, is that 
almost 60 percent of junior officers at the Military Academy felt that "[a]n officer's wife is as much a part of the 
, 
unit as her husband', signifying the support for involvement of the military spouse in unit activities. 
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In recent years there has, however, been a growing reluctance of wives to take part in the customary military 
unit functions, largely due to the increase of dual income families but also because many military families now 
live off-base. The exception being, where members live in isolated areas, (much more prevalent during the 
Border War) and where work and social life is still centred on the military base. Even with respect to this 
aspect of military life, there is a trend towards occupationalism. 
8.2.8 Residence 
Military housing is allocated to members on the basis of income and number of dependants. While single 
members are still expected to obtain permission to live off base from their officer commanding, more and 
more married couples prefer to live within the civilian community, especially if they are area bound or are 
not subject to frequent relocation. 
The often poor state and rising cost of military housing has facilitated this trend. Whereas in the past 
members paid a fixed rate for military accommodation, this rate is now calculated as a percentage (8 %) of 
a member's salary up to a maximum of R350 00. With the increased rental of military accommodation, 
most uniformed members prefer to make use of the housing subsidy scheme to purchase their own home. 
The rising mess fees too, have meant that even single members, prefer to live in private dwellings. 
8.2.9 Post-service status 
Uniformed personnel in the SANDF receive the same pension benefits as the broader Public Service with 
the exception that they have the option to retire at the age of 55 years rather than 65 years, as is the norm 
for the rest of the public service. They also retain certain benefits, such as free military medical care upon 
retirement, which public servants don't have, and are eligible for disablement pensions if injured during 
service. While it is true that the SANDF attempts to look after their retired personnel, they are not neces-
sarily held in high esteem by broader society by virtue of their prior standing in the military. 
8.3 TRENDS PROMOTING OCCUPATIONALISM 
The shift from a predominantly institutional to occupational military has not only been influenced by the 
changing nature of military service, but by the changes in the structure and operation of SADF itself. 
These include the increasing civilianisation of the military; the move to an all-volunteer force; cuts in 
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military budgets resulting in a decline in work and living conditions of service members; and the shift in 
recruitment from elites to representing the broader population. 
8.3.1 Civilianisation 
The civilianisation of employment in the military occurs at two levels, firstly, through the civilianisation of 
military occupations, and secondly, through the increase in the number of civilian personnel employed in 
the military. 
Either civilian or uniformed personnel, indicating that the type of work performed does not require a specific 
military or combat skill can fill many of the posts in the SANDF. As indicated in Section 8.2.3, where there 
is a comparison between public servants and uniformed personnel in the level and type of work performed, 
they are appointed, promoted, remunerated and administered according to so-called transverse principles. 
In many respects, especially with the new service dispensation, uniformed personnel are treated as than 
"public service employees in uniform" when it comes to their conditions of service. 
Another trend that may contribute towards the civilianisation of the military profession, is the accreditation 
of military courses with some civilian qualification. The SANDF plans to establish a Defence Training 
Board, which will be affiliated to the South African Qualification Authority in order to gain access to the 
national qualification framework. The aim is to gain accreditation for military training in order to allow for 
the transfer of military learning to a later civilian career (Rutsch, 1996:5). To a certain extent this has 
become a necessity, given the implications of the short and medium service system, as military service is 
no longer a guaranteed long-term career. Another argument in favour of the collateral utility of military and 
civilian skills is that public funds spent on training and education in the SANDF are not lost to society. 
Besides the civilianisation of the military profession, the SANDF employs a considerable number of 
civilians. In November 1996, the SANDF Directorate Personnel Planning Division statistics reflected that 
the actual number of civilians in employment of the SANDF were 23 152 or 23 percent of the total full-time 
force component of the Defence Force7 (see Diagram 8.2). These civilian military employees are fully 
integrated with the uniformed personnel, and perform vital logistical and support functions alongside 
uniformed personnel. They serve primarily in supportive roles, in the administrative, financial, technical and 
7. A complete breakdown of the Department of Defence Personnel Strength per Arm of Service and service system is provided in 
Appendix A. 
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medical branches. The increase in the civilian component of the Department of Defence in recent years also 
reflects the greater sophistication of systems and closer support required from the defence industry. The SA 
Navy has the largest percentage of civilians, with 50 percent of its full-time component and almost the entire 
dockyard being manned by civilians. Similar to many other countries, there is a trend towards the employ-
ment of civilian contract workers to render specific services, particularly in the Navy and Air Force. 
46% 
1% 27% 
•LTS 
•MTS 
•STS 
DAUS 
•CIVILIAN 
3%'-----' 
Diagram 8.2: Personnel strength by service system (November 1996) 
Although integrated with unifonned personnel functions, civilians and unifonned military personnel are treated 
as two unique personnel components. Civilians in the SANDF do not fall under the Defence Act. They are 
public servants. and conditions of employment are regulated by the Public Service Act, 1994 and the 
Labour Relations Act, 42 of 1996. Accordingly, civilians have the right to join trade unions of their choice, 
and can partake in collective bargaining, but do not have the right to strike, as per definition; they are still 
classified as rendering an essential service. 
Most significanijy, the power and influence of senior civilians within the Department of Defence will increase 
' . 
dramatically once the civilian Defence Secretariat is fully established. The Defence Secretary is to act as the 
accounting officer of the Department of Defence, a function previously perfonned by the Chief of the SANDF, 
and is the principal adviser to the Minister of Defence on matters relating to defence policy, human resource 
policy, fiscal and administrative duties delegated by the Minister. Henceforth, the civilian employees within 
the Department of Defence will be a major component of the military, both numerically and in tenns of power 
and influence. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
119 
8.3.2 The shift from conscription to an all-volunteer force 
Another significant structural development that has profound implications for the nature of military service, 
is the recent shift from a conscript to an all-volunteer force in South Africa. Whereas the conscript system 
made little demand on the military as an employer, a volunteer system necessitates that marketplace 
criteria are taken into consideration. Cortright (1977:218) is of the opinion, that where armed forces recruit 
rather than conscript personnel, a new contractual basis for military employment comes into being, which 
is associated with a decline in the notion of military service as a calling. Many join not because of the 
uniqueness of the military service, but for other reasons, such as tertiary education and job opportunities 
that provide the financial and promotion prospects needed to attain material success. Obvious factors that 
influence the relative attractiveness of enrolment in the military on a voluntary basis, are pay, service 
benefits, and the availability of alternative employment opportunities. 
This view is supported by a survey conducted amongst the first intake of volunteer recruits at SAS 
Saldanha Naval Training Base during 1994. The findings revealed that the recruits had little understanding 
of the career possibilities in the South African Navy (SAN), and out of the 203 recruits, 157 indicated that 
they joined the Navy due to a lack of employment opportunities (Merts, 1996:41). They joined the Navy 
not on the premise that it was a calling, but as a job. Similarly, junior officers at the Military Academy in 
response to the questions pertaining to the reasons for joining the military only 25 percent indicated that 
they thought military service a calling, while 78 percent indicated that they wanted a secure job with promo-
tion and favourable retirement benefits (see Appendix C). 
The failure to emphasise the unique military lifestyle or character of the military during recruitment could be 
a contributing factor, as is reflected in the following advert designed for the appointment of personnel and 
logistics officers in the former $ADF: 
"The Quarter Master General is interested in people who have recently obtained a three year B degree or 
National Diploma in the Personnel or Marketing field. If you are looking for a progressive employer where 
your qualifications and potential will be put to full use, feel free to come and discuss your prospects ... The 
SA Defence Force offers a comprehensive remuneration package including a competitive salary supple-
mented by an annual service bonus and a worthwhile fringe benefit range: * service allowance * excellent 
pension scheme * free medical and dental treatment * ample leave and sick benefits" (Sunday Times, 1989 
as quoted in Malan, 1994b:45). As Malan indicates, as degreed personnel who will serve as officers, one 
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cannot help but notice the total absence of any reference to ,the uniqueness of the military profession or 
military service ethic. 
Assumed that traditional military benefits such as housing, pensions, and medical care are major 
incentives for joining the military, it can be expected that any decline in such perks could propel service 
members to adopt civilian type labour practices to protect their interests. In this regard Lane (1977:104) 
states that " ... perhaps the major incentive for unionisation amongst an all-volunteer force would be the 
perception of an erosion of self-related benefits and a certain frustration and helplessness to do anything 
about if. 
8.3.3 Erosion of service benefits 
In recent years the Defence Force have observed far-reaching cuts to its defence budget. As a percen-
tage of the Gross Domestic Product, the defence expenditure declined form 4,3 percent in 1989 to an 
estimated 3,45 percent in 1996. As a percentage of state expenditure this signifies a decline from 15,7 
percent in 1989 to an approximate of 5,9 percent in 1996. In the short to medium term, this decline in the 
defence budget is expected to continue as the national priority shifts away from defence to that of socio-
economic development. 
The urgent requirement to restrict government spending on defence will inevitably compel a reduction in 
the full-time component of the Defence Force. With personnel costs making up more than half of the 
defence budget, the most likely cuts will be on the terrain of manpower. Past cuts in the defence budget 
have already been associated with large-scale retrenchments, where roughly 18 percent of the total 
defence force cadre was laid off (Du Plessis, 1993:6). This naturally increases the sense of insecurity 
amongst uniformed personnel who have little recourse of action should they be retrenched. 
With the implementation of the three tier service system in 1994, military service is no longer a guaranteed 
long-term career.a While the different service systems are more suited to present security needs, the 
decline in permanence of tenure has several implications. Members are not guaranteed that their 
contracts will be renewed, and this creates a certain amount of discontent, especially among those who 
had thought that the military was a long term career or who had hoped to renew their contracts. The 
demonstrations by members of 21 Battalion at Lenz against the termination of their short-term service 
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contracts testify to this (Citizen, 1995:5). An additional problem is that particularly the medium-term system 
poses unique demands with respect to the pension fund, which is not presently catered for by the Govern-
ment Service Pension Fund. 
The perceived decline in permanence of tenure in the SANDF, together with the progressive erosion of 
service benefits has created the feeling that the chain of command can no longer be relied upon to protect 
individual interests. For example, since 1994 no SANDF input or comment to the Public Service Commis-
sion for uniformed personnel with regard to the division of funds for improving service benefits has been 
successful. Consequently, the erosion of "institutional" benefits over the past few years has been exten-
sive. 
To name but a few, free duty buses were discontinued in 1992, and where they have been retained in 
remote areas, members are charged market-related fees. Other benefits, such as the housing subsidies 
and study incentive schemes have become taxable, in some cases amounting to a financial loss of up to 
40 percent. Military accommodation tariffs, which before were fixed, have been increased substantially 
and are now calculated as a percentage of a member's salary. Other benefits have not kept up with the 
rate of inflation, such as the clothing allowance for civilian clothes, which has remained at a fixed rate of 
R350, 00 since 1986. Service allowances, such as the Staff Qualification Allowance and a service 
allowance to the members of the management echelon have been totally discontinued. Sport allowances 
too have been reduced and members are no longer reimbursed for expenses incurred with respect to 
subsistence and travel.9 This has substantially reduced the participation in sport at all levels. The new 
compensation system that came into effect in 1996 virtually eliminates all unique compensation benefits. 
As will be illustrated, the present willingness to join a representative association or union is strongly 
correlated with the erosion of service benefits experienced by military personnel. 
The proposed rationalisation of personnel, too, has a significant impact on institutional commitment and 
loyalty. As Malan (1993:25), states "[m]any [SADF] officers must find it difficult to ascribe to the concept of 
a calling rather than an occupation in a military, which has recently proved highly vulnerable to the market-
place phenomena of redundancy, rationalisation and retrenchmenr. Rationalisation is already taking place 
through natural attrition. Since April 1994 until July 1996, the personnel strength of the SANDF has 
8. See Section 6.4 for a description of the 'force structure'. 
1 
9. These details were obtained from a letter submitted compiled by the Personnel Division, SANDF to the Minister of Defence dealing 
with labour relations in the SANDF. 
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decreased by more than 12 000, largely as a result of retirements, resignations and non-renewal of 
contract (CSANDF, 1996:1). Some posts have been frozen or abolished, and recruitment to vacant posts 
is limited to certain specialist musterings. Expired contracts are also only being renewed where absolutely 
necessary. Voluntary severance packages have been offered to members to encourage resignation, with 
serious effects on morale of those who have chosen to remain and have to cope with the additional work-
load and inefficiencies that have arisen. 
Actual retrenchment or compulsory severance, scheduled to commence in 1997, constitutes the final stage 
. , 
of the rationalisation process. The following criteria will be taken into consideration - the person's level of 
expertise, past work performance and potential and productivity, adherence to course requirements, physi-
cal and psychological abilities, disciplinary record, domestic circumstances and normal age distribution 
within the personnel structure. 
The proposed rationalisation or downsizing is a cause of great concern to those who wish to remain in the 
SANDF, regarding their own relationship with the military and their future careers. In a study by Wrong 
and McNally (1994:209), it was found that there was~ significant decrease in organisational commitment 
after downsizing began among those who remained behind, or had supposedly made it. 
8.3.4 Changing racial composition 
With the shift to an all-volunteer force, the racial representation of the full-time force changed significantly. At 
the beginning of the eighties only a third (33,6 percent in 1981) of the full-time forces were other than white 
(Du Plessis, 1993:16). This figure increased to more than 50 percent by the early nineties and at present, 
whites represent only 29 percent of those serving in the full-time forces are white (see Diagram 8.3). This 
trend is likely to increase even further, largely due to demographic trends but also as a result of the 
integration of the non-statutory and homeland armies into the new National Defence Force. 
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Diagram 8.3: Racial profile of SANDF (November 1996)10 
Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division, SANDF. 
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From past actions it appears as if the black recruits entering the security forces have a more positive 
disposition towards unionisation. This is seen in the support for organisations such as the Police, Prisons 
and Civil Rights Union (Popcru) amongst black policemen and prisons personnel, even in the absence of 
any law recognising such rights. Members of the ANC's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) now 
integrated in the SANDF too have shown their sympathy with the cause of Popcru. These recruits are less 
socialised into the traditional military culture and appear to be more critical and less receptive to orders. 
The actions of the now disbanded National Peacekeeping Force11, who went on strike when they realised 
they were incorrectly paid and who torched the car of MK Chief of Staff Siphiwe Nyanda when he tried to 
address them, testify to this (Weekend Argus, 1994; Die Burger, 1994). 
Likewise, the predominantly black homeland armies now integrated into the SANDF bring with them a 
number of legacies. Most of these officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying 
their demands. The lack of political legitimacy, as well as the inability to deliver on the economic front, 
caused much of the instability in these former self-governing territories, all of which have succumbed to 
coups. In fact, the inability to deliver on the economic front has been one of the main causes of coup 
d'etats in Africa (Reichardt & Cilliers, 1996b:82). 
Many black soldiers have personally experienced the benefits of trade unionism, while in civilian employ-
ment, and in some instances have an external reference group to substantiate this. International research 
10. Refer to Appendix A for breakdown per Race and Gender for the Full-time Force component. Note that there are 24 missing cases 
which did not indicate race. 
11. The National Peacekeeping Force consisted of member of MK, APLA, the TBVC Defence Forces and the former SADF, was created 
with the intention to be used in an internal peacekeeping role. 
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also demonstrates that occupational officers more frequently come from lower-status groups and where 
they consider themselves as underprivileged, are on average more supportive of a civilian type of union in 
the military (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49). One of the consequences of occupationalism, is the priority with 
self-interest and the need to have some voice in the determination of pay and conditions of service. The 
most common form of self-interest articulation, is a trade union (Moskos, 1988:17). 
8.4 CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATIONALISM 
The shift towards an occupational dispensation has significant implications for the management of labour 
relations in the SANDF. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a professional/institutional dispen-
sation, compared to that of an occupation is the commitment to selfless service. The most significant sign 
of altruism, is the subordination of individual financial rewards to the goals of serving society. Yet the 
attitudes of officers at the Military Academy reflect an almost total priority with self-interest (see Table 8.6). 
Table 8.6: Features of a preferred job* 
Important Unimportant 
Variable % % 
A job with a oooct salary 97 3 
A steady job with good security 85 15 
A iob with oooct frinoe benefits 95 5 
A iob where you can make the world a better place 72 22 
A job where I can serve my country 57 43 
* Total number in sample 183. 
Traditional institutional values such as" a job that gives me a chance to make the world a better place to 
live in" and a "job that gives me a chance to serve my country" rated the least important on this scale. 
Similar tends were identified in the United States armed forces, in a study by Segal (1978:230), measuring 
certain preferred job characteristics between army, navy and civilian personnel. In all three work environ-
ments, personnel regarded good pay, fringe benefits, and the opportunity to control their personal lives and 
the avoidance of bureaucracy as the most preferred job characteristics. Factors such as prestige, job 
cleanliness, availability of free time, not being bossed and an opportunity to serve one's country were 
relatively less important. 
However, while the marketplace values were the most preferred, institutional values were not unimportant 
features of a preferred job. A significant proportion still regarded service to the nation as an important 
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feature of military service, even in the absence of an immediate military threat to the country. This indi-
cates that while there is a high tendency towards occupationalism, the junior officers still displayed a 
commitment towards traditional institutional values, reflecting a mixture of a sense of calling and a view of 
soldiering as a job. According to Caforio and Nuciari (1994:37) these responses are typical of the 
"pragmatic professional officer" who maintains traditional and ideal professional values, but at the same 
time stresses a strong interest in aspects such as job security, transferability of skills and the public image 
of the profession. 
Traditionally, it has been considered contrary to the professional ethics and standards of the professional 
soldier, to organise into interest groups (such as trade unions) to advance their own financial rewards. Yet, 
the responses to the questions, relating to the need for some form of organisation to represent the 
interests of members with respect to pay and promotion, reveal that the majority of junior officers felt that 
some form of mild collectivism, such as an association (not a trade union), was needed to represent and 
negotiate on their behalf outside the chain of command. In addition, there appears to be a general feeling 
that the chain of command can no longer be relied upon to protect the interests of individual members. 
The mere fact that only 16 percent felt that their interests were well looked after by the respective head-
quarters and staff divisions, indicates a relatively high level of dissatisfaction with some aspects of the 
military's ability to handle personnel problems (see Table 8.7). In this regard, Moskos and Wood (1988: 
288) state that "[t]o the degree that military members perceive senior military leaders as ineffective 
defences of an institutional compensation system, creeping occupationalism will appear in the rank and 
file". 
Table 8.7: Need for a representative association* 
Agree Disagree 
Variable % % 
Need for representation on hiQhest level on pay and promotion. 93 7 
Need for a leaal representative to take pay problems to court. 82 18 
Need for a representative association. 91 9 
Opposed to representative association bypassing the existing chain of command 36 64 
to neaotiate. 
Interests of members are well looked after by HQ 16 84 
* Total number in sample 183 
This appears to be a universal trend among all ranks. In a survey conducted among officers attending the 
various staff colleges of all four arms of service, 85 percent of Junior Staff and Warfare Course officers, 86 
percent of Senior Command and Staff Course officers and 77 percent of the Joint Staff Course officers, felt 
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that there is a need for representation on pay and promotion directly on the highest level. The over-
whelming majority, 68 percent supported the idea of an association (not a trade union} to represent their 
views, while only 43 percent supported the idea that the SANDF needs a more effective collective 
bargaining structure (such as a military trade union} to protect and advance the interests of members. The 
higher the rank and the more senior the officers, the less the support for either a professional association 
or trade union12 (see Diagram 8.4). 
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Diagram 8.4: Need among officers for representation. an association or military union* 
* Tota/in sample 188 
Similar results were obtained from an opinion survey conducted by the Military Intelligence Division Effect 
Analysis throughout the entire Defence Force among all the rank groups. In this survey 50 percent of 
respondents believed that there is a role for unions in South Africa, and that should there be a union for 
the SANDF, that they would join. The conclusion can thus be reached that there is a definite need for 
representation on pay and service conditions, be this by a professional organisation or a trade union. 
8.5 PRESSURE FOR A PLURALIST LABOUR RELATIONS DISPENSATION 
One of the reasons for the need for some kind of representative structure to place pressure on both the 
military command structure as well as the political decision-makers is precisely because most sources of 
grievance cannot readily be addressed within the chain of command. The required decisions are often 
12. These results were obtained from a survey conducted during October 1996. The rank profile for the Junior Staff Course ranges on 
average between Lieutenant to Major, for the Senior Command and Staff Course from Lt Col to Colonel and for the Joint Staff Course 
from Colonel to Brigadier. 
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beyond the legal competence of the officer commanding or the internal authority structure of the military. 
As uniformed personnel are excluded under the Labour Relations Act, 42 of 1996, and therefore from the 
Public Service Central Bargaining Chamber for the Public Service, this has meant that problems arising 
from the forum structure or other unique institutional needs, cannot be adequately negotiated by the 
military leadership. As stipulated in Section 195 of the Constitution of 1996, the SANDF at present has to 
function as an integral part of the Public Service. The Public Service Commission and the Department of 
Public Service and Administration, is responsible to give direction and approve all collective aspects with 
respect to salaries, pay and allowances and other conditions of service of members of the SANDF. 
The Central Chamber of the Public Service Bargaining_ Council, is the formal mechanism, through which 
public servants, via their respective unions, negotiate with the State as the collective employer. As 
uniformed members are excluded from the Labour Relations Act, this forum, does not serve the needs of 
the military per se, as the SANDF has to compete with the broader public service for the available funds in 
a forum in which it is not represented. As a result, the SANDF has to accept without any recourse the 
results of the agreements reached for the broader Public Service. As indicated in Section 8.3.2 of this 
chapter, the Public Service Commission has not been sensitive to the unique institutional needs of the 
military and tends to treat military personnel in the same manner as the rest of the public service. The lack 
of representation and inability of the system to protect its unique compensation system has resulted in 
further pressure to have some form of labour union or some para-union structure. 
Out of necessity and in attempt to pre-empt trade unionism, the SANDF has approached Cabinet, and 
obtained approval to investigate an alternative negotiation mechanism, through which the military leader-
ship can bargain for the interests of the military personnel, outside the bargaining structures that are in 
place for the rest of the Public Service. There is increasing pressure on the SANDF to accept a more plura-
list labour relations dispensation, partly due to the inefficiency of the current dispensation, but more impor-
tantly, because there is a need for representation by the members themselves. The ever visual presence 
of the South African National Defence Union {SANDU), is adding to this pressure, and is demanding that 
soldiers should be granted the same, or similar labour rights as the police, or else face a challenge in the 
Constitutional Court on this issue. 
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8.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
If an analysis is made of the variables listed by .Moskos, as indicators of a military social organisation 
moving towards an occupational dispensation, then, this trend is visible in both defence policy and perso-
nal attitude towards military service in the SANDF. 
This drift towards occupationalism is evident from the attitudes of military personnel, many of whom no 
longer view service in the military as a calling. The uniqueness of the military compensation system has 
also been eroded by the marketplace approach in the determination of the basis, mode and level of 
compensation for military personnel. The present institutional system of evaluation is also under review. 
So too, is the institutional legal system of the military that has to be brought in line with the Constitution. 
The equality clause in the Constitution has also meant that women can now serve in any position in the 
SANDF. Even with respect to military life, there is a trend towards occupationalism as members prefer to 
live off-base and military wives are less involved in the activities of the military community. Although atten-
tion is being paid to the role of veterans in the new SANDF, they are treated as any other public servant 
and are not necessarily held in high esteem, by society, by virtue of their prior standing in the military. The 
significance of this shift to a more occupational model, specifically with respect to the variables linked to 
compensation, the system of evaluation and the legal system, is that the service conditions of the military 
practitioner have become virtually the same as any other public servant. 
Certain trends within the military itself reinforce the ascendancy towards a more occupational dispensation. 
The increase in the number, and influence of civilians within the Department of Defence, has a certain 
erosive effect on institutional values. The shift to an all-volunteer force also means that not only 
institutional but also marketplace criteria are taken into consideration during recruitment, if quality 
personnel are to be recruited and retained. The increase in the number of persons entering the SANDF 
from underprivileged backgrounds also tends to promote occupationalism, but these trends are not limited 
to Blacks. The overwhelming majority of officers at the Military Academy and at the various staff colleges 
were white, and they supported the need for representation on pay and benefits at the highest level. This 
support is partly due to the erosion of service benefits that have taken place over the past few years, and 
the inability of the military leadership to prevent this decline. One of the consequences of the ascendancy 
of occupationalism within the SANDF, is that the unitarist labour relations practices have come under 
increasing pressure. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
129 
One of the current problems with the existing labour relations dispensation, is that there is no forum where 
either the military leadership, or a representative association, or union, can negotiate on behalf of unifor-
med military personnel. The new Labour Relations Act excludes members of the SANDF and is only 
applicable to personnel employed by the Department of Defence in terms of the Public Service Act. This 
implies that alternative means for addressing labour matters with respect to uniformed personnel needs to 
be found, as any other employee, soldiers are entitled to just labour relations channels and other mecha-
nisms to ensure that their aspirations and complaints are addressed. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE SANDF 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
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No labour relationship exists in a vacuum. While the military may be unique, and have a particular value 
system, the style and apprdach to labour relations will to a large extent be circumscribed by influences 
from society. The military cannot isolate itself from society, as it is from society that it draws its manpower. 
As stated in an South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Service Guide, " ... the SANDF cannot 
stress values that are far removed form those of society, for to do so, will result in society forcing changes 
upon the military ... it is the general spirit of the country which influences the opinions and standards of the 
military" (SANDF, 1996b:2-3). 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the most important societal forces that influence the 
management of labour relations in the SANDF. Many of these forces can be directly linked to the current 
political dispensation. The fact that certain labour rights are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa has a significant impact on labour relations policy in the SANDF. While the constitutional 
provisions are perhaps central to the "military union" debate, there are other forces within the socio-political 
and military environment, such as dominant political and associated trade union culture; the extent of 
labour rights for the broader public service; and the relative importance and status of the military in society, 
that impact on the management of labour relations in the SANDF. The entire labour relations force field 
needs to be taken into consideration if appropriate labour relations mechanisms are to be created for 
uniformed personnel. 
9.2 SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING LABOUR RELATIONS 
The following section focuses on those societal forces that exert an influence on the management of 
labour relations in the SANDF. The first, and possibly the most influential, is the recent trend in the 
direction of increased egalitarianism, political democracy and the protection of basic human rights in South 
Africa. 
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9.2.1 Equality of rights 
The central issue in the equality of rights debate is whether the provisions relating to labour relations in the 
Interim Constitution1 can be restricted for members of the armed forces. Those who support the idea, 
claim that it is socially unjust or undemocratic, if members of the armed forces are denied the freedom of 
association to join a union, for the purpose of collective bargaining to protect their interests, especially if 
these rights are guaranteed to other employees. Those against, maintain that the rights of soldiers must 
yield to the unique role of the military in society. 
Currently, the labour rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution, Section 17, state that "[e]very person shall 
have the freedom of association" which implies that membership to a union is a constitutionally protected 
right. Furthermore, Section 27 guarantees that "every person shall have the right to fair labour practices, 
workers shall have the right to join trade unions, to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade 
union and to strike". Section 16 guarantees "the right to assembly, demonstrate and petition", and accor-
ding to this clause, every person shall have the right to assemble and demonstrate with others peacefully, 
and unarmed, and to present petitions. 2 While all the above rights have been restricted in the Defence 
Act, 1957,3 these provisions have not been explicitly curtailed for members of the armed forces in either 
the Interim Constitution or the new Constitution. The implication is that the SANDF may have to condone, 
or even protect the rights of its members to demonstrate, to form, or join organisations for the purpose of 
bargaining with.the military command structure on matters related to their terms of service. 
Provision is made in the Section 33 of the Interim Constitution as well as in the new 1996 Constitution, 
Section 39 (1) to limit the above-mentioned rights. However, any limitation on any right, must be 
"reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom, taking into account all relevant factors including"( a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the /imitation 
and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose". Should the SANDF deem it 
necessary to restrict the rights of soldiers, it will have to justify that such restrictions are warranted in 
accordance with the requirements in the limitation clause. 
1. The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 remains in effect until the next elections in 1999. The provisions in this 
Constitution will be discussed with cross-reference to any amendments made in the new 1996 Constitution that will come into effect 
after the 1999 elections. 
2. The Freedom of Association clause has been retained virtually unchanged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996 . 
under Section 18, the Labour Relations Clauses under Section 23, and the Right to Demonstrate under Section 17. 
3. See Section 6.3.3 for the restrictions on trade unions in the Defence Act. 
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According to Phillips and Crosby (1977:100), armed forces (such as SANDF) facing a possible constitu-
tional challenge have four options. The first option is to maintain the present status quo, by retaining the 
prohibition on trade union membership, collective bargaining and the right to strike. In such an event, the 
Defence Force will have to justify that it is reasonable, and essential to withhold the freedom of association 
and labour relations rights. As the Defence Force renders an essential service to society, it could argue 
that a military union would break down loyalty, discipline and morale, thereby affecting the ability of the 
Defence Force to carry out its mission successfully. According to Delholm and Humes (1977:86), the 
general opinion exists that the constitutional rights of members of the armed forces might well be restrai-
ned, if a deterioration in discipline leading to the compromise of a higher public interest could be demon-
strated. 
In so far as the right to freedom of association is concerned, the limitation must be reasonable and justi-
fiable. Where this right is restricted, alternative provisions need to be put in place, as the essential content 
of the right in question may not be negated by the limitation. In this regard, the provision in Section 1268 
of the Defence Act which allows a member of the permanent force to belong to a professional or vocational 
institute, society, association, or like body approved by the Minister could be an alternative, but even then, 
the role and functions of such associations would need to be specified. 
The second option is to prohibit collective bargaining and strike action in the military, but authorise the right 
to join a union under certain conditions. Thus, allowing the freedom of association, but curtailing the right 
to collective bargaining and strike action. As the armed forces depend for their effectiveness upon 
cohesion and absolute discipline and obedience to an established chain of command, it could argue that 
bargaining or even the formation of bargaining units within the armed forces, would seriously inhibit, if not 
destroy, the combat readiness of the armed forces {Delholm & Humes, 1977:84). Countries such as the 
Netherlands and Germany have followed this option (USA, 1977:10-11). 
The third option is to prohibit striking, while authorising collective bargaining, thereby, allowing the freedom 
of association to belong to a union, with the purpose to bargain with the military command structure over 
terms and conditions of service. Such a ruling would give the military the same rights as the rest of the 
public service, which also does not have the right to strike. This option has been followed by the Danish 
armed forces and is based on the premise that there is no fundamental difference between the armed 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
133 
' forces and the rest of the public service (USA, 1977:20). This is the option that the South African National 
Defence Union (SANDU), is pressing for. 
The fourth option is to place no restrictions on the rights of military personnel to unionise or to partake in 
collective bargaining, or to strike. In other words extending all the constitutional and statutory labour rights 
to soldiers. The only country, which has extended these rights to soldiers, is Sweden (USA, 1977:22). 
Currently, the main restraining force prohibiting the development of unions in the SANDF are the restric-
tions in the Defence Act. However, historical experience with respect to labour relations in South Africa 
indicates that legal prohibition does not stop demands for unionisation, and might even spur union propo-
nents to press their case even harder. This is indeed the case, as is reflected in the various newsletters of 
SANDU and "position papers" 4 on labour relations submitted to the Human Resources Sub-Committee of 
the Defence Review. In a position paper submitted to the latter committee, SANDU proposed that" ... the 
right to associate (to obtain membership of a trade union) of members of the Permanent Force of the 
SANDF, be recognised . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining" and it intends challenging the restric-
tions in the Defence Act placed on trade unions in the Constitutional Court (SANDU, 1996: 65). An appli-
cation was already submitted to the Constitutional Court in September 1995 to declare the restrictions on 
trade unions in the Defence Act unconstitutional, but was referred back to the Supreme Court.5 The union 
subsequently postponed its case to see firstly, whether the armed forces would be included under the 
revised Labour Relations Act which came into effect on 11 November 1996, and secondly, to see what 
alternative labour regulations will be promulgated in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act. Should 
the rights of soldiers still be restricted, SANDU plans to continue its constitutional challenge. 
A key issue, as mentioned earlier, may not necessarily be the legality of such legislation, but its 
enforceability. The effectiveness of anti-union legislation has slowed or hindered union organisation, but 
has not been able to prevent it. There are other forces at play that may either restrain or drive the need for 
unions in the military. These forces are linked to the prevailing socio-political and military climate in the 
4. As part of the Defence Review process, all interested parties have the opportunity to put forward their views on specific issues, such as 
labour relations, which will be taken into consideration in the drafting of final regulations pertaining to the specific issue. 
5. The case was referred to the Supreme Court as no reasons were shown why the Supreme Court could not have dealt with the matter 
in terms of its powers under Section 101(1) or Section 101(3) of the Constitution of 1993. Insufficient special circumstances and 
urgency were provided to grand direct access to the Constitutional Court. Other reasons provided was that the SANDF is in the 
process of drafting labour regulations in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act, 1957. Source: Case Number: CCT32/95 in the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in the matter between the South African National Defence Union (first applicant) and George Vuma 
(second applicant) and the Minister of Defence (first respondent) and Chief of the National Defence Force (second respondent). 
Ref:9145/95/p. 39. B.J. de Klerk. (Document obtained from Mr C. van Niekerk, Executive Officer, SANDU) 
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country, and include factors such as the presence of a strong trade union culture, the extent of labour 
rights for the rest of the public service and the status of the military in society. 
9.2.2 Dominant political and trade union culture 
In most countries, where labour rights have been extended to the armed forces, there is a close relation-
ship between labour and government. Military representation in these European countries developed as 
part of the social norm of active support and promotion of government and was considered reflective of the 
social trends within those countries. 
Here, a crucial point of comparison can be made between the South African and the European situation, 
especially with respect to the black trade union movement. While black trade unions were never illegal, 
and in fact existed since the early twenties, the black trade union movement in South Africa became 
radicalised as a direct response to the inequality experienced on both the industrial and political terrain. 
The inequality and lack of legal, political, and industrial rights, coupled to state repression, pushed black 
unions into radical political activities. From the outset, the black trade union movement made overt political 
demands for the transformation to a more equitable society and it is appropriate at this point, to provide a 
brief background of the political role of unions (Heinecken & Du Plessis, 1994:34). 
The first black trade union federation to have any significant political impact was the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) formed in· 1956. From the outset, SACTU saw its task primarily in 
political, rather than industrial relations terms, and believed that a significant improvement in the conditions 
of black workers, depended on winning the vote for the whole population. At its inaugural conference, for 
example, it argued that "[y]ou cannot separate politics and the way in which people are governed from their 
bread and butter, or their freedom to move to and from places where they can find the best employment, or 
the houses they live in, or the type of education their children gef' (Baskin, 1991 :13). SACTU cemented its 
political involvement by immediately joining the ANC and participating in the mass political campaigns. 
SACTU's aim was to apply pressure on the state, in the form of demonstration strikes or campaigns, to 
obtain a more favourable dispensation not only for them, but also for the broader populace. 
But this brought it into direct confrontation with the state, which was resolute to suppress any upsurge in 
black militancy (Friedman, 1987:27-30). This was specifically so, after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 
and with the banning of the ANC. Having exhausted all passive means to bring about an improved political 
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dispensation for Blacks, the ANC formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) the "Spear of the Nation", and initiated 
the armed struggle against the apartheid state. Almost the entire SACTU leadership was recruited into 
MK. However, the government managed to infiltrate MK networks and mass arrests followed (Baskin, 
1991:15). The arrests and banning of many of SACTU's leaders coupled to the weak organisational 
structure of SACTU, led to its eventual disintegration. By the mid sixties,' the only Black worker organisa-
tion left were those organised in parallel unions by the white dominated Trade Union Council of South 
Africa (TUCSA) (Friedman, 1987:32). Consequently, black trade union activity virtually disappeared, but 
the lessons learned, laid the foundations for a new form of trade unionism. 
The 1970s witnessed the gradual increase in the de facto power of black workers. The spontaneous 
strikes originating in Natal in 1973 and the Soweto riots of 1976 resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
political awareness among blacks. During this period there were renewed attempts to organise Bl.acks into 
independent unions. Having learnt from the experience of SACTU, the unions refrained from becoming 
overtly involved in politics, but instead, used the existing works committees and to a lesser extent, the 
liaison committees, established under the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, to gain access to the 
factory floor. These structures, were created to serve as an alternative to trade unionism by the state and 
employers, but instead, were used by workers to build strong factory floor structures (Maree, 1987:4). 
Despite initial gains, the union movement soon ran into difficulties when many persons involved in the 
organisation and promotion of black trade unions were banned. These bannings increased after the 
Soweto Riots of 1976. But the impetus was not totally lost, as workers were better organised and many 
multinational companies in South Africa, under international pressure, started to recognise the unregis-
tered black trade unions (Maree, 1987:5). For most of the decade of the seventies, trade union activities 
centred on obtaining elementary rights - the right to organise, to be recognised and to bargain over wages 
and working conditions. 
In 1979, when far-reaching reforms to labour legislation were introduced on the recommendation of the 
Wiehahn Commission, blacks were permitted to make use of the statutory labour relations dispensation for 
the first time. Hereafter, the black trade union movement grew rapidly and as the only legal channel 
available to blacks&, the trade union movement, which initially avoided politics and focused on 
6. Blacks only obtained the right to vote in 1994. 
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strengthening workplace structures, was inevitably, forced to respond to wider political issues. Soon the 
black trade unions, together with other social movements organised under the banner of the United 
Democratic Front, engaged in joint campaigns to challenge the rule of the apartheid government. While 
many of the black trade unions belonging to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) were 
initially cautious of becoming overtly involved in politics, they soon realised that unions had a duty to their 
members to join the political groups in their battles (Friedman, 1987:440). A successful political challenge 
to the state demanded that alliances be formed with other social groups. Webster (1988:194) refers to the 
type of unionism that emerged during this time, as not merely political unionism,1 but as social movement 
unionism. This form of unionism is typical in authoritarian countries where workers are excluded from the 
central political decision-making processes and are forced, to become involved not only in economic, but 
also social and political issues. 
The founding of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in November 1985, provided 
renewed impetus for the union movement to take up the political challenge, against the white-dominated 
political system and against capitalism. According to Baskin (1991 :67) "Cosatu became an outlet for politi-
cal hopes of far more than its members. It acted as a political centre. Youths and students looked to it for 
guidance, churches asked it for political direction, ambassadors, foreign visitors and political journalists 
canvassed its opinions·. Cosatu was the voice of the black people in South Africa, in the absence of any 
legal political bargaining channel. Together with other political organisations, Cosatu organised various 
stayaways and strikes of political significance, such as the protest against the state of emergency and 
against elections where blacks could not vote. While such activities brought the labour movement in direct 
confrontation with the state, they were by now well organised, and firmly entrenched in almost every 
economic sphere in South Africa, making it nearly impossible to crush the unions, despite the bannings 
and detentions of many of its leaders under the states of emergency in the mid-eighties. 
With the unbanning of the black political organisations in 1990, the Black trade unions have formed strong 
links with the parties, which likewise promote the interests of the working class. Despite some areas of 
conflict and disagreement, the trade union movement has a close and cordial relationship with the new 
ANC-led government, with whom the largest trade union federation Cosatu, is in alliance. Since 1990, 
unions have become more involved in joint decision-making with other key role players, on a vast range of 
7. Although the concept political unionism and social movement unionism is often used interchangeably, a clear distinction exists 
between the two concepts. Political unionism is more closely linked to the SACTU period where union involvement in politics was 
linked to the struggle for African independence. Social movement unionism is where the union movement plays a more assertive role 
in community and national politics to bring about change in the social structure (Lambert, 1989:3-5). 
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socio-economic and political aspects, and can be said to have moved from a position of resistance politics, 
to an era of "politics of reconstruction". Particularly since 1994, labour has become well interpenetrated in 
state structures, and some have suggested that the labour movement has entered a new era of "strategic 
unionism'"d (Patel, 1994:5). This shift in strategy signifies a desire to participate in the formulation of 
industrial policy and the implementation of such policies that will enhance both wealth creation and the 
distribution of wealth, the two issues being viewed as inseparable. This signifies a fundamental break from 
the old adversarial unionism of previous decades. 
Given the role played by the trade union movement in obtaining both labour and political rights for the 
broader populace, it is understandable ·that the present social democratic ANC-led government will be 
sensitive to the needs of employees, whether they are policemen or soldiers. To substantiate this, the 
Minister of Labour, Mr Tito Mboweni, just prior to the promulgation of the new Labour Relations Act stated 
in a press report, that he was investigating the possibility of including soldiers under the new labour 
dispensation9 (Beeld, 1996:9). The mere fact that President Mandela set aside time to meet with a 
delegation from SANDU, to discuss the grievances of soldiers who protested outside the Union Buildings, 
illustrates the sensitivity to labour problems. This, despite the f ct, that SANDU is not a recognised union 
and can even be considered an "illegal union", if interpreted against the provisions in the Defence Act.10 
The support for trade unionism is also reflected in the public attitude towards trade unions in the military. 
Despite the derogatory cartoons and public sentiment expressed in various newspapers when SANDu11 
was created in 1994, there is substantial public support for allowing trade unions in the SANDF. In an 
opinion poll, conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) and Human Science Research Council 
(HSRC) among the broader public, 52 percent Black, 39 percent Coloured, and 51 percent of Asian 
8. · Strategic unionism is defined by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) as having the following characteristics: ··a tendency 
for unions to go beyond a narrow focus on wages and conditions; • the generation and implementation of centrally co-ordinated goals 
and integrated strategies; e.g. for full employment, labour market programmes, trade and industry policy, productivity, industrial 
democracy, social welfare, and taxation policies which promote equity and social cohesion; • sophisticated participation in tripartite 
bodies; • a commitment to growth and weaffh creation as well as its equitable distribution; • the active pursuit of these goals and 
strategies in their own right both inside and outside the arena of industrial relations: with • the emphasis upon strong local and work 
place organisation: and *the extensive delivery of education and research services ... ' (ACTU/TDC , 1989:289). 
9. This announcement was made after SANDU's National Secretary, Mr Corvan Niekerk attended a breakfast with the Minister of Labour, 
Mr Tito Mboweni on 20 August 1996 (SANDU, 1996:3). 
10. The writer was invited to attend this meeting held on 6 April 1995 at Thuynhuys, Cape Town as an academic observer. During the 
meeting the President stated that he was concerned about the grievances of soldiers as he depends on the SANDF to maintain 
stability and assist in bringing down the level of crime. After the meeting the President ordered his legal advisers and the Minister of 
Defence, Mr Joe Madise, also present at the meeting, to investigate the grievances of the soldiers at 21 Battalion who previously 
demonstrated outside the Union Buildings. 
11. See articles among others 'War brewing over union for soldiers' (Argus, 1994:1); 'A fear that Govt must dispel' (Star, 1994:1); 'Whose 
orders would be obeyed' (Argus, 1994); 'Absurd for forces to be able to strike'. (Argus, 1994:6); 'No unions - we're SANDF' (Pretoria 
News, 1994:1); 'Weermagvakbond will nie staak nie' (Beeld, 1994); 'SANDF Declares War' (Weekend Argus, 1995:1). 
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respondents were in favour of allowing trade unions. In contrast, almost 73 percent of Whites disagreed 
that members of the SANDF should be allowed to join trade unions (see Diagram 9.1 ). 
80 
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Diagram 9.1: People in the SANDF should be allowed to form trade unions by race 
Source: Institute for Defence Policy12 
If an analyses is made according to political party, then the Pan African Congress (PAC) were most 
supportive at 61 percent, the lnkhata Freedom Party (IFP) at 59 percent and the ANC at 52 percent of 
trade unions in the SANDF. Respondents supporting the traditionally white parties were against the 
SANDF allowing unions. (Schutte and Sass 1995a:52) These findings substantiate the view that Blacks, in 
general, are more supportive of trade unionism. 
To the question: "In view of the fact that they perform an essential service and some people think the 
service they render should be uninterrupted should members of the SANDF be allowed to strike or demon-
strate"13, more than half, 56 percent of the respondents were against allowing strikes and demonstrations 
in the SANDF (Schutte & Sass, 1995a:53). Naturally, any decision to permit labour unions in the armed 
forces will be influenced by public sentiment. However, it is unlikely that persons, who have struggled to 
obtain both labour and political rights, will give up those rights readily under the current dispensation. 
The problem the SANDF faces, should it permit members to join trade unions of their choice, is the possibi-
lity that unions could be formed along political lines. Members of the ANC's former armed wing Umkhonto 
12. The detailed breakdown of the figures quoted in Diagram 9.1 were obtained from the Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand. 
13. This can be considered a leading question. The responses may have been different if the question was, for example 'The Constitution 
grants workers the right to strike, should members of the SANDF have this righr. 
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we Sizwe still have strong links with the ANC, which in turn has COSATU as an ally. The PAC's former 
armed wing APLA is closely aligned to the National Council of Trade Unions, NACTU. There is the real 
fear, that trade unions in the SANDF could not only undermine the constitutional principle of political 
impartiality, but civilian control over the Defence Force. 
Nevertheless, with the greater degree of acceptance of unions in South Africa, and in light of the history of 
the labour movement and the close alliance of labour with government, it may be assumed that the proba-
bility to accept trade unions in the SANDF will be higher. However, as Ballantyne (1983:9) indicates 
"[c]ommunity acceptance is unlikely while unionism is associated with political and industrial activism". 
This view is substantiated by the results of the IDP/HSRC opinion poll among the broader public, where 
the majority of respondents accepted trade unionism, but rejected strike action and demonstrations by 
members of the SANDF. Also, (as was the case in France), where the extension of labour rights might 
politicise the armed forces, the government will be less inclined to extend these rights to soldiers. This 
could possibly be the reason why President Mandela declined SANDU's request to extent labour rights to 
soldiers, and why the SANDF has been excluded under the new Labour Relations Act that came into effect 
in November 1996. 
However, if unions have shifted towards a position of strategic unionism, the question could be asked if 
unions for military personnel would not also adopt a similar stance. In other words, not become involved in 
the past militant stance associated with the era of social movement unionism and resistance politics, but 
become more involved in the formulation of defence policy. Such involvement could even enhance the 
legitimacy of the defence force within society and create greater commitment to the defence force amongst 
its members. 
9.2.3 Influence of public sector labour rights 
In the European countries that have extended labour rights to the military, this occurred only after these 
rights were granted to other state employees. From the public service, these rights transferred to the 
police and lastly to the military (Fleckenstein, 1988:182). 
Until 1993, public service employees were denied the right to join trade unions, to strike or bargain collec-
tively with the State as the employer. The main reasons given for the restrictions placed on the labour 
rights of state employees, relates not only to the essential nature of the services they render to society, but 
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due to the implication of collective bargaining and industrial action for the state both financially and 
politically. For the security forces, these rights were curbed due to the critical role they play in society in 
maintaining order, stability and national safety (Heinecken, 1993:4). 
However, on 2 August 1993, after years of labour unrest among state employees, all public servants with 
the exception of the services departments14, were granted basic worker rights, comparable to the private 
sector with the promulgation of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA), 102 of 1993. Shortly 
afterwards, the Department of Correctional Services that had witnessed an increase in unionisation and 
labour unrest among prison warders, requested that these rights be extended to its uniformed personnel. 
Subsequently, they were included when amendments were made to the Public Service Labour Relations 
Act, 1994. 
This step was to have considerable impact on the then South African Police (SAP). The Police and 
Prisons Civil Right Union (POPCRU) represents both police and prisons personnel, and in 1993, both the 
SAP and the Correctional Services witnessed an upsurge in trade union activity. The spill over from the 
prisons department to the SAP was inevitable (Heinecken, 1993:16). Consequently, the SAP (now South 
African Police Service) amended the Police Act, No 7 of 1958 to include a section on South African Police 
Labour Regulations in 1993, which permitted policemen to join trade unions for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, but prohibiting strike action. 
In 1995, labour legislation once again underwent change. A new Labou·r Relations Bill was tabled in 
February 1995, bringing all employees under one law - the private sector, public service, nurses, teachers, 
agricultural and domestic employees, but initially excluded members of the SANDF, agencies and services 
established in terms of the Intelligence Services Act, and the South African Police Services (SAPS). This 
exclusion, flows from the unique functions they perform and followed the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) criteria, Convention 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and protection ofthe right to organise, 
article 9(1)) which stipulates that "[t]he extent to which this right can be extended to the security forces and 
police be subject to national legislation and regulations". 
But shortly afterwards, the SAPS under pressure from the three unions representing policemen, requested 
that it be included under the new labour dispensation. As a result, the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 
14. The services departments referred to are the South African Police, South African Defence Force and Correctional Services. 
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(hereafter LRA) which came into effect on 11 November 1996 includes everyone, with the exception of 
uniformed members in the SANDF, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service. 
Civilians in the Department of Defence are included under this legislation. This implies that they have the 
same labour rights as other employees. Civilians in the Department of Defence have the freedom of 
association to join a trade union and to participate in the activities of such a union, without fear of 
victimisation. Besides the entrenched organisational rights, the new LRA also provides the framework to 
promote joint decision-making in the workplace, collective bargaining and specialist labour bodies to help 
resolve disputes speedily (RSA, 1995:3-8). 
Through the ·establishment of workplace forums, employees can participate in joint decision-making and 
consultation at the workplace. Forums can only be established in workplaces of more than 100 employees 
and must be established on the initiative of a representative trade union that has majority membership 
(RSA, 1995:83-88). Beyond the workplace, these civilian employees are represented through their unions 
on the Central Public Sector Co-ordinating Bargaining Council which covers issues that affect the whole 
public sector. Furthermore, civilian employees are represented by their unions on the Sectorial Bargaining 
Council for the Department of Defence, which deals with issues specific to their employment in the DoD15 
(RSA, 1995:38-39). While the terms and scope of the agreements with the four recognised employee 
organisations differ, these unions act as the official collective bargaining agent of civilian members; have 
access to the premises of the Department of Defence upon prior arrangement; may conduct recruiting 
drives during working hours on condition that employees meet on a voluntary basis; may make use of 
departmental notice boards after obtaining permission from the Officer Commanding and may not be 
victimised for trade union activities. 
Should there be a dispute, civilian employees may refer such matters to the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The main functions of the CCMA is to resolve workplace disputes by 
' 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, to assist in the establishment of workplace forums and statutory 
councils, as well as give advice and assistance to parties in a dispute. Disputes that the CCMA cannot 
resolve may be referred to the new Labour Court. Appeals against the rulings of the Labour Court can in 
tum be referred to the Labour Appeal Court (RSA, 1995:114-124, 150-168). 
Another important provision of the new Labour Relations Act, is the protection of legal strikes. Employees 
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cannot be dismissed or disciplined for a legal strike, while employees who go on an illegal strike may face 
a court interdict, or a claim against them for losses resulting from the strike and dismissal. (RSA 1995:64-
66) Employees classified as rendering and essential service may not strike, but must refer such a dispute 
to mediation or arbitration. The new LRA only lists the police and parliamentary services and any other 
service in which the disruption thereof may endanger the lives, personal health and safety of the entire 
population or part thereof, as essential services. A special, "essential services committee" will decide on 
what other categories of employment can be classified as essential services, and it is yet to be seen 
whether this will include all, or only certain civilian employees in the DoD (RSA. 1995:76-77). Last, but by 
no means least, is that an entire chapter of the new LRA is devoted to regulations and procedures dealing 
with unfair dismissals (RSA. 1995: 169-181). 
Besides the mechanisms available and protections under the new LRA, the DoD has also created a unit 
·Labour Relations Communication Forum (LRCF) to ensure employee participation at lower levels. The 
functions of the LRCF are to address matters of mutual interest of concern within the jurisdiction of the unit 
Officer Commanding; to promote sound communication between Officers Commanding and employees; to 
submit proposals with respect to labour matters that cannot be solved at unit level and to monitor and 
supervise the execution of agreements between the SANDF and recognised employee organisations. The 
LRCF consists of the Officer Commanding of the unit, the Personnel Officer and a committee secretary, 
representatives of the employee organisations whose recognition agreement provides for representation at 
unit level, and representatives of unattached employees.16 
Within the DoD, there is thus the situation where civilians working alongside uniformed personnel, often 
doing the same work, have full labour rights and are represented at various levels, while uniformed 
personnel have no labour rights under the new dispensation. According to Grobbelaar (1996:15), some of 
these civilians, such as those working in the naval dockyard, perform tasks more essential to operational 
effectiveness than uniformed personnel in administrative positions. 
This disparity in labour rights has been one of the driving forces behind SANDU's fight for recognition and 
right to represent uniformed personnel. SANDU's mission statement declares that the union aims "[t]o 
15. Currently the DoD has recognition agreements with four employee organisations, the Public Servants Association of South Africa 
(PSA), the Public Service League of South Africa (PSL), the National Education Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU) and the 
South African Health and Public Service Workers Union (SAHPSWU). 
16. See the following: CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletins, 'The Department of Defence and the SAHAPSWU', No. 43/95 
'Recognition agreement between the DoD and Nehawu', No. 80/95, 'The SANDF and Labour Relations Communication Forums' 
No. 85196. 
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represent the interests of all members, irrespective of rank, race, religion or sex, by means of reasonable 
and impartial labour relations practices".11 In doing so, it has declared that it will " ... maintain an apolitical 
image at all times, and to counter any unlawful interference in the execution of the mission by any person, 
political party, other organisation or institution". Furthermore, that it will " ... represent and promote the 
interests of all persons through a process of active and collective bargaining" but will at the same time 
"... acknowledge and respect the identity, culture and traditions of the individual arms of service" .1s The 
fact that SANDU exists and appears to have substantial latent support increases the spill over of labour 
rights to uniformed personnel. 
As almost fifty percent of uniformed members support the idea of a trade union and the DoD has already 
witnessed incidences of labour unrest among soldiers, the potential for collective action cannot be ignored. 
According to Perry (1977:98) this is especially so in a society which has given de facto and de jure recog-
nition to such action as being legitimate in the search for job security and improved working conditions. 
We see for example, that despite the restrictions placed on trade union activity by the Correctional 
Services Act, 8 of 1959 and the Police Act, 7 of 1958 these departments were nevertheless subject to 
incidences of labour unrest and trade union activity, which eventually culminated in the acceptance of 
trade unionism. As a matter of interest, the restrictions placed on trade union activities in the latter 
departments were similar to those in Section 1268 of the Defence Act, 1956. 
Furthermore, Steele and Heinecken (1995:85) who analysed the convergence between private and public 
sector labour relations systems established that in the long run, specialised structures have not been 
acceptable or successful in the regulation of labour relations. Despite the existence of numerous avenues 
of appeal, such as individual conflict resolution mechanisms (updating the grievance and disciplinary 
procedures), the creation of alternative communication structures or discussion forums, full labour rights 
were only extended to employees after these structures proved ineffective or unable to meet the needs of 
employees19. The implication of this finding is that the SANDF cannot assume that an upgrading of the 
Military Disciplinary Code, or the revitalisation of the forum structure, will automatically preclude the need 
for collective bargaining or some alternative structure, should there be such a requirement. Should the 
17. lnfonnation brochure provided by SANDU to the State President at the meeting held at Thuynhuys, Cape Town, 6 April 1995. 
18. Of interest, is that SANDU was started by approximately 30 unifonned members who saw a union as the only way to solve their grie· 
vances. According to its executive officer Mr Cor van Niekerk, a fonner major in the South African Airforce, the union has approximate· 
ly 60 percent non-rommissioned officers and 40 percent officers and has slightly more black members (mostly in the lower ranks) than 
white members. 
19. See Heinecken (1993) for a comprehensive overview of the labour relations dispensation and development for both unifonned and 
civilian personnel employed by the Department of Defence as well as the other services departments. 
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SANDF ignore this need, it will most likely result in a situation where unions (such as SANDU) or 
associations place pressure on the organisation "outside" the statutory framework of the law, as has been 
the case in every other public service department in South Africa. 
9.2.4 Decline in the status of military profession 
The need to have some form of representation is often enhanced where military personnel are treated the 
same as the rest of the public service and where they have experienced a decline in their relevance and 
status in society. Harries-Jenkins (1977:61) claims that one of the most important factors motivating the 
military to unionise, is the feeling that the armed forces, in comparison with other institutions in society, 
have lost their previously held status, and have suffered an undue amount of deprivation. "When there is a 
significant loss of privilege and status of the military in society, trade unions are then formed as a pressure 
group to re-establish the privileges formerly held by the armed forces". 
With the focus on social development and upliftment in South Africa, the SANDF does not enjoy the same 
status within society as it did in previous years. Under the National Party, especially during the PW Botha 
era, the former SADF played a central role in political decision making through the Joint Security Manage-
ment System and consumed a growing share of the countries national resources. But with the withdrawal 
of the SADF from Angola and independence of Namibia, the military since 1990 found itself very rapidly 
relegated to the fringes of South African power politics. A budget which peaked at 3,4 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product in 1989 had been slashed to 2,2 percent by 1995, with massive further budgetary 
cuts envisaged (Shaw, 1994:229; Wood, 1995: 15). 
At this stage in the history of South Africa, the military faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its 
existence, but certainly its expenditure, size and future role within society. According to Fourie (1996:176), 
there is an anti-military lobby in the ANC for virtual unilateral disarmament of the military, partly because 
many feel that the SANDF is "still too white" (particularly its officer corps), and because it is thought that 
reconstruction and development requires priority above the military. The ANC feels that defence funding 
should be cut in favour of social projects (Sunday Times, 1996:7). 
To add to this, the SANDF frequently faces demands in the media to motivate the need to upgrade or 
acquire more technologically advanced equipment. Even though the Interim Constitution, 1993 Section 
226 ( 4) states that the Defence Force must be "... a balanced, modem and technologically advanced 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
145 
military force"20 whose primary task is the protection of the Republic, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity, 
it is unlikely that it will be utilised in this role. There is no conventional military threat to the country. The 
main task of the SANDF will be to support the police in internal law and border duties, and to prepare for 
possible involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region. The greatest threat to South Africa at 
present comes from socio-economic problems like unemployment, poverty, inadequate education, lack of 
housing and social services, crime and violence - none of which demand a military solution. 
Reconstruction and development for stability and security has become the national priority, not defence 
(CSANDF, 1996:1). 
The perception that there is decline in the relevance and importance of the military is reflected in the views 
of officers presently serving in the SANDF. In the survey conducted among officers attending the junior, 
senior and joint staff courses, it was found that while 60 percent of the officers felt that the Defence Force 
is more legitimate than a few years ago,21 79 percent were of the opinion that South African society views 
military service as less important today. So while officers perceive the SANDF to be more legitimate in the 
eyes of the broader populace, the importance of their role and function in society is seen to have declined. 
However, the officers did not agree with society's view that military service is less important and that 
military issues should receive a lower priority, just because there is no external threat. The overwhelming 
majority, 88 percent disagreed with the statement that "[b]ecause of the present absence of an external 
threat, that South African society must not emphasise military issues". 22 The implications of these findings 
are that officers feel that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they fulfil. 
Another factor, affecting officers' commitment to serve is the fact that 68 percent felt that operationally, the 
Defence Force was more competent a few years ago (see Table 9 .1). As professionals they themselves 
feel that they are becoming less capable of fulfilling their primary role in society. The erosion of military 
20. This clause has been removed from the Interim Constitution and replaced with Section 200(1) '(!)he defence force must be structured 
and managed as a disciplined military force' whose (2) '(p]rimary object ... is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity 
and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.· The removal of 
the clause relating to 'technologically advanced military force' possibly relates to the public debate over the purchasing of the corvettes 
for the SA Navy and other more sophisticated weaponry for the SANDF (Sunday Times, 1996:7). 
21 During the apartheid era, the former SADF lacked legitimacy, as many blacks perceived the military as a means to maintain white 
supremacy. Especially after the troops were used in the townships to curb the rising tide of black resistance in the mid eighties, this 
resentment grew (Nathan, 1989a:70). 
22. In an opinion survey conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy and Human Sciences Research Council it was found that Whites, 
Asians and Coloureds were significantly more supportive of the need for a strong defence force than Blacks (Schutte & Sass, 1995b: 
44-45). 
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budgets, the cancellation of advanced weapons system and the apparent preference for social projects are 
seen as symptoms of national neglect. The inability to maintain and acquire new equipment, the 
integration process, and the perceived lowering of standards of training, the rationalisation and resignation 
of competent military officers and the impact of affirmative action, all contribute towards the feeling of 
relative deprivation. 
Table 9.1: Perceptions on status and relevance of military service* 
Yes Unsure No 
Variable % % % 
The SANDF is more legitimate than a few years ago. 60 17 30 
South African society views military service as less imoortant than a few years ago. 79 12 9 
Because of the present absence of an external threat, South African society must 21 17 88 
not emphasise military issues. 
Operationally the South African armed forces were more competent a few years ago 68 12 20 
than today. 
Total in sample 188 
The perceived decline in the relevance and status of their profession, together with the lack of mechanisms 
to advance their deteriorating conditions of service, underlies much of the present need for some form of 
collective representation at the highest level. 23 
9.3 FORCE FIELD OF MILITARY UNIONISM 
This chapter outlines some of the societal forces that influence, either directly or indirectly, the manage-
ment of labour relations in the SANDF. In this regard, Manley et al (1977:107) developed a model illustra-
ting the force field of military unionism. This model has been adapted to the South African situation, and 
serves as an apt summary of the forces that influence the management of labour relations in the SANDF. 
Virtually none of the restraining, but all of the driving forces identified by Manley et al are evident in South 
Africa (see Diagram 9.2). 
Much of the debate surrounding labour rights for military personnel in ·South Africa centres on the 
constitutionality of prohibiting unions. Even though the SANDF is excluded from the ambit of the new 
Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 and the Defence Act, 1956 Section 126 (as amended) limits the 
23. See Section 8.4. For a discussion on the need for representation on pay problems and support for a professional association and trade 
union with collective bargaining rights by officers serving in the SANDF. 
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labour rights of military personnel, the testing ground for justifying such limitations will no doubt be the 
Constitutional Court. In this regard, it is debatable to what degree the rights of soldiers as employees, in a 
democracy, can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed. In all probability, restrictions will not be placed on 
the freedom of association, but on the activities of any organisation representing the collective interests of 
military personnel that constitute a clear danger to loyalty, discipline and morale. 
Public opposition Parliamentary Resistance Perceived threat Department 
to military antipathy within military from potential of Defence 
RESTRAINING unions enemies legislation 
~ + + + + + 
FORCES FORCE FIELD OF MILITARY UNIONISM 
t f t t t t 
DRIVING Occupationalism Dominant trade Public sector Perception of Department 
and belief that union culture advocacy anti-military of Defence 
a union can environment policies 
be effective 
Diagram 9.2: The force field of military unionism 
Source: As adapted from Manley R. McNichols C. and Saul Young G., 1977:107. 
The question may not be the legality of such legislation, but its enforceability. Many of the forces that 
either drive or restrain the development of some form of group representation within armed forces are 
linked to the socio-political and military environment. As Manley et al (1977) illustrate, where there is 
private sector opposition or public and parliamentary antipathy, it is unlikely that labour rights will be 
extended to the armed forces. However, the sensitivity of the present ANC-led government to labour and 
the support for trade unions among the broader populace, indicates that there is no overwhelming private 
sector opposition to unions in the military. The support for allowing trade unions in the military also stems 
from the fact that the rest of the public service as well as the police have labour rights. As indicated in 
previous chapters, the recent pay stance24 by government where uniformed members are remunerated on 
the same pay scales as the rest of the public service, reinforce the perception that they are merely public 
servants in uniform. If they are treated no differently from public servants by government, one cannot 
expect soldiers to behave the same as any other employee if faced with a decline in service benefits and 
tenure. 
The need for representation can also be coupled to the perceived anti-military environment. At this stage 
24. See Section 8.2.3 and 8.3.1 for a discussion on the parity in salary scales with the rest of the public service. 
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in the history of South Africa, the SANDF faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its existence, but 
most certainly of its expenditure, size and future role within society. Even though most officers felt that the 
military is politically more legitimate, they did not support the idea that just because of the present absence 
of an external threat, that South African society must under emphasise the role, and importance of the 
military. 
Nearly all the forces outlined by Manley et al (1977) indicate that the DoD faces the possibility of unionisa-
tion, and it is against this background, that the SANDF is being pressurised to create the necessary 
mechanisms through which the interests of uniformed members can be articulated and addressed. 
9.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A key issue in the military union debate in South Africa is whether the right to belong to a trade union for 
the purpose of collective bargaining can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed for military personnel. The 
suggestion is made that in all likelihood the activities of a union, but not the freedom of association to join a 
trade union could be curtailed, on the basis that it is the activities of unions that constitutes a danger to 
organisational and combat effectiveness. However, ultimately, it is not the legality of the restrictions on 
trade unions, but its enforceability that will be the decisive factor. 
The dominant political and trade union culture in South Africa is supportive of trade unionism, as is reflec-
ted in the results obtained from a public opinion poll measuring the support for unions for military person-
nel. While some European countries have restricted the rights of military personnel to belong to trade 
unions, especially where union activity is associated with political and industrial activism, a position was 
put forward that the recent shift ta· strategic unionism in South Africa, tends to indicate that a military 
personnel would be less likely under the new political dispensation to partake in radical political activities, 
but would most likely, play an influential role in the formulation of defence policy. 
Presently, the pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed personnel in the SANDF is enhanced by the 
fact that the police and civilian employees serving in the Department of Defence have labour rights. The 
fact that these civilians work alongside military personnel and have mechanisms whereby their needs can 
be articulated, while uniformed members lack effective structures, increasing the pressure for unionisation. 
Public sector experience also indicates, that the creation of alternative specialised structures to deal with 
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labour relations issues have often proved ineffective and have eventually led to the acceptance of 
unionism. 
The inclination of military personnel to form or join a union is enhanced where the military institution, and 
the military profession, has suffered a significant loss of privilege in society. This perception was verified 
by a survey conducted among a select group of officers, many of whom felt that military service is consi-
dered less important, and that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they 
fulfil. These responses could be attributed to government priority with social upliftment, rather than 
security in the absence on any external threat. 
To conclude, it was proposed that the entire industrial relations force field needs to be taken into conside-
ration in the debate on whether military personnel will be likely to join, or form unions, or whether labour 
rights can be extended to military personnel. Ultimately, as the experience of the public sector and the 
police indicates, it may be better to create the necessary structures whereby soldiers can negotiate their 
conditions of service, than for the state to be forced to cope with non-institutionalised labour unrest by 
"armed' soldiers. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH 
MILITARY SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
150 
A position frequently put forward is that soldiers are not workers, and are therefore excluded per definition 
from having labour rights. While there may be substance to this argument, a contract of employment does 
exist between members of the armed forces and the State as employer, as regulated by the Defence Act, 
1957 and the Public Service Act, 1994.1 The fact that Section 126C of the Defence Act, 1957 recognises 
that "[a]ny member of the Permanent Force shall exercise his rights with respect to labour matters in terms 
of the regulations, and the State as his employer shall handle and administer all such matters, including 
the resolution of disputes, in accordance with regulations", indicates the acknowledgement of the need for 
labour relations regulations. 
Similar sentiments are expressed in the White Paper on Defence, which states that the Department of 
Defence (DoD) must create appropriate labour relations mechanisms, through which the interests of 
SANDF members can be articulated and addressed (SANDF, 1996a:37). 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether labour rights can be extended to soldiers in South Africa. 
Taking international precedent, the unique nature of the military profession, the recent drift towards occu-
pationalism, as well as the socio-political and military circumstances into consideration, some suggestions 
are made that could improve the present labour relations dispensation for uniformed personnel. 
The shortcomings of the existing individual and collective grievance resolution mechanisms are high-
lighted, and certain suggestions are made that could improve the efficiency of these structures. The 
establishment, appointment, role and possible labour relations function of the Military Ombudsperson is 
discussed. As the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may have to accommodate either/or 
professional associations or trade unions, some suggestions are made as to how these organisations 
1. The Public Service Act, 1994, Section 8 determines that the public service shall inter alia consist of persons who (a) hold posts on the 
fixed establishment and (ii) the services, thus including persons who hold posts in the Permanent Force of the SANDF. 
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could be accommodated, without undermining the authority structure of the military, or posing a threat to 
civilian control over the armed forces. 
10.2 ACCOMMODATING THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE 
This section focuses specifically, on some of the means whereby the present labour relations dispensation 
for uniformed members of the SANDF, can be improved to accommodate the needs and aspirations of 
soldiers as employees. 
10.2.1 Revision of individual grievance procedures 
The Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) (Schedule 1 of the Defence Act) is the structural base of authority 
whereby the SANDF maintains discipline and resolves military related pr blems.2 Included in the MDC is 
Section 134 dealing the Redress of Wrongs procedure. This procedure is the means whereby an aggrie-
ved member of the SANDF, can submit a written request for a redress of wrongs right up to the President, 
should the member be dissatisfied with the decision taken by the command structure. 
In principle, the Redress of Wrongs procedure can be compared to a grievance procedure found in any 
other private organisation, although the issues tha~ can be channelled through this procedure relate more 
specifically to issues of injustice. For example, a superior may have treated a subordinate with unneces-
sary harshness, or the member may feel he/she has been unjustifiably disciplined or insulted. Grievances 
where members have no legal claim, such as transfers,.~ave nomination for courses and pay fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the MDC. Such grievances are addressed through the normal chain of command 
structures or communication "forum" structure, which makes provision for both individual and collective 
grievances. 
One of the main problems with the present grievance resolution procedures is that until recently, feedback 
was not coupled to specific time periods. The procedure only stated that feedback must be given within a 
"reasonable time". Amendments made to the MDC have reviewed this and coupled the resolution of 
grievances at the various levels to specific time periods. Even so, in practice there is considerable delays 
given the bureaucratic nature of the military organisation. 
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Notwithstanding, if any grievance procedure is to function properly, aggrieved members should not only 
receive feedback within specific time limits, but also be able to appeal against unsatisfactory responses. 
At present there is no dispute resolution procedure for either disputes of rights3 (those which fall under the 
jurisdiction of the MDC) or disputes of interests, which are channelled through the normal command 
structure. Should a member of the SANDF feel dissatisfied with the feedback received from the Chief of 
the SANDF (CNDF), this may be forwarded to the President, whose answer is final. 
Another concern with the present procedure is that it is not considered an impartial channel of restitution. 
Grobbelaar (1996:15), a senior officer in the SANDF, claims that in practice uniformed members are often 
reluctant to submit grievances through the Redress of Wrongs procedure, " ... because of a concern of 
possible victimisation or negative consequences for their future careersn. A grievance procedure will not 
be effective if employees fear that they will be victimised or intimidated for lodging a complaint. Recently, a 
Lieutenant Magama, who wrote a letter to President Mandela complaining about racial discrimination, was 
court martailed for not channelling his grievance through the MDC. In his defence, he stated the reason 
for not doing so as ·... they expect us to complain to the very people who are unjustly discriminating 
against us" (Mail and Guardian, 1997:6). The conclusion can be reached that due to the shortcomings 
mentioned that the MDC does not function as an effective grievance mechanism. 
10.2.2 Revision of the communication "forum" structure 
During 1995, the communication "forum" structure4 was introduced, to enable various rank groups to 
submit proposals with respect to the improvements in their conditions of service, identification of problem 
areas and means to improve higher morale in the unit. The forum structure is primarily a communication 
structure, whereby either individual or collective grievances, complaints and suggestions can be brought to 
the attention of higher authority. While this is a valuable forum, the main shortcoming of this mechanism is 
that there is no remedial channel, should there be dissatisfaction with the feedback received from higher 
2. A commission under the chairmanship of R Adm J.E. Relief has been tasked to review the entire Defence Act including the MOC to 
bring it in line with Constitutional requirements. The revisions affecting summary trials, which can be compared to disciplinary hearings 
as well as court martials may have some impact on labour relations. 
3. A "dispute of right' is that to which a party is entitled by law, by contract, by agreement or by established practice. Most of the 
complaints that can be channelled through the MOC fall within this category. A dispute of interest is that which a party is not yet 
entitled. Any matter causing conflict between an employer and employee and not regulated by law, agreement or custom can give rise 
to a 'dispute of interest'. It is specifically in this sphere where there is a lack of effective individual and collective procedures with some 
form of dispute resolution mechanism for uniformed personnel in the SANOF. 
4. See Section 7.3.2 for a discussion of how this structure f~nctions. 
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authorities. In labour relations terms, grievance, disciplinary and dispute resolution procedures are 
complementary to one another. The absence of one renders the others less effective. 
Most of the grievances channelled through the forum structure concern matters of interest, that relate to 
the determination of new terms and conditions of employment. Unlike disputes of right which have judicial 
foundation, the resolution of disputes of interest constitute a more dynamic aspect of labour relations, as 
the right still needs to be established. The settlement of such disputes may require the establishment of 
procedures such as conciliation, mediation or arbitration.s 
A possible means to overcome the shortcomings for resolving both individual and collective disputes, is to 
utilise a mechanism similar to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) created 
under the new Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. The CCMA& is a state funded body, governed by a 
tripartite board composed of representatives of government, labour and business, designed specifically, to 
resolve disputes as speedily as possible at local and central level by means of conciliation, mediation and 
where necessary, arbitration. Only where disputes cannot be resolved, are they referred to the Labour 
Court for adjudication. These dispute resolution mechanisms are already available to civilian employees in 
the DoD, but as uniformed members are excluded from the scope of the Labour Relations Act, it is deba-
table whether the DoD could utilise this structure for uniformed personnel. 
Should a similar mechanism be created to resolve disputes for uniformed personnel, criteria will need to be 
established with respect to the appointment, selection and tenure of such officials. Such a military CCMA 
could possibly function as follows. After a complaint has been channelled through the forum structure,7 
and an unsatisfactory response is received from the CNDF, resulting in a dispute, the matter could be 
referred to the military CCMA. The method of settlement will depend on the seriousness of the dispute. 
The more critical the issue, the greater the tendency to make use of compulsory arbitration. 
A possible problem for the military, is that arbitration does tend to take the initiative out of the hands of the 
actual participants and means that the selection of the arbitrator, or even mediator must be fully acceptable 
to all parties involved in the dispute. As military personnel do not have access to the Labour Court due to 
5. Conciliation entails bringing together the parties and urging them to continue negotiation until a settlement is reached. Mediation, is 
where a third party acts as a go between supplying new perspectives and arguments in an attempt to achieve a settlement, whereas in 
arbitration the third party takes on the role of adjudicator. 
6. Refer to Section 9.2.3 for a discussion of this mechanism. 
7. Refer to Section 7.3.2 for a discussion of the communication structure for collective grievances. 
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their exclusion from the Labour Relations Act, a possible option to consider, in the case of fundamental 
disagreement, is for the MO to investigate and make recommendations on disputes that could not be 
resolved by the military CCMA. These recommendations are submitted to the Ministry of Defence who 
must report back to the MO and in severe cases to the President, as Commander in Chief of the Defence 
Force. 
The most obvious value of such a structure is that it may render the present individual and collective 
grievance procedures for both disputes of rights and interests, more acceptable. As unresolved grievan-
ces are one of the main causes of labour unrest, a special CCMA that is compatible with military service, 
may diffuse potential discontent within the ranks of the SANDF. 
10.2.3 The military ombudsperson 
The creation of the post of Military Ombudsperson (MO) is one of the most favoured means proposed by 
Parliament and the DoD to address the problems and grievances of military personnel (Citizen, 1996:11). 
10.2.3.1 Establishment and appointment 
In terms of the Interim Constitution, Section 110 to 114 and the new 1996 Constitution, Section 182, 
provision is made for the establishment and appointment of a Public Protector to investigate all complaints 
over the total spectrum of Government. These include, for example, complaints by the public against mal-
administration in connection with government affairs; improper conduct by a person performing a public 
function; improper acts with respect to public money; improper or unlawful enrichment of a person perfor-
ming a public function resulting in improper prejudice of another person. 
The premise of the Public Protector is that there should only be one such institution for the whole of the 
Republic of South Africa. One means whereby a MO could be accommodated is to appoint such a person 
as a Deputy Public Protector within the office of the Public Protector. Section 7 (3)(a) of the Public 
Protector Act, 23 of 1994, also makes provision for the Public Protector to request a department to place a 
person with specialised knowledge at his disposal to assist with investigations. There is thus scope, within 
the current dispensation to appoint a person within the office of the Public Protector to attend to complaints 
brought by SANDF personnel, or which have been lodged against the SANDF, by the public. The location 
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of a MO in this capacity, within the office of the Public Protector, would also ensure that the institution of 
MO is seen as independent of the influence of the DoD. 
Should a MO be appointed independently, but more or less on the same level as the Public Protector, the 
matter would have to be negotiated between the Public Protector and the Ministry, Parliament (the Joint 
Standing Committee and the Portfolio Committee) and the DoD, to avoid duplication of functions. An alter-
native could also be to create or appoint a Defence or Soldiers Complaints Commissioner, who could 
perform the same function as that of a MO, but be accountable to the Public Protector. 
Whatever the structure, it is imperative that the role and function of the MO be perceived as independent. 
An investigation of those countries that have provided for a MO shows that it must be totally independent 
from the military or any other civil institution, if it is to have any legitimacy.a However, the incumbent needs 
to have a sound knowledge of military values, procedure, administration and functioning. 
10.2.3.2 Role and functions 
Based on the White Paper on Defence and statements by the Joint Standing Committee of Defence 
Chairman, Mr Tony Yengeni, it would appear as if the role of the MO is to monitor adherence to democratic 
civil-military relations; undertake investigations at the request of parliament; investigate complaints against 
the SANDF by military personnel and investigate complaints against the SANDF by members of the public 
(SANDF, 1996a:12; Citizen, 1996a:11). The MO as with the Public Protector is appointed by and reports 
to parliament.9 The essence of the MO's role is to ensure the observance of the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution by military personnel and to investigate any human rights violations. Other typical functions 
could include oversight of the Legal and Personnel Divisions at DoD headquarters; the procedures 
followed by the military courts and prisons; and the detention and dismissal of uniformed members. 
The right to appeal to a MO to investigate irregularities of court martials, arrests, detentions or dismissals, 
may also render the disciplinary procedure more congenial. In any such, or related human rights 
8. In order to cultivate feeling of mutual trust among servicemen and the public in the military, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, 
Portugal and Austria have considered it necessary to establish a military ombudsman or a defence ombudsman. In some countries the 
MO functions separately from the Public Protector and in others, is part of the same department (Watters & Partners, 1994:114; 
Chapman, 1966:245-259). 
9. The role and functions of the Military Ombudsperson could be prescribed in the Defence Act, which is currently undergoing substantial 
revision to bring it in line with the Constitution, and provisions spelt out in the White Paper on Defence. 
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violations, members should have the right to submit their complaint directly to the MO, without going 
through the chain of command. Ironically, in the absence of a MO, this role is currently being fulfilled by 
SANDU. For example, SANDU recently secured a Supreme Court interdict, that it is unconstitutional for 
the SANDF to hold persons in detention without the option of applying for bail (Beeld, 1997:4). 
Another function of the MO is to conduct tours of inspection. In other countries, such inspections are made 
at random, or in some cases, may have been initiated by complaints received from the public or members 
serving in the armed forces themselves. The department or unit receives only a day's notice of inspection 
visits (Chapman, 1966:251). The MO in South Africa could fulfil a similar function. Even though the MO 
has only powers of enquiry, the impartiality of the findings and the mere consciousness of the MO, may 
have a healthy effect on the whole organisation, as well as the leadership behaviour of superiors. 
Although the MO can be a valuable institution to investigate irregularities, it is debatable whether it should 
interven€ in the chain of command to resolve grievances or disputes. To do so would require that the 
powers of the MO be extended to at least those of an arbitrator, to be able to adjudicate and ensure fair 
labour practices. As suggested, a possible alternative, is for the MO to act as an impartial body in the 
absence of a Labour Court. The power of the MO to make recommendations to the Minister of Defence, to 
refer matters to the President as Commander in Chief of the SANDF and to report to Parliament, should 
ensure sufficient oversight and adherence to just and fair labour practices. 
10.2.4 The need for group representation 
While the implementation of a CCMA type dispute resolution mechanism for the military, and the estab-
lishment of a MO, can improve the present labour relations dispensation for military personnel, there is still 
a need for representation on pay and conditions of service. The need for some form of group representa-
tion, is central to the current labour relations debate within the SANDF. 
The desire to have an organisation to represent their interests10 is precisely because most sources of 
grievances cannot be readily addressed within the chain of command. The required decisions are often 
beyond the legal competence of the officer commanding or the internal authority structure of the military, 
but lie with external role players or political decision-makers. 
employees are to oe sought ana retains tfie discretion to decide thefinal outcome wiflioutTtib]ecting if to 101m agreement wfffi 
employees or their representatives' (Salamon, 1987:243). 
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The reason why professional associations and not trade unions are admissible relates to their modus 
operandi. Professional associations aim to represent the professional interests of their members by 
projecting an image of professionalism and by enhancing the status of their occupation in the eyes of the 
employers, government and the public (Salamon, 1987:129). However, as the Belgium experience indi-
cates, this does not preclude professional associations from adopting or behaving like trade unions if their 
aspirations are not met by more moderate means. 
10.2.4.2 Scope of activities 
As previously indicated, it is not the freedom of association to belong to a trade union that poses any 
potential threat to organisational or combat effectiveness, or civilian control over the military, but the activi-
. ties traditionally associated with trade union activity. The next question that arises, is what restrictions can 
be placed on the activities of organisations representing military personnel? 
Unions or associations, representing military personnel may need to confonn to certain criteria if they are 
to have any locus standi within the SANDF. As one of the concerns is that unions will politicise the anned 
forces, restrictions could be placed on the right of such organisations to be fanned along party political 
lines, to join political parties or partake in their activities. Such a restriction is justifiable as the principle of 
political impartiality of the anned forces is constitutionally entrenched.15 The suggestion was also 
previously made1& that should an organisation be fanned to represent military personnel, it would be less 
inclined towards radical political activities under the current political dispensation, given the shift towards 
strategic unionism. 
Another concern is whether organisations representing military personnel will divide the military along 
racial lines. This too could be justifiably curtailed, as the principle of equality of rights17 in the constitution 
specifically states that racial exclusivity as criteria for membership is not acceptable. A possible problem, 
however, is if these organisations are fanned along the classical division that already exists in the military, 
namely between officers and non-commissioned officers. The officer corps of the SANDF is still 
15. Section 226 (6) of the Interim Constitution states that: 'No member of the permanent force shall hold office in any political party or 
political organisation'. This clause has been expanded in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996, Section 199 (7) to: 
'Neither the security service, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions - (a) prejudice a political party 
interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or {b) further, in a partisan manner, nay interest of a political party'. 
16. See Section 9.2.2 for a discussion on the shift from social movement unionism to strategic unionism in the post 1994 era. 
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predominantly white, while the opposite holds for non-commissioned officers, who are mainly Black. 
Although European experience does not indicate that officers and non-commissioned officers are 
organised as opposing groups, the racial, cultural and political divisions are not as acute in these 
countries, as in South Africa. 
Besides the need for organisations representing military personnel to concede to the above-mentioned 
constitutional principles, restrictions could be placed on the activities that may be detrimental to organisa-
tional or combat effectiveness. For example, limitations could be placed on the right to intervene in the 
chain of command and authority structure, that threaten to divide the loyalty of the member between the 
unit and the union/professional organisation. Activities that may undermine discipline or combat readiness 
too could be constrained. As the collective resistance against authority is considered an act of mutiny, 
limitations could justifiably be placed on the right to strike or demonstrate. Provision could be made for the 
entire representation process to be suspended during times of national emergencies or war. Similar 
regulations have been imposed on military unions and professional associations in advanced democracies. 
If these restrictions are accepted by military associations or unions, and are enshrined in legislation, it 
removes many of the potential fears that group representation may hold for the SANDF. Under such 
conditions, some form of group representation for military personnel could be permissible, and may even 
contribute towards morale and loyalty. The present dissatisfaction with the ranks of the SANDF is not as a 
result of union involvement, but due the lack of effective grievance and representative structures. As 
Cortright (1977:231) aptly states" ... unions do not create employee grievances, they simply try to deal with 
them and erase their causes. The tensions that threaten military reliability cannot be traced to 
unionisation. They depend on military mission and on command ability to meet rank and file needs. 
Internal effectiveness hinges on the decisions of commanders, not labour leaders". The solution lies with 
the military leadership's ability to resolve disputes. 
The question that remains, is what will be the role and function of an organisation representing military 
personnel, given the restrictions placed on their activities? Even negotiations over pay and conditions of 
service is in most cases removed from the scope of bargaining, as benefits gained from negotiated settle-
ments by the public service unions, are extended to uniformed personnel. A shortcoming, is that there is 
17. See Section 8 (2) of the Interim Constitution states that 'No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and 
without derogating from the generality of this provision, on one of more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex .. .'. 
Section 9 (3-4) of the 1996 Constitution includes a similar provision. 
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no organisation or institutionalised mechanism whereby uniformed members can participate in the formu-
lation of policy, or where they can lobby, bargain or negotiate for their unique institutional requirements. 
10.2.4.3 Process of representation and joint consultation 
The form of group representation that may be permitted in the SANDF, would in all probability not 
resemble trade unions in the classic sense, but be closer in definition and behaviour to that of a profes-
sional association. Based on the premise that members of the SANDF may be permitted some form of 
group representation, the following process of representation and joint consultation could be considered 
(see Diagram 10.1 ). 
FINAL DECISION 
REPRESENTATIVE 
ORGANISATIONS 
JOINT ST ANDING 
COMMITIEE ON DEFENCE 
MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE 
DISCUSSIONS 
FORMALANDINFORMAL 
r 
REPRESENTATIVE 
ORGANISATIONS 
DEFENCE 
SECRETARIAT 
REPRESENTATIVE 
ORGANISATIONS 
Diagram 10.1 : Institutionalised process of joint consultation 
Those organisations approved by the Minister to represent the collective interests of military personnel 
could upon prior agreement hold regular informal and formal discussions with the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), on matters that affect their service dispensation and employment in the SANDF. The scope of 
such discussions needs to be specified, but would typically include issues affecting human resource policy. 
After holding informal discussions with the associations, the MoD confers with the relevant role players 
such as Chief of the Defence Staff of the SANDF and designated staff officers, representatives of the 
Defence Secretariat and Public Service Commission (representing the State as employer). The Minister 
may also consult other external role players, such as the MO, should this be deemed necessary. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
161 
Hereafter, the MoD holds formal discussions with the associations. After considering the recommenda-
tions of the various organisations representing military personnel, the Minister makes a final decision. 
Should the Minister tum down recommendations by the respective associations, the reasons for doing so 
needs to be motivated. However, to give this process legitimacy, any matter falling within the jurisdiction of 
discussion on which the associations have not been consulted, has no judicial validity. 
The Minister of Defence could refer matters that may have political repercussions, to the Joint Standing 
Committee or the Portfolio Committees of Defence for deliberation. Should the decisions made by these 
committees require a revision of policy, this can then be referred to the Defence Sec~etariat whose task it 
is to formulate human resource policy. The input of the SANDF is secured through the Council on 
Defence,1a which is the forum for institutional decision-making affecting the entire DoD. Once policy has 
been formulated the MoD can once again consult the association for their final comment. This process 
may ensure that organisations representing military personnel are not placed in a position of confrontation 
with the SANDF. At the same time, the associations have an opportunity to influence any draft agreement, 
decree or directive, affecting their service conditions, before being promulgated. 
Even in the absence of any representative organisation, this structure could be of value. As in the case of 
Germany, "trustmen" are selected to represent and serve on a council at the level of the MoD, representa-
tives of the forum structure from the various regional commands, could similarly represent and inform the 
MoD of problems and grievances within the ranks, or offer advice to the Minister. 
While the above process could ensure some form of participation in policy formation, there is still a need 
for a mechanism where uniformed personnel can negotiate or lobby for their unique service requirements. 
In the Co-ordinating Bargaining Council of the Public Service, the Public Service Commission represents 
the State as collective employer, versus the trade unions and personnel associations, who represent the 
interests of the public servants as employees. As uniformed personnel are excluded from the Labour 
Relations Act, the military per se is not represented on this forum. Even though pay and conditions of 
service negotiated for the broader public service is extended to military personnel, (effectively removing a 
potential area of conflict from the, military arena) the unique institutional requirements of the military cannot 
be negotiated on this forum. An alternative mechanism, through which the interests of the military could be 
accommodated, outside the bargaining structures that are in place for the rest of the Public Service, is 
required. 
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A means to accommodate the interests of military personnel, under the current dispensation, is to create a 
special mechanism, such as a Defence Service Review Board (DSRB), for military personnel. Typically, 
representatives of the various organisations representing military personnel, representatives of the DoD, 
and the Public Service Commission, would serve on the DSRB, with possibly the MO as chairman. This 
would not be a collective bargaining forum, but a mechanism for joint consultation and recommendation. 
As previously mentioned, salaries are negotiated by the broader public service and extended to military 
personnel. This forum serves only to address the unique service conditions of uniformed members that 
need to be reviewed by the Public Service Commission. Should there be fundamental areas of conflict 
between the parties concerned, these could be referred to the Minister of Defence and ultimately to the 
President, as Commander in Chief of the SANDF, for final determination. 
An area of concern, is how much pressure will be brought on political authorities by organisations repre-
senting military personnel. One of the main reasons why military personnel, elsewhere, have formed 
collective organisations, is precisely because interest groups are more effective in persuading the political 
authorities to accept participation in those areas of decision-making that affect them. These include cuts in 
military budgets, possible amendments in military benefits, and to the system of military justice. What 
remains uncertain, is what form of pressure, and what the powers of such organisations will be. A principle 
of military professionalism is after all, the acceptance of constraints on the institutional autonomy of the 
military by civil authorities. 
Should such associations press to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces, this 
could seriously disturb the current delicate balance of civilian control over the SANDF. Harries-Jenkins 
(1977:61) warns, that where the military has suffered an undue amount of deprivation, pressure groups are 
often formed to re-establish formerly held privileges. Strong professional associations, lobbying for the 
institutional interests of the military could pose a threat to civil-military relations, especially where the 
interests of such organisations run counter to public interest. 
Given the constraints that could reasonably and justifiably be placed on organisations representing military 
personnel, it is unlikely that trade unions as found in the civilian sector could be compatible with military 
service. The challenge is to create acceptable alternatives. Whatever organisational form a military union 
may take, the scope of bargaining would need to be clearly defined. 
18. The Council on Defence consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the CNDF and the Defence Secretary. 
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10.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1994, the DoD has faced increasing pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed military personnel. 
This pressure has come about largely as a result of the inefficient labour dispensation for uniformed 
personnel, and an increasing need for some form of representation and channel, whereby uniformed 
members can lobby, bargain or negotiate for their unique institutional dispensation. 
Much of the present frustration within the chain of command can be attributed to the inefficiency of present 
labour relation mechanisms, particularly the lack of any dispute resolution mechanism for either disputes of 
right or interest for military personnel. A possible solution is the institutionalisation of a structure, similar to 
the CCMA that would enable soldiers to resolve disputes at both local and central level. In the case of 
fundamental disagreement, and in the absence of a Labour Court, such matters of dispute could be 
·referred to a MO for investigation and recommendation, and if necessary, final adjudication by the 
President as Commander in Chief of the SANDF. 
The appointment of an independent MO within the office of the Public Protector, may be a very valuable 
institution. Not only could the MO address complaints by the public and military personnel but could 
investigate irregularities in the military justice system, hereby rendering the disciplinary procedure more 
congenial. The mere presence of an independent and impartial MO, who reports to Parliament, could 
have a healthy effect on the whole organisation. 
While an upgrading of the present individual and collective grievance structures and the appointment of a 
MO could improve the efficiency of present labour relations mechanisms, this may not preclude the need 
for some form of group representation, or institutionalised mechanism, whereby uniformed personnel can 
exert some influence over their service conditions. Should members express the desire to have their 
interests advanced through some kind of collective organisation, restrictions will in all likelihood be placed 
on the activities that constitute a clear danger to organisational or combat effectiveness of the armed 
forces. 
The main utility of an organisation representing military personnel in the SANDF could be to advance and 
represent the interests of their members on professional or institutional matters that affect their conditions 
of service. A possible means whereby this could be achieved is through an institutionalised process of 
joint consultation with the Ministry of Defence and Parliamentary Defence Committees. The creation of a 
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body, such as a Defence Services Review Board, outside the dispensation that exists for the broader 
Public Service, could also serve as a means whereby the DoD, the organisations representing military 
personnel and the Public Service Commission can review the institutional service dispensation for military 
personnel. 
However, the pressure on the SANDF to adopt a more pluralist approach to labour relations is apparent. 
Mechanisms should be created to accommodate the needs of soldiers as employees. Experience in both 
the private and public sector demonstrates that if the need to unionise exists, no law or legislation will 
prevent it. The challenge is to balance the needs of the solider, in a free democratic society, versus the 
needs of the military to have an effective organisation, bound by professional principles, and subordinate 
to the needs of society. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Findings on professionalism and unitarist labour relations practices 
An analysis of the military profession reveals that it is indeed a unique profession that requires a high 
degree of personal dedication from members to the goals of the organisation. Loyalty and commitment to 
the service and to the nation are considered to be the most desirable qualities in individuals who are 
recruited to the officer corps. Because of the unique social function the military is expected to fulfil and the 
control members of the armed forces exercise over the means of organised violence, society and the 
military demand a greater degree of personal commitment from their members. All in the service of the 
armed forces are required to demonstrate high standards of patriotism, discipline, courage and self -
sacrifice in the course of their duties, and to demonstrate a responsibility to use their skill in the interests of 
society. 
Consequently, employment in the armed forces has been structurally very different from civilian industrial 
organisation. As a professional, the soldier is seen to be responsible to a client, society (the sense of 
professional "calling"), while as a bureaucrat, the soldier is responsible to serve the government. In both 
cases the modem soldier is corporate (exclusive), bureaucratic (hierarchical), and professional (mission-
oriented). The commitment to professional values coupled to the uniqueness of the military function, has 
also meant that traditionally, labour relations practices have diverged sharply from the civilian sector, not 
only as a result of function of military labour, but due to the normative constraints placed upon the 
profession. 
The emergence of trade unions or even professional associations is viewed as a direct threat to the 
professionalism of the armed forces. This is especially so, where the activities of such organisations are 
seen to weaken professional military values, such as member's commitment to the professional social ethic 
associated with selfless service, the corporatism of the military, subservience to civil authority and political 
\ 
impartiality. Consequently, armed forces have approached the management of labour relations from a 
typically unitarist perspective, actively opposing any attempts at unionisation and collective bargaining by 
members of the armed forces. 
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With reference to the South African situation, the same principles of professionalism have applied. A high 
priority is placed on need for a disciplined force, loyalty and commitment to the service and to the nation. 
Members of the SANDF are expected to submit to the basic ethics of soldiering, not act in self-interest and 
at all times fulfil their duty in a politically non-partisan way. Compliance with these normative 
considerations have meant that labour relations has been managed from a unitarist perspective, which 
implies that every attempt has been made to prevent unionisation and to apply punitive sanctions to those 
who have been involved in such activities. Any grievances are to be addressed strictly in accordance with 
the internal command channels and deviation from these formalised structures is a punishable offence. A 
legal prohibition was placed on trade union activity, strikes or actions of public protest, with participation in 
such activities being declared a criminal offence. 
The main motivation for restricting the labour rights of soldiers, in the case of South Africa, as elsewhere, is 
the belief that trade union activity could undermine the professionalism of the SANDF and divide the ranks 
along racial and institutional lines. The concern is that unionisation will undermine the authority of military 
commanders, dividing the loyalty of members between the unit and the union. An additional concern, 
given the integration of seven different armed forces in 1994 to form the SANDF, is that unionisation could 
politicise the armed forces. Such activity, it is held will erode command authority and lead to the decline 
not only in organisational, but the combat effectiveness of the SANDF. 
11.2 Findings on occupationalism and pluralist labour relations practices 
Despite the requirement for members of the armed forces to be committed to the principles of military 
professionalism, there has been a progressive weakening of these traditional professional values since 
after World War 11, but particularly after the Vietnam war. With the fragmentation of the military profession 
into many specialities, the military profession has experienced a degree of de-professionalisation, which 
has been associated with a shift towards occupationalism. Occupationalism does not imply a decline in 
professional competency, but a modification in traditional professional values and attitudes towards military 
service. 
Whereas the professional/institutional military is legitimated in terms of values, norms and purposes that 
transcend self-interest, the more occupational the military, the more military service is seen in terms of 
marketplace criteria. The ascendancy of occupationalism is associated with changes taking place in both 
the nature of military service, and the nature of military organisation. The civilianisation of military work, 
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the shift to an all volunteer force, the change in recruitment from elites to the broader population, as well as 
the erosion of the unique institutional compensation system of the military, all contribute towards the 
ascendancy of occupationalism within armed forces. 
One of the potential outcomes of occupationalism, is that military service is no longer viewed as a calling, 
but as a job like any other. Associated with this trend, is the requirement for greater say in the 
determination of salary and working conditions. Particularly where institutional goals are no longer seen to 
be totally compatible with the individual's needs, the demand for a pluralist labour relations dispensation is 
increased. One of the potential outcomes, is unionisation. 
With reference to the South African case study, it is clear that there has been a weakening of traditional 
institutional values associated with a rapid ascendancy in occupationalism, with respect to both the nature 
of military service and the nature of military organisation. Two surveys conducted at the SA Military 
Academy, one in 1989, just before the withdrawal from Namibia, and the other, just after the formation of 
the SANDF in 1995 reveal that the already visible drift towards occupationalism increased in the latter 
period. An analysis of the variables listed by Moskos as 1/0 indicators also demonstrates that the SANDF 
is experiencing a distinct drift towards occupationalism, especially with respect to those variables linked to 
compensation, the system of evaluation and the military legal system. 
Recent structural changes within the SANDF have tended to reinforce this trend. The emphases on the 
collateral utility of military and civilian skills have strengthened the horizontal comparisons between civilian 
and military employment. The recent shift to an all-volunteer force too has also meant that the SANDF is 
obliged to take marketplace criteria into consideration if quality personnel are to be recruited, and retained. 
Many members currently joining the SANDF under the volunteer system do so not out of patriotism, but for 
the material benefits such employment brings. The present erosion of service benefits and job security, 
coupled to the inability of the military leadership to prevent the erosion of service benefits and tenure, 
underlies much of the present felt need for some lobbying or bargaining structure in the SANDF, whether 
this be a union or a professional association. 
However, research indicates that an increase in occupationalism does not necessarily lead to unionism or 
even some mild form of group representation. Some highly institutional militaries accept military unions, 
while some occupational militaries reject any form of group representation. The reason for this is that the 
driving forces for military unionisation are in most cases linked to broader societal factors. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
169 
Specifically within the South African context, these societal forces may be the decisive factors that 
determine whether labour rights can be extended to the military personnel serving in the SANDF. The 
current lichphin around which the military union debate in South Africa hinges, is whether the SANDF can 
prove that it is reasonable and justifiable to limit the labour rights of military personnel on the basis that 
trade unionism and collective bargaining will be detrimental to national defence capability. 
11.4 Findings on the European experience with military unionism 
Many of the arguments put forward in this dissertation are based on the European experience of 
unionisation, particularly the Northern European countries that have accommodated some form of group 
representation. The experience of these countries clearly demonstrate that the origins, structure and 
function of the type of group representation found in a particular country is reflective of the history and 
societal context within which the military functions. The multiple systems of group representation that have 
emerged are a direct result of these differences. 
Although this complicates cross-cultural comparison, certain universal trends do exist which may be of 
comparative value. The dominant model of group representation within the armed forces are the 
professional associations, which can be differentiated into those who represent all ranks (Germany) to 
those who represent a particular rank group or military speciality (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark). With 
the exception of Germany, different provisions apply to conscripts. 
The aims of the professional associations are to protect the professional interests of service members. In 
most instances, the unions and professional associations do not have collective bargaining rights, only 
consultative rights. As military pay is normally kept in accord with public sector wage trends, negotiations 
over wages are generally. removed from the military arena. Nonetheless the influence of these 
professional associations and trade unions have resulted in a definite improvement in the conditions of 
service of military personnel. Operational matters affecting military command and discipline are generally 
excluded from consultation and no country, except Sweden, has granted their soldiers the right to strike. 
In an attempt to enhance participation in decision-making, most countries have created representative 
committees to supplement the formal grievance and disciplinary procedures within the chain of command. 
In addition, the establishment of a parliamentary military ombudsman to investigate the complaints lodged 
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11.3 Findings on the impact of societal forces on the management of labour relations 
In this regard, the single most important societal factor influencing the emergence of unions is where union 
membership carries with it the constitutionally protected right of freedom of association. Many argue, that 
it is "socially unjust" or "undemocratic" for members of the armed forces to be denied the freedom of 
association to join or form organisations that can protect or advance their interests. The counter argument 
is that the rights of the individual must yield to the rights of society to have an effective military 
organisation, subordinate to the needs of society. 
Where labour rights have been extended to soldiers, this has most frequently occurred under social 
democratic governments, where there is a strong link with the civilian trade union movement. Where there 
is a dominant and strong trade union culture, and where other public servants particularly the police, have 
these rights, the inclination to extend labour rights to soldiers is increased. Another factor influencing the 
inclination towards unionisation, is where the military as institution has experienced a relative decline in 
their conditions of service and status compared to other groups in society. 
Under such circumstances, trade unions or professional organisations are often formed to act as pressure 
groups, which can influence those areas of decision-making that effect the armed forces. This role is 
enhanced where soldiers perceive an anti-military environment to exist, and where government is seen to 
have divested itself form its paternal obligation to the military. It is this role which has raised the most 
concern, given the potential impact unions may have upon the political control of the armed forces. 
With reference to the South African situation, a decisive factor is whether the labour rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed for members of the 
SANDF. Given the established trade union culture in South Africa, there appears to be relative support for 
the right of soldiers to belong to trade unions, by both the public (other than whites), and by members 
serving in the SANDF (including white officers). The pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed 
personnel in the SANDF is enhanced by the fact that other employees, including the police and civilian 
employees serving in the Department of Defence have labour rights. The perception that the government 
has divested itself from its paternal obligation to the military, with the shift in government priority to social 
uplifitment, reinforces the need for some form of group representation. 
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by soldiers serve as an alternative channel through which soldiers can voice their individual or collective 
grievances. 
11.5 Findings on the compatibility of labour rights with military service 
It appears as if the different forms of group representation implemented have been accommodated without 
any apparent adverse effects on military readiness, efficiency or discipline. There has been some concern 
that the restrictions on overtime have had a negative impact on training, and that the time spent on 
consultation with the representative associations have slowed down decision-making and reduced 
management flexibility. On the other hand, communication, general working and living conditions of 
military personnel and labour relations practices have improved. Many have even suggested, that the 
creation of representative structures has created a more enlightened and democratic dispensation and 
enhanced military leadership and dedication to the mission of the military, rather than, undermine discipline 
and loyalty to the chain of command. 
The issue of whether group representation has negatively affected organisational or combat effectiveness 
is difficult to verify. Especially concerning combat effectiveness, the absence of any empirical evidence 
means that conclusions on this aspect of military functioning are speculative, as there is no experience of 
possible differences between unionised or non-unionised forces in actual combat situations. 
The image of a military union acting as a praetorian guard, has not been a feature of the European 
experience. This could possibly be ascribed to the strict controls imposed upon the issues subject to 
negotiation and the activities of these unions and associations, both within the chain of command, and in 
their relations with the Ministries of Defence. The European experience conclusively demonstrates, that 
the type of group representation that emerges is reflective of the societal context in which the military is 
immersed. Furthermore that the· extension of labour rights to the armed forces is only compatible with 
military service if subject to a certain constraints. Consequently, very few countries have permitted their 
professional associations or trade unions to have full collective bargaining rights, or the right to strike. 
Thirdly, that where the military organisations and unions operate under certain constraints, no adverse 
consequences have been reported for organisational effectiveness or civilian control. 
Turning to the South African situation, the Department of Defence is facing increasing pressure to extend 
labour rights to uniformed military personnel. This mood is enhanced by the ineffective labour relations 
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dispensation for military personnel and the inability of the military leadership to prevent a deterioration of 
the present institutional service dispensation of uniformed personnel. The cuts in the military budget and 
the pending rationalisation are all contributing factors over which the military leadership has little control. 
The interest in unionisation could not have come at a worse time in the history of the South African armed 
forces, but is a possibility, or even reality that cannot be ignored if one looks at the forces that drive military 
unionism. 
Much debate currently focuses on how to accommodate the increasing demand for labour rights by military 
personnel, and what structures or mechanisms can be created that will be compatible with the unique 
nature of military service in South Africa. Some suggestions are made in this regard. The first is to 
address the need for a more effective and impartial grievance and dispute resolution mechanisms to 
resolve potential areas of discontent. A suggestion is made that the institutionalisation of a mechanism 
similar to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for military personnel could 
render present procedures more effective. Should such a mechanism be introduced, a dispute could be 
channelled through the chain of command via the communication forum structure to the military CCMA. 
Where matters cannot be resolved, such cases may be referred to a Military Ombudsperson (MO) for 
investigation and recommendation~ and in instances of fundamental disagreement, to the President, as 
Commander in Chief of the SANDF. 
The appointment of an independent MO within the office of the Public Protector, could be a very valuable 
institution to address complaints by members of the SANDF and by the public, investigate irregularities in 
the military justice system and conduct tours of inspection. The mere presence of an independent and 
impartial MO, who reports to Parliament, may ensure sufficient oversight and commitment to fair labour 
practices within the SANDF. 
While an upgrading of the present individual and collective grievance structures and the appointment of a 
MO could improve the efficiency of present labour relations mechanisms, this may not preclude the drive 
for some form of group representation. There is still the need for some kind of institutionalised mechanism 
whereby uniformed personnel can exert some influence over their service conditions. The main utility of an 
organisation representing military personnel in the SANDF, would be to advance and represent the 
interests of their members on professional or institutional matters that affect their conditions of service. A 
possible means whereby this could be achieved is through an institutionalised process of joint consultation 
with the Ministry of Defence and Parliamentary Defence Committees. The creation of a body, such as a 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
172 
Defence Services Review Board, outside the dispensation that exists for the broader Public Service, could 
also serve as a means whereby the Department of Defence could review the institutional service 
dispensation for military personnel. 
Should the extension of labour rights to members of the armed forces result in a constitutional battle in 
South Africa, the SANDF will have to prove conclusively that the activities of unions, including collective 
bargaining and the right to strike, will be detrimental to military effectiveness and national interest. If this 
means that restrictions will be placed on the rights of soldiers to belong to trade unions for the purpose of 
collective bargaining, effective alternatives need to be provided. As no right may be negated by such 
limitations, the SANDF is obliged to create appropriate labour relations mechanisms that are compatible 
with the unique nature of military service. 
11.6 Concluding remarks 
The challenge is to balance the needs of the soldier, in a free democratic society to have labour rights, 
versus needs of the military to have an effective organisation, bound by professional principles, and 
subordinate to the needs of society. Each of these areas require some careful thinking, if a rational 
balance is to be found between the needs of the "soldier as an employee" within the unique environment of 
national security. 
The conclusion is reached that institutionalised mechanisms have to be implemented though which 
potential areas of conflict can be resolved, and through which the soldier can exert some influence over 
their conditions of employment. It would be far better to do so, than to be forced to concede to demands 
by disgruntled soldiers - at gun point. This may be a small concession in "industrial democracy', for 
"defence of democracy", in South Africa. 
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labour relations issues have often proved ineffective and have eventually led to the acceptance of 
unionism. 
The inclination of military personnel to form or join a union is enhanced where the military institution, and 
the military profession, has suffered a significant loss of privilege in society. This perception was verified 
by a survey conducted among a select group of officers, many of whom felt that military service is consi-
dered less important, and that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they 
fulfil. These responses could be attributed to government priority with social upliftment, rather than 
security in the absence on any external threat. 
To conclude, it was proposed that the entire industrial relations force field needs to be taken into conside-
ration in the debate on whether military personnel will be likely to join, or form unions, or whether labour 
rights can be extended to military personnel. ,Ultimately, as the experience of the public sector and the 
police indicates, it may be better to create the necessary structures whereby soldiers can negotiate their 
conditions of service, than for the state to be forced to cope with non-institutionalised labour unrest by 
"armed' soldiers. 
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MILITaRE AKADEMIE/MILITARY ACADEMY 
LEIERSKAPONTWIKKELINGSPROGRAM (LOP) 
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (LOP) 
VRAELYS 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PROFESSIONALISME 
PROFESSIONALISM 
, . 
C-1 
APPENDIXC 
Die vraelys is opgestel om informasie oor u sieninge van bepaalde aspekte 
rakende 1 n loopbaan as 1n militOre offisier te bekom 
This questionnaire was compiled to obtain information on your views regarding 
certain aspects of a career as a military officer. 
U naam mo et nerens . op die vraelys aangebring word nie. U bly dus so ver 
moontlik anoniem. Alle informasie wat u verskaf sal as vertroulik beskou 
Yo rd. 
Your name is not to appear an)"llhere on the questionnaire. In other vords, 
you remain anonymous as far as possible and your response vill be treated 
confident:ially. 
Beantwoord die vrae deur die items vat u kies met 1 n X te merk. 
Answer the questions by marking the items selected ~ith a X. 
AFDELING A 
SECTION A 
PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE 
PERSONAL DATA 
1. Studierigting/Field of Study 
Natuurwetenskappe Handelwetenskappe 
Natural Sciences Commercial Sciences 
2. Weermagsdeel/Arm of the Service! 
Le~r Lugmag Vloot SAGD 
Army Air Force Navy SAMS 
3 . Rang/Rank 
Geesteswetenskappe 
Human Sciences 
KO/CO 2 Lt Lt Kapt/Capt . Maj 
A db/Mid Vdg/Esn Olt/S Lt Lt (SAV/SAN) Lt Cdr 
4. Jaargroep/Year Group 
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5. Huwelikstatus/Marital State 
I 
Getroud 
Married 
AFDELING B 
SECTION B 
Ongetroud 
Unmarried 
VRAELYS 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
, . 
C-2 
Dui asseblief aan of u met die volgende sewe stellings saamstem [ l] of 
verskil [2]. 
Please indicate whether you agree [l] of disagree [2] with each of the 
following seven statements. 
1. Alle lede van 'n eenheid/HK behoort ter bevordering van 
eenheidsgees in 'n milit~re basis te woon. 
In the interest of esprit d'corps all members of a unit/HQ 
should live in p military base. 
(1) (2) 
2. Die skeiding tussen offisiere en adjudant- en onderoffisiere 
is uitgedien en behoort afgeskaf te word. 
The seperation between officers and NCO's is obsolete and 
should be abolished. 
3. Die Yeermag verwag van my om aan te veel aktiwiteite deel 
te neem wat niks met my werk te make het nie. 
The Defence Force requires me to participate in too many 
activities that are not related to my job. 
4. Ek wens dat meer offisiere werklik besorg was oor nasio= 
nale veiligheid. 
I wish that more officers had a genuine concern for national 
security. 
(1] (2] 
(1) (2] 
[1] [2) 
5. Dissipline is heeltemal te laks in die Yeermag van vandag. 
[1] (2) 
Discipline is much too lenient in todays Defence Force. 
6. Meer toesig oor lede se werk en gedrag is'nodig op laer 
vlakke in die Weermag. 
More supervision of members' work and behaviour is needed at 
lower levels within the Defence Force. 
[1] [2] 
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7. 'n Hens kry billiker behandeling in 'n burgerlike werk as 
in die Weermag. 
One will get a better deal in a civilian job than in the 
Defence Force. 
C-3 
[1] [2] 
As u aan die tipe werk dink wat u graag sou wou h@, is die volgende stellings 
belangrik [l] of onbelangrik [2]? 
In thinking about the kind of job you would like to do, are the following 
statements important [l] or unimportant [2]? 
8. 'n Yerk wat my die geleentheid hied om my land te dien. 
A job that gives me a chance to serve my country. 
9. 'n Werk wat my die geleentheid bied om van die w~reld 'n 
beter plek te maak om in te woon (bv deur terrorisme uit te 
skakel). 
A job that gives me a chance to make the world a better place 
to live in (ie stamp out terrorism). 
10. 'n Werk wat goeie sekuriteit bied; geen moontlikheid van 
summiere ontslag nie. 
A steady job with good security; no chance of summary 
dismissal. 
11. 'n Werk met 'n goeie salaris. 
A job with a good salary. 
12. 'n Werk wat goeie byvoordele het. 
A job with good fringe benefits. 
[1] [2] 
(1) (2] 
(1] [2] 
(l] (2] 
(1) [2] 
Dui asseblief aan of elk van die volgende belangrik [ 1] of onbelangrik [ 2] 
vir u besluit was om by die Staande Hag aan te sluit. 
Please indicate whether each of the following was important [l] or 
unimportant [2] in your decision to join the Permanent Force. 
13. Diens in die Weermag is vir my 'n roeping; ek sou geen 
ander werk wou doen nie. 
To me service in the Defence Force is a calling; I would not 
like to do any other work. 
[1] [2] 
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14. Ek hou van dis s ipline, 
samehorigheid, eenheidstrots ..• 
ordelikheid, struktuur, uniformiteit, 
I like discipline, orderliness, structure, uniformity, 
cohesiveness, unit pride .•. 
15. Ek wou 'n familietradisie van milit~re diens voortsit. 
I wanted to continue a family tradition of military service. 
16. Ek het 'n voorliefde vir die Yeermag : wapenstelsels, 
skepe, vliegtuie, milit~re operasies, ens fassineer my. 
I have a special liking for the military : weapon systems, 
ships, aircraft, military operations, etc fascinate me. 
17. Ek is in my wese 'n militaris; ek glo dat 'n nasie se 
grootheid deur milit~re mag bepaal word en daarom meet die 
Veermag so sterk as moontlik wees. 
I am a militarist at heart; I believe that a nation's 
greatness is determined by military power and therefore the 
Defence Force must be as strong as possible. 
18. Ek kon nie/sou nie kon aanpas in 'n burgerlike beroep 
nie. 
I could not adapt/would not be able to adapt to a civilian 
career. 
19. Ek wou 'n werk gehad het wat sekuriteit, bevorderings~ 
moontlikhede en gunstige aftreevoorwaardes hied. 
I wanted a secure job with promotion and favourable retire= 
ment benefits. 
20. Beroepsmoontlikhede het beter gelyk in die Veermag as in 
die burgerlike lewe. 
Job opportunities looked better in the Defence Force than 
in civilian life. 
[1] (2] 
(1] [2] 
(l] (2] 
(l] [2] 
(1) [2] 
(l] (2) 
[l] (2] 
Dui asseblief aan of u met elk van die volgende stellings saamstem [l] of nie 
saamstem nie [2]. 
Please indicate whether you agree [ 1] or disagree [ 2] with each of the 
following statements. 
21. Van geen weermagslid behoort verwag te word om 'n ver= 
plasing te aanvaar wat horn of haar nie pas nie. 
No Defence Force member should be required to take a transfer 
he or she does not want. 
[l] [2] 
C-4 
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22. Alle milit~re personeel moet hulle operasionele diens 
verrig ongeag-die gevolge wat dit vir hulleself of hulle 
families mag inhou. 
All military personnel should perform their operational duty 
regardless of personal and family consequences. 
23. Persoonlike belange en voorkeure is altyd ondergeskik 
aan die Weermag se belange. 
Personal interests and wishes must always take second place 
to the interests and requirements of the Defence Force. 
24. Wat 'n lid na-ure doen het niks met die Weermag te doen 
nie. 
What .a member does aftelt hours is none of the Defence Force's 
business. 
25. Rangverskille behoort nie 'n rol te speel in lede se 
sosiale verkeer na-ure nie. 
Differences in rank should not be important in members' 
social life after hours. 
26. 'n Lid se private lewe is sy eie saak; bevelvoerders 
behoort geen belang daarby te h~ nie. 
What a member does in his private life should be of no concern 
to his officer commanding. 
27. Die konsep dat 'n offisier 24 uur per dag aan diens is, 
is nie vandag meer geldig nie. 
The concept of an officer being on duty 24 hours a day is no 
longer valid. 
28. Lede van my weermagsdeel moet meer daarin belang stel om 
die taak op hande af te handel as in hul persoonlike belange. 
Members of my arm of the service should take more interest 
in getting the job done and less interest in their personal 
concerns. 
29. Weermagslede het mense nodig wat hulle saak oor saltly- of 
bevorderingskwessies direk op die hoogste vlak kan stel. 
Defence Force members need people to represent their views 
on pay and promotion issues directly at the highest level. 
C-5 
[1) [2] 
[1] [2] 
[1] (2] 
[1] (2] 
[1] [2] 
[1] [2) 
[1] (2] 
[1) [2] 
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30. Yeermagslede het 'n vaste regsverteenwoordiger nodig 
wat hul soldykwessies hof toe kan neem indien nodig. 
Defence Force members need a legal representative to take 
their pay problems to court if necessary. 
# • 
31. Indien dit nie dissipline sal benadeel nie, is 'n onaf= 
hanklike vereniging (nie 'n vakbond nie) wat na lede se 
belange kan omsien 'n goeie idee. 
As long as it does not harm discipline an independent 
representative association (not a trade union) would be a 
good idea. 
32. Ek is nie ten gunste van 'n vereniging wat die erkende 
bevelskanaal omseil om ond7rhandelings in my belang te voer 
nie. 
I am opposed to the idea of a representative association 
bypassing the existing chain of command to negotiate on my 
behalf. 
[l) [2) 
[l) [2) 
[1] [2) 
33. Die onderskeie hoofkwartiere en stafafdelings sien goed om 
na die belange van individuele weermagslede. 
The interests of the individual members of the Defence Force 
are well looked after by the respective headquarters and staff 
divisions. 
34. Vergoeding moet volgens 'n lid se bekwaamhede en kwalifi= 
kasies vasgestel word en nie volgens posvlak, rang of seniori= 
teit nie. 
Compensation should be based on one's skills and qualifica= 
tions and not on post level, rank and seniority. 
35. Ek dink normaalweg aan myself as 'n persoon met spesiale 
opleiding en ervaring wat vir die weermag werk, eerder as 'n 
milit~re beroepsoffisier. 
I normally think of myself as a person with special training 
and experience working for the Defence Force rather than as a 
military career officer. 
36. My posisie in die Yeermag word eerstens bepaal deur my 
milithe opleiding, kwalifikasies, kundighcld en onderv.lndi.ng 
en daarom is dit belangriker as my offisierskap. 
My standing in the Defence Force is basically determined by 
my military training, qualifications, expertise and experience 
and it is therefore more important than my officership. 
[1) [2) 
[l] [2] 
[1] [2] 
[1] [2] 
C-6 
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37. Ek sou verkies dat die geldwaarde van my diensvoordele 
(toelaes, gratis mediese sorg, ens) by my saltly gevoeg word 
en dat daardie •voordele" afgeskaf word. 
I would prefer that the money value of my service benefits 
(allowances, free medical care, etc) be added to my pay and 
these "benefits• dropped. 
38. 'n Offisier se eggenote behoort te voel dat sy net so 'n 
deel van die eenheid as haar man is. 
An officer's wife ought to feel as much a part of the unit as 
her husband. 
39. As ek onverwags ryk sou word (bv deur 'n erflating te 
ontvang of 'n groat prys te wen) sou ek nogtans met my 
milit~re loopbaan voortgaan tot aftree ouderdom. 
If I suddenly become rich (due to an inheritance, winning a 
big prize, etc) I would continue my military career until 
retirement. 
40. In die tegnologies gevorderde weermag van vandag het ans 
regtig nie meer soveel tradisies en seremonies (parades, ens) 
nodig as in die ou tyd nie. 
In the technological advanced Defence Force of today, we 
really do not need so many traditions and ceremonies (parades, 
etc) as in times past. 
41. Terwyl ek aan die Milit~re Akademie studeer is ek in die 
eerste instansie student en dan offisier. 
While studying at the Military Academy I am a student first 
and an officer second. 
42. Ek is eerstens 'n offisi r met 'n kommissierang in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Yeermag, tweedens 'n Le~roffisier/lugmag= 
offisier/vlootoffisier/SAGD-offisier en derdens 'n vlie~nier/ 
personeelpraktisyn/logistikus/valskermsoldaat ... 
I am firstly a c"ommissioned officer in the SArv'Defence Force, 
secondly an army officer/ air force officer/naval officer/ 
SAMS officer and thirdly a pilot/personnel practitioner/ 
logistician/paratrooper ... 
C-7 
(1) (2) 
(1) (2) 
[1) [2) 
[l] [2] 
[1] [2] 
[1] [2] 
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43. Indien u nie met die laaste stelling saamstem nie, dui 
asseblief aan-wat die volgorde behoort te wees. 
If you disagree with the last statement, please indicate what 
the sequence·should be. 
[1] [2] 
1. .................................................................. 
2. . ................................................................ . 
3. . ................................................................ . 
C-8 
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C-9 
110 TRENDS BY QUESTION 
S/No % Institutional % Occupational Missing 
01 8,2 91,8 1 
02 78.7 21,3 1 
03 43.2 56.8 1 
04 69.8 30.2 2 
OS 61.0 39.0 2 
06 41.2 58.8 2 
07 22.2 77.8 4 
08 56.8 43.2 1 
09 71.6 28.4 1 
IO 14.8 85.2 1 
11 3.3 96.7 1 
12 5.5 94.5 1 
13 25.3 74.7 2 
14 78.7 21.3 1 
15 14.2 85.8 1 
16 60.7 39.3 1 
17 32.2 67.8 1 
18 8.2 91.8 2 
19 21.3 78.7 1 
20 35.0 65.0 I 
21 33.0 67.0 2 
22 45.4 54.6 I 
23 32.0 68.0 3 
24 20.2 79.8 1 
25 33.3 66.7 1 
26 21.3 78.7 I 
27 41.5 58.5 1 
28 62.8 37.2 4 
29 6.6 93.4 2 
30 17.7 82.3 3 
31 8.8 91.2 3 
32 35.9 64.1 3 
33 16.1 83.9 4 
34 22.8 77.2 4 
35 28.7 71.3 3 
36 28.9 71.l 4 
37 61.1 38.9 4 
38 59.1 40.9 3 
39 32.6 67.4 6 
40 54.7 45.3 5 
41 45.67 54.4 4 
42 * 75.2 24.8 19 
TOTAL 37% 63 % 
TOTAL 1535.2 2664.8 
* This means that questions 42 and 43 were combined to give the answer(s). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
# • 
C-10 
110 TRENDS BY ARM OF SERVICE 
AIR FORCE ARMY NAVY SAMS 
Ques No Inst Occ Inst Occ Inst Occ Inst Occ 
01 11.5 88.5 2.4 97.6 0 100 7.7 92.3 
02 78.8 21.2 76.2 23.8 71.4 28.6 100 0 
03 47.8 52.2 33.3 66.7 50.0 50.0 23.1 76.9 
04 72.6 27.4 63.4 36.6 71.4 28.6 61.5 38.5 
05 66.1 33.9 40.5 59.5 57.I 42.9 84.6 15.4 
06 43.4 56.6 39.0 61.0 28.6 71.4 38.5 61.5 
07 25.5 74.5 19.0 81.0 7.1 92.9 23.1 76.9 
08 61.9 38.1 42.9 57.1 57.1 42.9 61.5 38.5 
09 76.l 23.9 61.9 38. l 85.7 14:3 53.8 46.2 
IO 14.2 85.8 16.7 83.3 0 100.0 35.7 64.3 
11 2.7 97.3 0 100.0 14.3 85.7 7.7 92.3 
12 6.2 93.8 0 100.0 14.3 85.7 0 100.0 
13 11.5 88.5 14.6 85.4 21.4 78.6 15.4 84.6 
14 84.l 15.9 66.7 33.3 71.4 28.6 76.6 23.4 
15 J?.7 82.3 2.4 97.6 14.3 85.7 0 100.0 
16 64.6 35.4 59.5 40.5 64.3 35.7 30.8 69.2 
17 36.3 63.7 23.5 76.5 35.7 64.3 30.8 69.2 
18 8.9 91.l 7.1 92.9 7.1 92.9 7.7 92.3 
19 20.4 79.6 21.4 78.6 28.6 71.4 23.l 76.9 
20 40.7 59.3 21.4 78.6 14.3 85.7 46.2 53.8 
21 34.8 65.2 28.6 71.4 35.7 64.3 30.8 69.2 
22 44.2 55.8 47.6 52.4 57.1 42.9 38.5 61.5 
23 42.3 57.7 11.9 88. l 28.6 71.4 15.4 84.6 
24 23.9 76.1 9.5 90.5 14.3 85.7 28.6 71.4 
25 34.5 65.5 23.8 76.2 28.6 71.4 65.5 34.5 
26 24.8 75.2 7.1 92.9 35.7 64.3 23.l 76.9 
27 44.2 55.8 28.6 71.4 42.9 57.l 53.8 46.2 
28 63.1 36.9 51.2 48.8 85.7 14.3 69.2 30.8 
29 7.1 92.9 2.4 97.6 14.3 85.7 7.7 92.3 
30 17.0 83.0 11.9 88.l 30.8 69.2 30.8 69.2 
31 9.0 91.0 2.4 97.6 7.1 92.9 23. l 76.9 
32 41.4 58.6 26.2 73.8 28.6 71.4 23.l 76.9 
33 19.6 80.4 12.5 81.5 7.1 92.9 7.7 92.3 
34 30.6 69.4 9.8 90.2 7.1 92.9 15.4 84.6 
35 32. l 67.9 9.8 90.2 50.0 50.0 30.8 69.2 
36 30.6 69.4 22.0 78.0 35.7 64.3 30.8 69.2 
37 63.I 36.9 58.5 41.5 64.3 35.7 46.2 53.8 
38 62.5 37.5 48.8 51.2 50.0 50.0 69.2 30.8 
39 38.5 61.5 22.0 78.0 28.6 71.4 15.4 84.6 
40 64.5 35.5 24.4 75.6 71.4 28.6 46.2 53.8 
41 38.4 61.6 50.0 50.0 64.3 35.7 69.2 30.8 
42 0.9 99.l 0 100.0 0 100 0 100 
TOTAL 37% 63% 26% I 74% 36% 64% 35% I 65% I 
TOTAL 1558. l I 2641.9 1108.9 l 309 l.l 1502.0 2698.0 1468.3 I 2131.1 I 
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* . 
QUESTIONAIRE ON VIEWS ON PRESENT EXPERIENCES IN SANDF 
VRAEL YS OOR HUIDIGE ERV ARIN GS IN DIE SANW 
NATURE/AARD 
• The aim of the questionnaire is to obtain your views on aspects of your experience as officer. 
D-1 
APPENDIX D 
• Your name must not appear anywhere on the questionnaire. In other words, you remain a11011ymo11s as 
far as possible. Your individual responses will be treated as confidential. 
• Mark the items you select with an X. 
• Die doe/ van die vraelys is om u sienings te bekom oor aspekte van u ervaring as offisier. 
• U naam moet nerens op die vraelys verskyn nie. Met antler woorde, u bly a11oniem so ver as moontlik. 
U indiwiduele antwoorde sal as vertroulik hanteer word. 
• Merk die items wat u kies met 'n X. 
PERSONAL DAT A I PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE 
1. Arm of Service I Weermagsdeel 
Army I Leer Air.Force I Lugmag 
2. Mustering I Indeling I Korps 
3. Rank I Rang 
Lt 
S Lt I Lt 
Capt I Kapt 
Lt (SAN) 
4. Course I Kursus 
Maj 
Lt Cdr 
5. Racial group : How would I describe myself? 
Rassegroep: Hoe sat ek myselfbeskryf? 
African, Black 
Afrikaan, Swart 
Coloured 
Kleurling 
Navy I Vloot 
Lt Col I Lt kol 
Cdr I Kdr 
Indian, Asian 
Indier, Asier 
6. Home Language : Which language do I speak most often at home? 
Huistaal : Watter taal praat ek meestal by die huis? 
7. Marital State I Huwelikstatus 
Col 
Kol 
SAMS/SAGD 
Brig 
Cdre I Kdoor 
White 
Blank 
Unmarried I Ongetroud Married I Getroud 
8. Highest Academic Qualification I Hoogste Akademiese Kwalifikasie 
St 10 Diploma B Honn M D 
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QUESTIONS I VRAE 
Please indicate whether you agree [1] or disagree [2] with each of the following statements 
related to your present experiences of the SANDF. 
Dui asseblief aan of u saamstem [1] of nie saamstem nie [2] met elkeen van die volgende 
stellings oor u huidige ervarings van die SANW. 
I. · As long as it does not hann discipline an intlepentlent represe11tative 11ssoci11tio11 (not a trade 
union) would be a good idea. 
Indien dit nie dissipline sal benadeel nie, is 'n onaflwnklike verteemvoortligentle vereniging 
(nie 'n vakbond nie) 'n goeie idee. 
2. The SANDF needs more effective employee structures (even perhaps a military trade union) 
to protect the interests of uniform members. 
Die SANW het meer effektiewe werknemerstrukture nodig (miskien selfs 'n militere 
vakbond) om die belange van unifonnlede te beskenn. 
3. Women should be allowed to do combat duty in the front line. 
Vrouens behoort toegelaat te word om vegdiens in die frontlinie te verrig. 
4. The SANDF is more legitimate (trusted by the broader population) than a few years ago. 
Die SANW is meer legitiem (vertrou deur die breer bevolking) as 'n paar jaar gelede. 
5. South African society views military service as less important than a few years ago. 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing beskou mi/itere tliens as minder belangrik as 'n paar jaar 
gelede. 
6. Because of the present absence of an external threat, South African society must not 
emphasise military issues. 
Weens die huidige afwesigheid van 'n eksteme bedreiging, moet die Suid-Afrikaanse 
samelewing nie militere kwessies beklemtoon nie. 
7 Operationally the South African armed forces were more competent a few years ago than 
today. 
Operasionee/ was die Suid-Afrikaanse gewapende magte meer bekwaam 'n paar jaar gelede. 
[I] [2] 
[I] [2] 
[I] [2] 
[I] [2] 
[1] [2] 
[I] [2] 
[I] [2] 
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VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
E-1 
APPENDIX E 
SANJI / SANDF 
BEVOECDHEIDSBEOOBDELINC / EFFICIENCY ASSESSHENT 
I 
Vrn/L1n/See tot Maj/Lt ldr · Pte/A1n/Sea to Maj/Lt Cdr 
VERSLAGJAAR / ASSESSNENT YEAR 
II 1 Jal 95 tot 30 Jun 96 1 Jul 95 to 30 Jun 96 II 
PERSOONLIIE EN DIENSBESONDERHEDE / PERSONAL AND SERVICE PARTICULARS 
Van I Surnaae 
Voorletters I Initials 
Geboorte Datu1 I Date of Birth 
Hagsno11er I Force Ru1ber 
Io11onikasietaal I Co11unication Language 
Beroepsklas I Occupational Class 
Kilitere Rang en Datu1 I Military Rank and Date ••••• / •••••• / •••• t 
Aanstelling (Posnaa1) I Appoint1ent (Post Ma1e) 
lorps (Indeling) I Corps (Mustering) 
BEOORDELAAR SE BESONDERHEDE / RATER'S PARTICULARS 
Van I Surnue !I 
Voorletters I Initials 
Rang I Rank 
Kagsno11er I Force Mu1ber 
Handtekening I Signature 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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F-2 VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
BEOORDELINGSBLAD / ASSESSMENT SHEET 
PONTE VIR TOKKKHHIMG I MARKS FOR ALLOCATION 
I = Onaanvaarbaar I Unacceptable 
2 = Svak I Veak 
4 = Aanvaarbaar I Acceptable 
5 = Bevredigend I Satisfactory 
6 = Goed I Good 
7 = Boge1iddeld I Above Average 
8 = Uitstekend I Excellent 
3 = Onderge1iddeld I Below Average 9 = Uitstaande I Outstanding 
KOLOKKE I COLUMNS 
A - Beoordelaar I Rater 
B - Eenheidsko1itee I Unit Co1aittee 
FAKTOR 1: BESTUURSVERKOe / FACTOR 1: MANAGERIAL ABILITY 
Reeks Ele1ent A B 
Serial 
1 Beheer oor die vloei van verk 
Control of the flov of vork 
2 Gehalte van ondergeskiktes se verk 
Standard of subordinates' vork 
3 Ver1oe 01 verksprioriteite te bepaal 
Ability in deter1ining job priorities 
4 Ver1oe 01 doelstellings/doelvitte te bepaal 
Ability in deter1ining objectives/goals 
5 Handhaving van standaarde 
Upholding of standards 
6 Voorsiening vir proble1e vat 1ag opduik 
Providing against difficulties that 1ay occur 
7 Veraoe 01 tydige besluite te nee1 
Ability to take ti1eous decisions 
8 Selfvertroue 
Self-confidence 
9 Oordeelsver1oe 
Judge1ent 
10 Bantering van noodopdragte 
Handling of eaergency assign1ents 
I Subtotaal Kolo1 B I Sub-total Colu1n B I 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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E-3 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
FAKT02 2: WERISVEIU!Oe I FACTOR 2: JOB ABILITY 
Reeks Kle1ent A B 
Serial 
I Bereidvilligheid 01 op eie inisiatief voort te gaan 
Willingness to proceed at ovn inisiative 
2 Hako1ing van t7dskedules 
. Co1pliance vith t~1e tables 
3 Gehalte van verk 
Standard of vork 
4 Bereidvilligheid 01 verantvoordelikheid te aanvaar 
Willingness to accept responsibility 
5 Bydrae tot die verbetering van verks1etodes 
Contribution to iaprove vork 1ethods 
6 Deursett{ngsver~oe tydens lang en 1oeilike take 
Perserverence in long and difficult tasks 
7 Ver1oe 01 verskeie take baas te raak 
Ability to cope vith various assign1ents 
8 Yver 01 take te ondernee1 
Eagerness to undertake assign1ents 
9 Ver1oe 01 van een taak na die volgende 01 te svaai 
AbilitJ to switch fro1 one task to another 
10 lennis van die detail van hudige verk 
Inovledge of the detail of present vork 
~ Subtotaal (0101 B I Sub-total Colu1n 8 II 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
FAKTOR 3: AANPASSINGSVERHOe / FACTOR 3: ADAPTABILITY 
Reeh Ele1ent A B 
Serial 
1 Reaksie op voorstelle en kritiek 
Reaction to suggestions and criticis1 
2 Sneverking 
Co-operation 
3 Hof likheid en takt 
Tactfulness and courtesy 
4 Ver1oe 01 by nuve 1etodes/prosedures aan te pas 
Ability to adapt to nev 1ethods/procedures 
5 Beheer oor hu1eur onder nor1ale 01standighede 
Control of te1per under n~raal circuastances 
6 Handhaving van dissipline 
Maintenance of discipline 
1 Gesindheid teenoor die SAHi 
Disposition towards the SANDF 
8 Bereidvilligheid 01 1et onaangena1e take te help 
Willingness to share in unpleasant tasks 
9 Selfbeheersing onder 1oeilike 01standighed~ 
Self-control under difficult circu1stances 
10 Houding, netheid en algeaene gedrag 
Attitude, neatness and general behaviour 
I Subtotaal Kolo1 B I Sub-total Coluan B I 
KOHHENTAAR DEUR DIK BEOORDELAAR / COHHENTS BY THE RATER 
Beoordeling breedvoerig 1et lid bespreek I nie bespreek. Assessaent discussed in detail vith aenber I not 
discussed. 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
ERKENNf NG DEUR Lf D / ACKNO~LEDGEXENT BY XEXBER 
Ek nee1 kennis en aanvaar I aanvaar nie die.beoordeling. 
I take cognisance and accept I do not accept the assess1ent. 
DANDTElENING/SIGNATURE DATUH/DATE 
KOKXENTAAR DEUR DfR BEOORDEELDR LID / COKKENTS BY THE ASSRS5RD KRXBER 
EENBEfDSKOKffEE / UNff COXXITTEE 
Lede I He1bers Voorletters en Van I Rang I Rank Bandtekening I Signature 
Initials and Surna1e 
Voorsi tter I 
Chairperson 
Sekretaris/Secretary 
Lede I He1bers 
1. 
z. 
BLOl 1 I BLOCl I 
Potensiaal I Potential: A I B I c I D I E 
Opleiding I Training: U I l I 0 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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E-6 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
(Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
KONKENTAAR DEUR DIE EENHKIDSKOHITEK / COHKKNTS BY THE UNIT COHKITTEE 
OPNERKINGS DEUR BEVELVOERDER/DIREKTEUR / REHARKS BY OFFICER COKKANDING/DIRECTOR 
Die bcoordcling is bctroubaar I nic betroubaar nic. 
The assessaent is reliable I not reliable. 
Ko11entaar I Co11ents: 
HANDTElENING/SIGNATORK DATOll/DATK 
KAGSNOllHKR/FORCK HUllBKR RANG/RANl 
BLOK 2 / BLOCK 2 
Toeko1stige aanvending (Slegs Haj/Lt ldr) I Future utilization (Only Haj/Lt Cdr): N I S I P 
Potensiaal / Potential: A I B I C I D I K 
Onderskryving I Conf ir1ation: Ja I Hee Yes I No 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
{Wanneer ingevul/When completed) 
FINALE BERElENING I FINAL CALCULATION 
Faktor Subtota.al 
Factor 10101 B I 
Sub-total 
Coluan B 
1 
2 
3 
Totaal 
Total 
BERElENING / CALCULATION 
{Totaal I Total) (Aantal ele1ente beoordeel I 
Nuaber of eleaents assessed) 
= 
Ge1iddelde Punt I 
Average Hark 
KOXKENTAAR DEUR FUNKSIONELE DIREKTEOR BY VEERllAGSDEELHOOFlVARTIRR 
COMMENTS BY FUNCTIONAL DIRECTOR AT ARM OF THE SERVICE HEADQUARTER 
Toeko1stige aanvending {Slegs Maj/Lt Kdr! I Future utiliiation (Only Maj/Lt Cdr): N I S I P 
lo11entaar I Co11ents: 
BANDTEKENING / SIGNATURE DATUM I DATE 
Aanstelling I Appoint1ent: 
VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL 
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APPENDIX G 
TO CSP/DPU/R/105/2 
MANUAL: COMPLETION OF THE SANDF EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FORM: PTE/AMN/SEA TO 
MAJ/LT CDR 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This manual is divided into steps. 
2. Efficiency assessment must be done annually, before 31 July, for the 
assessment year 1 Jul to 30 Jun. 
3. The assessment form must be completed with a black ball point pen 
throughout. 
PROCESS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE ASSESSMENT FORM 
STEP I: PERSONAL AND SERVICE PARTICULARS 
4. The personnel office completes the personal and service particulars of the 
member to be assessed on page 1 of the assessment form. 
5. The member to be assessed must ensure that the information, as completed 
on page 1, is correct. 
STEP II: PARTICULARS OF THE RATER 
6. The rater must complete his/her personal particulars on page 1 of the 
assessment form. 
7. The rater must preferably be an Officer or Warrant Officer but, in any 
case, no lower than Sgt/PO. The rater must stand in a supervisory relationship 
towards the assessed member in the functional line. This applies also to 
civilian raters. 
STEP III: ASSESSMENT 
8. The rater gives his/her assessment in column A on pages 2, 3 and 4, and adds 
comments on page 4. 
STEP IV: ASSESSED MEMBER TAKES COGNISANCE OF THE ASSESSMENT 
9. The assessed member will now take cognisance of the assessment, and will 
indicate on page 5 acceptance/not acceptance thereof. 
~O. If the assessed member does not accept the assessment, he/she must state 
RESTRICTED 
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RESTRICTED 
reasons therefore on page 5. 
11. The assessed member must be allowed reasonable time to study the assessment· 
results, discuss it with his/her supervisor and if necessary with the unit com-
mittee. 
STEP V: UNIT COMMITTEE 
12. The particulars of the unit committee must be completed on page 5 of the 
assessment form, and the committee shall be composed as follows: 
a. A chairperson, who must be the officer commanding or his represen-
tative. 
b. · Two members, of which the first member must be the rater and the 
second member must be in the same corps/mustering and have at least 
the same rank as the assessed member. 
c. A secretary. (Any rotation of secretary during a series of assess-
ments must.preferably be avoided.) 
13. The unit committee gives its assessment in column B on pages 2, 3 and 4, 
completes block 1 on page 5 and adds comments on page 6. 
14. The unit committe must the calculate the final percentage on page 7. 
STEP VI: OFFICER COMMANDING/DIRECTOR 
15. The officer Commanding/Director of the assessed member concerned will 
indicate on page 6 if the assessment is reliable, adds his/her comments and 
completes block 2. 
GENERAL 
16. Members Recently Transferred. Where the unit committee is not in a po-
sition to authoritatively assess a member who was recently transferred, the 
member's previous supervisor must be involved. 
17. Elements in Block 1 and 2. Symbols under training, future employment, 
potential and confirmation in block 1 and 2, are explained as follows: 
a. Training: 
i. U = Training can be managed by the unit. 
ii. K = The member should attend a formal course. 
RESTRICTED 
E-9 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
RESTRICTED 
iii. 0 = Further training would be fruitless. 
b. Future Employment: 
i. N = Not to be employed in a staff post. 
ii. S = To be employed in a staff post only. 
iii. P = Can be employed in any post. 
c. Potential: 
i. A= Warrants accelerated promotion. (Should be allocated only 
in the exceptional case of a member whose performance is so 
outstanding that it warrants promotion to the next higher 
rank, even if the member does not fully comply with the 
promotion requirements. ) 
ii. B = Warrants normal promotion: 
iii. C = Does not yet warrant promotion. (Should be allocated to 
members who will not yet be able to meet the demands of the 
next higher rank but have the potential to do so if given 
guidance and experience.) 
iv. D = Does not warrant any further promotion. 
v. E = Does not merit present rank. (Remedial action is called 
for whether in the form of training or transfer to a more 
suitable post or, at need, dismissal.) 
d. Confirmation: 
i. Yes = I confirm the assessment. 
ii. No = I do not agree with the assessment. 
RESTRICTED 
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